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THIS BOOK looks at the legacy of the 1998–99Kosovo crisis for European security affairs. Itexamines the debates about the nature and
justification of intervention in the affairs of
sovereign states. It also considers the impact of the
crisis on NATO and on relations between western
states and Russia both during and since Kosovo.
Well-known ‘facts’ are critically assessed and
challenged. The authors argue, for example, that
the NATO attacks on Serbia were not a ‘war’, nor
did the crisis directly lead to moves to endow the
European Union with its own military dimension.
The authors also look at key issues and debates
that have, so far, often been neglected. They
consider the difficulties of entrenching ‘western’
norms and values in areas where ethnic
conceptions of national identity are dominant.
They also place the Kosovo crisis in the context of
the long-term evolution of a transatlantic
‘community of values’ between Europe and North
America.
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Preface
The origins of this book are rooted during Operation Allied Force in
1999. Even as that conflict raged, the two authors debated the issues
and decided that a book was necessary in order to examine a number
of the fascinating and important questions spawned by the Kosovo
crisis. After considerable deliberation, the present structure was
adopted for considering the crisis within the continuum of develop-
ments in post-Cold War European security. 
The book has been greatly assisted by the inputs of a number of
people who deserve special mention and our thanks. Dr Christopher
Donnelly, the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of NATO,
kindly arranged a series of very valuable interviews with NATO offi-
cials. These greatly illuminated a number of issues examined here.
Similarly, Mrs Anne Aldis and other members of the Conflict Studies
Research Centre at Camberley assisted the authors in the preparation
of our material. An expression of well-deserved appreciation is neces-
sary to Andrew Orgill and his team at the Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst library. They were very helpful in addressing our biblio-
graphic requests and pointing us in the direction of books, articles and
other material useful for coming to grips with the complicated issues
raised by the Kosovo crisis. Finally, family and friends gave considerable
encouragement and support and they receive our heartfelt thanks –
particularly Dorina Latawska who patiently endured much ‘shop talk’
from the authors during the gestation of this book!  
The final task to be performed here is to note that the analysis,
opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this book are those
of the authors alone. They do not necessarily represent the views of the
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the UK Ministry of Defence or any
other government agency.
Paul Latawski, Martin A. Smith
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Introduction
The structure and purpose of this book
This volume does not seek to offer a detailed account of the back-
ground to and course of the Kosovo crisis, which reached its peak of
intensity in 1998–99. A number of highly competent such studies have
already been published.1 Nor are the discussions that follow framed
principally as a ‘lessons learned’ analysis. The main objective here,
rather, is to examine and assess the impact of the Kosovo crisis on the
continuing evolution and development of key issues relating to post-
Cold War European security overall.
In measuring this impact the discussions begin, logically, with the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This was the chosen
instrument through which its member states sought to achieve their
objective of compelling the government of President Slobodan
Milosevic in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to cease and
desist from what the former considered to be unacceptable activities in
Kosovo province. Further, the FRY was also compelled effectively to
cede authority over Kosovo to an international protectorate. NATO
thus sits at the nexus of a number of important debates. Perhaps the
most controversial concern the nature of its intervention and the
circumstances in which such interventions in international affairs may
be considered justifiable and legitimate. Reflecting their importance in
most assessments of the Kosovo crisis, these issues are examined here
in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 2 considers structural issues and looks at the impact of the
conduct of Operation Allied Force – the NATO bombing campaign of
March–June 1999 – on both the internal workings of NATO and the
expansion of its geographical areas of interest and remit within Europe.
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This is followed, in Chapter 3, by an assessment of the premises,
assumptions and ultimate prospects for success of western-led
attempts, through NATO and other international institutions, to bring
about social, political and economic reconstruction in South East
Europe.2 Such efforts are being undertaken on the basis of trying to
transplant western norms and values relating to, for example, liberal
democracy and an inclusive – or ‘civic’ – national identity.
Relations between NATO and its members, on the one hand, and
Russia on the other, represent arguably the single most important 
set of links in contemporary European security affairs. The Kosovo
crisis can be described as a watershed event in the development of
Russia–NATO relations in the period since Russia re-emerged as an
independent state in December 1991. Chapter 4 of this volume thus
offers a detailed account of the difficult, occasionally tortuous, but 
ultimately essential diplomatic co-operation between the Russians 
and NATO members which accompanied the ongoing air campaign 
in the spring and early summer of 1999. The impact of the crisis, 
and of this co-operation, on the relationship since that time is also
considered here.
One of the favourite ‘lessons of Kosovo’ drawn by commentators
and observers since 1999 has been to do with the extent to which
Operation Allied Force painted up a military ‘capabilities cap’ between
the European members of NATO and the United States. As a direct
result of this, it is often argued, the member states of the European
Union (EU) resolved to develop an autonomous collective military
capability in order to enable them hopefully to avoid such an embar-
rassing degree of operational dependence on the US in Europe in the
future. The discussions in Chapter 5 argue that the impact of the
Kosovo crisis in this area has, in reality, been relatively marginal and
certainly less significant than the view sketched out above suggests. To
be sure, the intra-EU debates on the issue did get going at the same
time as Kosovo was reaching crisis point. However, the prime movers
in these debates – France and the United Kingdom – were motivated
principally by other concerns.
The discussions in Chapter 6, finally, are concerned with the issue
of why NATO and its members took such an interest in Kosovo when
they appeared to have few if any conventional strategic or economic
interests tied up there. The answer, it is suggested here, lies in consid-
ering the enduring importance of the post-Second World War ‘Atlantic
Community’ that has developed amongst the NATO members, and
the de facto extension of its boundaries since the end of the Cold War.
2 THE KOSOVO CRISIS
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Serb activities in Kosovo, it is argued, represented not a territorial
threat to NATO but rather a challenge to the core values for which it
claimed to stand. A response was thus deemed essential in order not
only to defeat this challenge but, in doing so, to uphold the credibility
of the institution itself.
Before embarking on these discussions, a brief recap on the back-
ground to and the course of the crisis in Kosovo may be useful. As 
indicated above, it is not our intention to describe or assess them in
detail; that task has been ably accomplished elsewhere. The objective
here is to provide a sufficient degree of background information in one
convenient place at the outset so as to spare both authors and readers
the necessity of having to digress in the main chapters with background
material.
Kosovo and the crisis
Kosovo was, for a long time, at the margins of European affairs. The
problems relating to it that leapt onto the front pages in 1998–99
were, for many, a ‘quarrel in a far-away country between people of
whom we know nothing’ to quote the now infamous words of British
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in 1938.3 The crisis in Kosovo
may have been, amongst other things, an indictment of the western
public’s knowledge and understanding of South East Europe’s history,
politics and geography, but it was far from being a peripheral matter in
the evolution of post-Cold War European security. As Roland
Dannreuther has observed, the importance of the Kosovo crisis has
been that it has acted as a ‘prism through which some of the most
contentious and unresolved questions of contemporary international
politics have been debated’.4
The historical background
It is safe to say that Kosovo is a land that has not been greatly
frequented in the past by outside travellers, or in more recent times 
by tourists on package holidays. Its inaccessibility, however, is less due
to challenging topographical features than a political geography char-
acterised by disorder and violence that has made this corner of South
East Europe, in periods of its history, a place best avoided. As Ger
Duijzings has observed, ‘Kosovo is an example of a poor, peripheral
INTRODUCTION 3
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and conflict-ridden society, where the central authority of the state has
been nominal for much of its modern history’.5
The physical geography of Kosovo is easy to understand. The
mountains ringing Kosovo make it a natural geographical unit. On its
southern rim are the S˘ar mountains – the highest range – bordering
Albania. On the western side are the Prokletije (Accursed) mountains,
so called because of the difficulty in crossing them. On Kosovo’s
eastern side stand the Skopska Crna Gora and, in the northern reaches,
the Kopaonik mountains form the border with Serbia proper. The 
interior of Kosovo is a kind of high plain divided into two roughly
equal parts by a range of hills running from east to west. The rivers 
in Kosovo either flow north or south from this line of hills. The largest
city and administrative capital is Pristina in the northern part of 
the territory.6
As a political unit, Kosovo formed part of the medieval Serb
Kingdom. By the second half of the fifteenth century, it had become
part of the Ottoman Empire’s conquests in the region. It remained in
the Ottoman Empire until the First and Second Balkan Wars of 1912
and 1913, when it became, once again, a province of Serbia. Apart
from the period of the Second World War, Kosovo remained in Serbia’s
‘successor’, Communist Yugoslavia.7 Whether as part of the Ottoman
Empire, Serbia or Yugoslavia, Kosovo was one of the poorer regions of
those states. Apart from some mineral wealth, agriculture was the
mainstay of economic activity.8
Ethnic composition of Kosovo
From the nineteenth century onwards, the competing national move-
ments of the Albanian and Serb inhabitants of the province increasingly
shaped the story of Kosovo. For each group, the province was associ-
ated with historical events seen as central to the development of 
their national identities. The Serbs have historically seen Kosovo as 
the cradle of their medieval Serb Kingdom; a land of monasteries,
castles and the resting place of great kings. In terms of Serb national
mythologies, there is no more important event than the Battle of
Kosovo (Kosovo Polje), fought between the Serb Kingdom and the
Ottomans in 1389. Less a defeat than a draw, Kosovo Polje, however,
marked the beginning of the end of medieval Serbia. The legends and
myths associated with Prince Lazar, the Serb leader at Kosovo Polje,
provided an important link between the medieval kingdom and the
4 THE KOSOVO CRISIS
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emergence of a modern Serb national consciousness from the nine-
teenth century onwards.9 Regardless of its ethnographic composition
(discussed below), Kosovo was regarded as a key part of the Serb
national patrimony.
For the Albanians, Kosovo also occupies an important place in the
development of Albanian nationalism. In one of its southern cities,
Prizren, the development of the Albanian national identity received a
powerful boost. In Prizren, during one of the innumerable crises of
South East Europe that involved the European great powers, the
Albanians formed a political organisation called the ‘League of Prizren’
in 1878 to support the Ottoman Empire’s control of the Albanian
inhabited parts of the region. One of the leading figures in the League
was Abdul Frasheri, who inspired united political action amongst the
Albanians of the Ottoman Empire. The aim of the League was to try
to prevent the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by the great
powers; particularly the Albanian inhabited territories of South East
Europe. Although supporting the Ottoman government, the League
of Prizren would eventually be suppressed by Ottoman forces because
of its nationalist tendencies. The League, however, marked an impor-
tant moment in the awakening of an Albanian national identity.10
With Kosovo thus important to both the Serb and Albanian
national identity, it was almost certain to be a contested piece of 
territory. In nationalist conflicts of this kind, demography plays an
important role in formulating claim and counter-claim. The ethno-
graphic composition of Kosovo and its evolution since the nineteenth
century, form an important backdrop to the contemporary conflicts
between Albanian and Serb for control of it. By the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century, the population of Kosovo had an Albanian
majority, with the Serbs as a sizeable minority.11 Although statistical 
data must be treated with some caution in these situations, it is clear
that, even allowing for political distortion, the Serb community was
diminishing in terms of its overall numbers. After Kosovo became part
of Serbia in the twentieth century, colonisation programmes did little
to arrest the trend of a growing Albanian majority. During the period
of Communist Yugoslavia, the Albanian majority continued to grow as
illustrated in Table Intro.1.
On the eve of the 1999 conflict, the Serb minority was estimated
as forming about 10 per cent of the population. In the wake of the
Serb exodus following the June 1999 withdrawal of FRY military and
police forces, the number of Serbs living in Kosovo may have been cut
by as much as three-quarters of its pre-conflict total.12
INTRODUCTION 5
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Kosovo 1989–99: conflict, diplomacy and conflict
The proximate background to the Kosovo conflict of March–June
1999 was the mounting Albanian–Serb tension and violence of the
previous decade. The Albanians, who had enjoyed a measure of 
autonomy in Communist Yugoslavia; controlling such things as local
administration and education, saw this swept away from the late 1980s.
This happened in the face of resurgent Serb nationalism and, more
particularly, the policies of President Milosevic who exploited it to
strengthen his political position in Serbia. The Albanian response was
initially non-violent. A semi-clandestine parallel society and political
life developed in Kosovo despite intermittent pressure from the Serb
authorities. 
By the late 1990s, however, non-violent protest began to give way
to armed Albanian resistance to what was seen as Serb oppression. This
manifested itself in the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) which, by the late 1990s, was gaining support within Kosovo
and international attention, even if its military achievements against the
FRY security forces were modest.13 As the dispute became violent, it
led increasingly to deaths, displacement of Albanians and destruction
of property. 
Although some outside observers had become concerned about
the growing tensions in Kosovo, the initially relatively low level of
violence, as compared with that seen in Bosnia in the first half of the
1990s, meant that these did not register high up on the agendas of
European security organisations such as NATO. In 1998, however, as
fighting intensified between FRY security forces and the KLA, Kosovo
did move up the political agenda of a NATO determined to stop 
the crisis escalating to a level of violence seen earlier in Croatia and,
especially, Bosnia. 
6 THE KOSOVO CRISIS
Table Intro.1—Ethnic composition of Kosovo, the censuses of 1961, 1971 
and 1981 (%)
1961 1971 1981
Albanians 67.1 73.7 77.5
Serbs 23.5 18.3 13.2
Source: M. Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (London, Hurst and
Co., 1998), p. 318.
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By autumn 1998, the violence in Kosovo had resulted in a situa-
tion where an estimated 250,000 Kosovar Albanians had been ousted
from their homes; roughly one fifth of their number lacking proper
shelter. In the context of this situation, the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1199 in September 1998, calling
for a cease-fire, withdrawal of most FRY security forces and talks
between the parties in conflict. It also issued a warning about a
looming ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ resulting from the fighting.14 In
an effort to increase pressure on the Milosevic government in
Belgrade, NATO threatened airstrikes in order to induce his compli-
ance with the terms of the UN Resolution. 
A combination of diplomacy and this military pressure persuaded
the FRY President to agree to comply in October. An agreement 
with Milosevic was brokered by US Assistant Secretary of State,
Richard Holbrooke. He was the man widely credited with successfully
bringing about the negotiation of the Dayton agreement, which had
ended the Bosnian civil war three years previously. FRY compliance
with the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement was to be verified by the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This
was the only outside monitoring agency that Milosevic was prepared to
accept in Kosovo. The OSCE created an unarmed, civilian ‘Kosovo
Verification Mission’ (KVM), which began operating in November
1998. A small, French-led NATO military ‘Extraction Force’ was
deployed to neighbouring Macedonia in case the KVM required 
emergency evacuation. 
By the beginning of 1999, the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement
was beginning to unravel. The FRY authorities began to move forces
back into Kosovo claiming, not entirely unreasonably, that their efforts
to comply with the UN Resolution had done little but give the KLA 
a breathing space in which to regroup and occupy positions formerly
held by FRY forces. On the Albanian side, allegations were made of
fresh killings and atrocities being committed by the FRY forces.
In the face of this deterioration, a final diplomatic effort began 
in January 1999 when the parties in conflict were summoned to
Rambouillet outside Paris. These high-level negotiations sought a
general settlement in the manner of the Dayton process for Bosnia.
The ‘Contact Group’, consisting of France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States,
aimed for a settlement that NATO was prepared to underwrite with 
a major peace support force in Kosovo. The proposals at Rambouillet
offered substantial autonomy for the Kosovar Albanians and held 
INTRODUCTION 7
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out the eventual prospect of a referendum that might lead to inde-
pendence. The Kosovar Albanians, with some reservations, eventually
accepted the formula, but the FRY delegation walked away from the
draft proposals.15 The FRY’s refusal to sign, and the deteriorating 
situation inside Kosovo, led to the withdrawal of the KVM in 
March and, within a week, NATO’s decision to finally use coercive
airpower. 
Operation Allied Force, March–June 1999
When NATO launched Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999, its
members and planners expected air operations to be successfully
concluded within a few days. In the event, NATO’s military effort
lasted for over two months. In this exercise in military coercion, the
United States publicly ruled out, at the start, the idea of committing
forces to a land invasion of Kosovo. When the FRY refused to be
cowed by the air onslaught, this thus called into question NATO’s
strategy of what some had called ‘immaculate coercion’.16
As in most modern armed conflicts, the media was an important
factor, with the protagonists fighting a second battle across the
airwaves.17 NATO’s well-publicised targeting mistakes, such as the
accidental bombing of Albanian refugees and the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade,18 illustrated the importance of effective media management
in modern conflict and the consequences when this proved difficult or
impossible. 
As the operation dragged on, NATO increased the numbers of
aircraft and widened the targeting list to strike at the heart of the FRY’s
infrastructure, government and media apparatus. By June 1999, it was
increasingly clear that NATO would use whatever level of force was
necessary for it to prevail. The use of ground forces was, at last, being
seriously considered. There was also mounting evidence that the air
attacks were causing serious damage and that unrest was beginning to
surface inside Serbia. By then also, NATO’s diplomatic pressure was
being actively supported by Russia. 
In early June, President Milosevic indicated his acceptance of the
international demands, compliance with which was necessary to end
the bombing.19 After brief negotiations with NATO, represented by
Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson, the FRY leadership agreed to
withdraw its security forces and accept a NATO-led peacekeeping force
and a UN international administration mission in Kosovo. These
8 THE KOSOVO CRISIS
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points were incorporated into Security Council Resolution 1244,
which was passed shortly thereafter. On the question of the future
status of Kosovo, the Resolution was deliberately ambiguous. Unlike
in the Rambouillet drafts, there was no clear signal that a referendum
on eventual independence would be organised.20 Kosovo’s future thus
remained uncertain.
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Chapter 1
NATO, Kosovo and 
‘humanitarian intervention’
NATO’s employment of military power against the government of
Slobodan Milosevic over Kosovo has been among the most controver-
sial aspects of the Alliance’s involvement in South East Europe since
the end of the Cold War. The air operations between March and June
1999 have been variously described as war, ‘humanitarian war’, ‘virtual
war’, intervention and ‘humanitarian intervention’ by the conflict’s
many commentators and critics. Key features of the debates over
NATO’s employment of military power have been concerned with its
legality and legitimacy (i.e. the role of the UN and international law),
its ethical basis and its impact on the doctrine of non-intervention 
in the domestic affairs of states. The conceptual debates that have
raged over these issues are important not only within the context 
of European security but more generally for their impact on the inter-
national system as a whole. This chapter examines these issues by
focusing on three broad questions. Why did NATO undertake military
action over Kosovo? What kind of armed conflict did it engage in? Can
such a resort to force be justified? 
‘Dirty Harry’ or ‘a knight in shining armour’? 
NATO’s decision to use military force over Kosovo
An implicit UN mandate?
NATO members first declared a willingness to use force over 
Kosovo in autumn 1998. The pivotal event at this time was the
Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, reached in October. Holbrooke had
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been explicitly dispatched to Belgrade by then American Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright to ‘underscore [to President Milosevic] the
clear requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1199 and to
emphasize the need for prompt and full compliance’.1 Further, his
mission to Belgrade was announced on the day after publication of a
report to the Security Council by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
dealing with the FRY’s lack of compliance with previous UNSC
Resolutions. In this report Annan ‘appealed to the international
community to undertake urgent steps in order to prevent a humani-
tarian disaster’ in Kosovo during the winter.2 The close proximity of
timing suggests that this call provided both a spur and justification for
the Holbrooke mission. The UN, via Resolution 1199, was, therefore,
centrally if indirectly involved in the framing of the terms of reference
for the Holbrooke mission, the accompanying NATO airstrike threat
and, later, NATO’s military action between March and June 1999. 
It can also be argued that the UN Secretary-General gave a de
facto green light to military action on a visit to NATO headquarters in
January 1999. In his public remarks before meeting the North Atlantic
Council, NATO’s top decision-making body, Annan said that ‘the
bloody wars of the last decade … have [not] left us with any illusions
about the need to use force, when all other means have failed. We may
be reaching that limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia’.3
According to Bruno Simma, he also told a press conference that
‘normally a UN Security Council Resolution is required’ [emphasis in
the original] to authorise military action by UN member states;
suggesting, perhaps, that one might not be with regard to Kosovo.4
Indeed, Tomás Valásek has claimed that NATO members purposely
‘sought and obtained an indirect endorsement’ of the right to use force
over Kosovo from Kofi Annan in January 1999, two months before
Operation Allied Force was launched.5
The launch of Operation Allied Force was, nevertheless, accompa-
nied by a major international controversy over the fact that NATO
members had not obtained, or sought, an explicit mandate in the form
of a UNSC Resolution. During the course of the operation, NATO
members spent a good deal of time and effort justifying it, usually
within a frame of reference to the UN.6 Reference was made to
NATO’s role in helping maintain the Dayton peace regime in Bosnia
(where it was operating under a UN mandate), that could be threat-
ened by uncontrolled violence in Kosovo. Further, it was asserted that
NATO had received the implicit authorisation of the Security Council
for military action on account of its support for the Holbrooke-
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Milosevic agreement, which had, as noted, been concluded with the
threat of airstrikes in the background. 
An especially commonly cited argument was that NATO was
acting ‘in the spirit’ of the UN Charter in attempting to compel the
Milosevic government to cease and desist its repressive activities in
Kosovo. The then NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, encapsu-
lated this argument at his first press conference after Operation Allied
Force got underway. He declared that ‘the NATO countries think that
this action is perfectly legitimate and it is within the logic of the UN
Security Council [sic] … we are engaged in this operation in order not
to wage war against anybody but to try to stop the war’.7 This line of
argument was bolstered by reference to key UNSC Resolutions. The
first UN Kosovo Resolution – 1160 – had been passed by the Security
Council in March 1998. It spoke of ‘the serious political and human
rights issues in Kosovo’.8 In September, Resolution 1199 used
stronger language. It spoke of the need to ‘avert the impending
humanitarian catastrophe’ in the province.9 In addition, as noted
above, the UN Secretary-General had called upon member states to
take action to prevent a ‘humanitarian disaster’ in Kosovo. Given the
inclusion of such phrases, there is some basis for the NATO claim to
have been acting in the spirit of the Resolutions and of the UN Charter
more generally.
The de facto blessing of the UN Secretary-General, although
welcome for NATO, had limited value. Kofi Annan’s views were, at
best, privately encouraging whilst he publicly upheld the principles of
the UN Charter. His public position with regard to Kosovo was
confirmed in the widely quoted remarks that he made to the press on
the day that Operation Allied Force was launched:
It is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when 
the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace. In helping
maintain international peace and security, Chapter 7 of the United
Nations Charter assigns an important role to regional organisations. But
as Secretary-General, I have many times pointed out, not just in relation
to Kosovo, that under the Charter, the Security Council has primary
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and this is
explicitly acknowledged in the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore, the
Council should be involved in any decision to resort to force.10
The UN Secretary-General could not, in any event, have bestowed
international legitimacy on Operation Allied Force even if he had been
so minded. He only has the right, under Article 99 of the UN Charter,
to ‘bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in
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his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and
security’. He cannot, however, give authorisation on behalf of the
Security Council or force its members to do so. 
The lack of explicit UN authorisation provoked serious opposition
to NATO’s military action, not least among two of the permanent
members of the Security Council; China and Russia. The Chinese
Ambassador to the UN, Qin Huasun, described NATO’s military
operations as a ‘blatant violation of the UN Charter, as well as the
accepted norms in international law’.11 He was categorical in express-
ing the view that ‘the Chinese Government strongly opposes such 
an act’. Russian condemnation was even more forthright. President
Boris Yeltsin called NATO’s operation ‘nothing other than an open
aggression’. It had, in the Russian government’s view, ‘created a
dangerous precedent’ that ‘threatened international law and order’.12
Forthright criticism was not only limited to those that predictably 
took a strong view on the sanctity of state sovereignty. The Rio Group
of Latin American states similarly expressed its ‘anxiety’ over the use 
of force in ‘contravention of the provisions of Article 53’ of the UN
Charter.13 Clearly therefore, important components of the interna-
tional community did not accept notions of an implicit mandate for
NATO’s action.
Humanitarian and strategic imperatives?
Apart from justifying its action within the context of previous 
UN decisions, NATO presented another set of arguments based on
humanitarian and regional stability considerations. In a press statement
on 23 March 1999, Solana outlined the reasons behind the decision to
begin airstrikes against Yugoslavia. He stated that NATO action
resulted from the fact that ‘all efforts to achieve a negotiated, political
solution to the Kosovo crisis having failed, no alternative is open but
to take military action’. He made clear that ‘NATO is not waging 
war against Yugoslavia’ but instead military action had been initiated
to ‘support the political aims of the international community’. In
supporting these aims, Solana emphasised that NATO’s action was
intended to ‘avert a humanitarian catastrophe’ and ‘prevent more
human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian
population of Kosovo’.
This was a point Solana stressed on three occasions in his state-
ment. He also indicated that NATO wanted to see the end of human
14 THE KOSOVO CRISIS
Lat 01  22/4/03  8:47 pm  Page 14
suffering embodied in a ‘political settlement’ with an ‘international
military presence’ to underwrite it. A further overarching aim of
NATO was to ‘prevent instability spreading in the region’.14
In another press release issued on 23 March, NATO echoed the
themes in Solana’s remarks. This additional statement, however, placed
more of an accent on the Alliance endeavouring to support the aims of
the international community to find a political solution: 
NATO’s overall political objectives remain to help achieve a peaceful 
solution to the crisis in Kosovo by contributing to the response of the
international community. More particularly, the Alliance made it clear in
its statement of 30th January 1999 that its strategy was to halt the violence
and support the completion of negotiations on an interim solution …
Alliance military action is intended to support its political aims. To do so,
NATO’s military action will be directed towards halting the violent
attacks being committed by the VJ [Yugoslav Army] and MUP [Interior
Ministry Forces] and disrupting their ability to conduct future attacks
against the population of Kosovo, thereby supporting international efforts
to secure FRY agreement to an interim political settlement.15
The most definitive statement of NATO’s initial war aims was issued as
air operations continued in early April 1999. In forthright terms,
NATO made clear that military action was driven by compelling
humanitarian reasons and in support of the political aims of the inter-
national community:
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has repeatedly violated United
Nations Security Council resolutions. The unrestrained assault by
Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces, under the direction of
President Milosevic, on Kosovar civilians has created a massive humani-
tarian catastrophe which also threatens to destabilise the surrounding
region. Hundreds of thousands of people have been expelled ruthlessly
from Kosovo by the FRY authorities. We condemn these appalling 
violations of human rights and the indiscriminate use of force by the
Yugoslav government. These extreme and criminally irresponsible 
policies, which cannot be defended on any grounds, have made necessary
and justify the military action by NATO … NATO’s military action
against the FRY supports the political aims of the international commu-
nity: a peaceful, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo in which all its
people can live in security and enjoy universal human rights and freedoms
on an equal basis.16
The major powers within the Alliance, in their individual public state-
ments, echoed the NATO line. President Bill Clinton, in a television
address on 24 March, maintained that military action came only ‘after
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extensive and repeated efforts to obtain a peaceful solution to the crisis
in Kosovo’. ‘Only firmness now’, Clinton declared, ‘can prevent
greater catastrophe later’.17 British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in a
statement to the House of Commons, said that, for the Kosovar
Albanians driven out of the province, ‘we have in our power the means
to help them secure justice and we have a duty to see that justice is now
done’.18 French President Jacques Chirac asserted that what was at
stake was ‘peace in Europe’ and ‘human rights’.19 German Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder argued that the ‘Alliance wants to stop serious,
systematic human rights violations and prevent a humanitarian catas-
trophe in Kosovo’.20
In providing a rationale for military action, NATO and its member
states made clear that exhaustion of all diplomatic avenues, urgent
humanitarian considerations and a desire to support the political aims
of the international community justified the decision to employ mili-
tary power. Furthermore, the desire to avoid a spillover of the conflict
into neighbouring states, with the consequential destabilisation of the
region, was an important consideration.21 Finally, there was an under-
lying sense that Serb actions in Kosovo represented an unacceptable
violation of the core norms and values embodied in the contemporary
‘Atlantic Community’. This latter dimension will be explored further
in Chapter 6.
Because NATO undertook military action without the explicit
authorisation of the UN Security Council, but with a number of
compelling humanitarian and strategic justifications, the basis of the
operation was bound to generate a great deal of controversy. The
controversies were not all political. Just as the action pushed the enve-
lope of international politics and legality, it also opened up important
military conceptual debates. 
Was Kosovo a ‘war’?
General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) – the highest ranking military officer in NATO and leader
of the Alliance’s military operations during the 1999 conflict – has
commented in his memoirs that ‘we were never allowed to call [this] a
war. But it was, of course’.22
Probing further into Clark’s memoirs gives a fuller picture of his
analysis of the nature of the conflict: 
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Operation Allied Force was modern war – limited, carefully constrained in
geography, scope, weaponry, and effects. Every measure of escalation was
excruciatingly weighed. Diplomatic intercourse with neutral countries,
with those opposed to NATO’s actions, and even with the actual adver-
sary continued during and around the conflict. Confidence-building
measures and other conflict prevention initiatives derived from the Cold
War were brought into play. The highest possible technology was in use,
but only in carefully restrained ways. There was extraordinary concern for
military losses, on all sides. Even accidental damage to civilian property
was carefully considered. And ‘victory’ was carefully defined.23
Such eminent academic figures as Professor Sir Adam Roberts have
echoed Clark’s view. Roberts has written that ‘NATO leaders were
reluctant to call their action “war”. However, it was war – albeit war of
a peculiarly asymmetric kind. It indisputably involved large-scale and
opposed use of force against a foreign state and its armed forces’.24 The
commentator Michael Ignatieff called the Kosovo conflict a ‘virtual
war’, one in which NATO ‘obtained its objectives without sacrificing 
a single Allied life’.25 Ignatieff went on to argue that Kosovo was a
‘paradigm of … [a] paradoxical form of warfare: where technological
omnipotence is vested in the hands of risk-averse political cultures’.26
Others called the conflict a ‘humanitarian war’.27 From Charles
Krauthammer’s point of view, ‘humanitarian war requires means that
are inherently inadequate to its ends’.28 Given this spectrum of
opinion, can NATO’s military action over Kosovo be accurately
termed a ‘war’ at all?
War has been defined as the ‘systematic application of organised
violence by one state to another to accomplish adjustments in political,
economic, cultural, or military relations’.29 The Penguin Dictionary of
International Relations defines war as ‘direct, somatic violence
between state actors’.30 These broad definitions, on first reflection,
seem to describe the armed conflict over Kosovo but they only really
scratch the surface of the concept of war. In Carl von Clausewitz’s
‘ideal’ type of ‘total’ or ‘absolute’ war, there is an enemy against whom
war is to be waged employing all available resources until the ‘terms of
victory’ can be dictated.31 Given NATO’s relatively limited aims (not
‘regime change’ in Belgrade, for example, but to compel Milosevic to
come to terms over Kosovo) and its self-imposed constraints on the use
of force, the Kosovo conflict did not match these classical criteria. 
General Clark’s analysis, however, does classify the armed conflict
over Kosovo as a ‘modern’ limited war. The idea of limited war is not
new. As Robert Osgood, one of the Cold War period’s principal
analysts of the idea noted, ‘the concept and practice of limited war are
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as old as war itself ’.32 During the Cold War, the idea of limited war was
the subject of considerable interest, particularly in the United States.33
Osgood, one of the major contributors to the discussion, defined it in
the following way:
A limited war is one in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for
which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not demand
the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that
can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement.34
Expanding on Osgood’s definition, these types of conflicts can be
limited geographically, are fought over limited objectives, use limited
means (weaponry) and have limitations regarding the targets that 
can be subjected to attack.35 A more contemporary analysis of the 
characteristics of limited war suggests that another limitation needs to
be added – to prevail with a minimum cost in lives. As one analyst 
has written: ‘casualties may soon represent a dominant, perhaps 
the dominant measurement of success or failure in wars of limited ends
and means such as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo’.36 In short,
limited war means ‘that either the ends or means or both, are limited
in the conflict’.37
It is recognised that one of the problems of waging a limited war
is that those asked to fight it are often inculcated with an absolutist
perspective of war that works against limitations on the use of force.38
Much analysis, moreover, narrowly places the accent on the nature 
of the military conduct of conflict rather than fully integrating its 
political dimension. Yet, as Clausewitz has long reminded us, ‘war is
the continuation of politics by other means’.39 This suggests that the
concept of limited war is of use in reference to the Kosovo conflict only
in the most generic sense of helping us to understand the limitations
placed by politicians on the military conduct of operations, rather than
fully capturing the nature of the conflict itself.
A further constraint on seeing the Kosovo conflict as a limited 
war in classical terms is the strong contemporary association of the
concept with the Cold War. Although of long lineage, limited war
thinking today is very much rooted in the experience of the Cold 
War, particularly that of the 1950s and 1960s. Thinking regarding
limited war became linked to the need to avoid a total war that would
entail the large-scale employment of nuclear weapons by the two
superpowers. As a consequence of this, John Garnett has argued, 
‘only conflicts that contain the potentiality for becoming total can 
be described as limited’.40 This legacy of Cold War thinking on the
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limited war concept suggests that it is not applicable to the conflict
over Kosovo.
It seems clear that the Kosovo conflict is better described
metaphorically rather than conceptually as a ‘war’ or ‘limited war’.41 As
for constructions such as ‘humanitarian war’ or ‘virtual war’, they are
labels bereft of any real conceptual meaning. If, therefore, the Kosovo
conflict cannot be conceptually best understood as a form of war, how
can it be conceived? 
The intervention and non-intervention debates
The military operations conducted by NATO in 1999 have been
described as an ‘intervention’ by many commentators and govern-
ments. The idea of intervention is well-trodden ground in terms of the
international relations discourse. As a concept, however, it has spawned
a variety of permutations; from ‘collective’ to ‘humanitarian’ interven-
tion.42 Moreover, intervention is often viewed critically against the
backdrop of the doctrine of non-intervention in the affairs of states.
Richard Little represented this view well when he wrote that ‘in the
international arena intervention is generally seen to be a violation of
sovereignty, and a threat to world order’.43 Others, however, see inter-
vention as a ‘ubiquitous feature’ of the international system. Hedley
Bull has argued that ‘no serious student can fail to feel that interven-
tion is sometimes justifiable’ and that there are ‘exceptions to the rule
of non-intervention’.44 Whichever of these views one may subscribe to,
it is clear that intervention in the affairs of another state raises a
number of questions regarding the ethics, legality and ultimately the
legitimacy of the intervention. The contested issues of intervention
and non-intervention are not new in terms of the international system.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, the debates have been rein-
vigorated, not least as a result of the Kosovo crisis and conflict. The
crisis, and NATO’s response, represents one of the key watersheds in
the post-Cold War debates on the question of intervention.
The doctrine of non-intervention
The doctrine of non-intervention in the affairs of sovereign states is a
well-understood facet of the international system. It is grounded in the
principle of sovereignty – what many consider to be the grundnorm of
NATO, KOSOVO AND ‘HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION’ 19
Lat 01  22/4/03  8:47 pm  Page 19
the state-centred international order. Sovereignty is the default setting
of the Westphalian state system that emerged after 1648. Simply
expressed, sovereignty means the independence of a territorially
defined state that also, within its boundaries, enjoys the right to order
its internal affairs as it sees fit.45 Following on from the central tenet of
a state’s right of domestic jurisdiction is the idea that a state should be
free from outside interference. This corollary forms the substance of
the doctrine of non-intervention.
This doctrine of non-intervention is well established in the fabric
of the international system. The UN Charter, in Article 2 paragraph 7,
famously reflects the degree to which non-intervention is ensconced 
as a guiding concept. It states that ‘Nothing in the present Charter
shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter’.46
The strength of support for the idea of non-interference is
undoubtedly very strong within the international community. Further
proof can be seen in two UN General Assembly Resolutions on the
‘Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States’,
passed in December 1965 and in an updated version in December
1981. The latter document declared that ‘No State or group of States
has the right to intervene or interfere in any form or for any reason
whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of other States’.47 The
1981 Resolution elaborated on the ‘rights and duties’ entailed under
the doctrine of non-intervention, categorically stating that it is: 
the duty of a State to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, 
military occupation or any other form of intervention and interference,
overt or covert, directed at another State or group of States, or any act of
military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of
another State, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force.48
Despite its status as a grundnorm, the integrity of the doctrine of 
non-intervention has never been unchallenged in application. The
underpinning concept of sovereignty, as Alan James has argued, has a
dual meaning. It encompasses an understanding of sovereignty both as
status and rights. James argues that ‘the link between sovereignty 
as status and sovereignty as rights is that, although the second sense 
of sovereignty is intimately associated with the first, it is not a concomi-
tant but a consequence of it. Sovereign rights attach to those entities
that enjoy sovereign status’.49
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In the age of the ‘failed state’, what constitutes ‘sovereign status’
is a question with important implications for the doctrine of non-
intervention. When a country ceases to have a functioning and effec-
tive central government, and contains an anarchical condition within
its borders, it is difficult to sustain the idea of the doctrine of 
non-intervention in either a de facto or de jure sense. As Fowler and
Bunck have argued, ‘it is ultimately the international community 
that determines whether a particular political entity qualifies as a 
sovereign state’.50 Moreover, the boundary line between sovereignty
and intervention is a shifting one conditioned by ‘what it means to be
a state at a particular place and time’.51
The idea that a universal norm of human rights applies to all 
individuals and transcends notions of sovereignty also has implications
regarding statehood. It suggests that the criteria of legitimate state-
hood include respect for human rights. When this is viewed against the
background of the development of international human rights norms,
it points to more perforations in the doctrine of non-intervention and
provides opportunity, if not intent, for intervention.52
Intervention
Defining intervention is a difficult business because of the number 
of forms it can take. As Thomas Otte has observed, ‘there is no 
precise and generally acknowledged concept of intervention’.53 The
multifaceted quality of intervention is often reflected in standard 
definitions. Indeed, one dictionary of international relations describes
it as ‘a portmanteau term which covers a wide variety of situations
where one actor intervenes in the affairs of another’.54 Hedley 
Bull has called it a ‘dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside 
or outside parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state’.55
This definition implies a range of modes of intervention that could
embrace political, economic or even normative ones through institu-
tions acting on behalf of the international community. It also suggests
that, in the light of the doctrine of non-intervention, it can be
perceived as a negative phenomenon. John Vincent has defined it in 
a similar manner to Bull, but attaches a more neutral proviso – that
intervention is ‘not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break 
a conventional pattern of international relations’.56 These broad 
definitions do not, by themselves, offer much precision or utility 
for considering NATO’s military action over Kosovo. What they do
highlight is the need to consider the ways and means of intervention.
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Interventions can be classified in a number of categories; such 
as the employment of political, economic or military power. In the
international system, military force continues to be ‘the most widely
available instrument’ for intervening in a country’s domestic affairs.57
According to Thomas Otte, ‘military intervention is the planned
limited use of force for a transitory period by a state (or group of
states) against a weaker state in order to change or maintain the target
state’s domestic structure or to change its external policies’.58
Contemplating military intervention, however, produces its own
admixture of challenging political and military decisions.59 Typically,
military intervention means embarking on a conflict where there is 
an asymmetry in military power. The intervener almost invariably
enjoys considerable military advantages over the target state. Such
supremacy, however, cannot be taken for granted as military inter-
ventions risk becoming protracted and leading to escalation.60 It is
more often than not the case that it is easier to become enmeshed in 
a military intervention than to find a viable exit strategy. Such risks
mean that the intervener must practice ‘selectivity’ before undertaking
military intervention.61
Otte’s definition of military intervention is certainly useful in char-
acterising NATO’s action over Kosovo. Nevertheless, as in the case of
the consideration of ideas of limited war discussed earlier, such a
conceptualisation does not adequately take into account the political
reasons for the military intervention. Stanley Hoffmann’s observation
that ‘the purpose of intervention is the same as that of all other forms
of foreign policy; it is to make you do what I want you to do, whether
or not you wish to do it’62 indicates the underlying generic purpose of
military intervention. It does not, however, adequately reveal why a
state or group of states launches a military intervention. In particular
it omits those crucial initial factors of political motivation or aims that
triggered military intervention in the first place and subsequently shape
its ethical qualities, legality and legitimacy. 
For that icon of the realist school of international relations, Hans
Morgenthau, the rationale for military intervention was clear: ‘all
nations will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene 
and their choice of intervention by what they regard as their respective
national interests’. According to Morgenthau, the doctrine of non-
intervention was something political leaders ‘never ceased to pay 
lip service to’. Moreover, he was dismissive of the prospect of inter-
national norms supplanting national interest when it came to justifying
a military intervention. ‘It is futile to search’, argued Morgenthau, ‘for
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an abstract principle which would allow us to distinguish in a concrete
case between legitimate and illegitimate intervention’.63
Others, such as Freeman, have taken a broader view; that other,
systemic, factors contribute to military intervention even if ultimately
national self-interest lies at the foundation of the decision to intervene: 
A state or society that descends into civil strife or anarchy is a cancer 
on the international body politic that endangers its neighbours and its
region. Segments of its population may destabilise neighboring states by
seeking refuge there. Its domestic violence may spill over its borders. Such
internal disorder is a threat to international order and the interests 
of other states. It invokes the logic of reason of system … Direct or 
indirect intervention by states in the internal proceedings of others is
never disinterested. States carry out such intervention as a matter of self-
interest, the interest of the international state system, or both. Of these
motives, the most compelling is self-interest.64
The idea that universal norms could provide legitimacy to military
intervention and override the doctrine of non-intervention moves the
intervention debate, in political terms, beyond the paradigm of
national interest guiding the intervener. Writing in 1984, Hedley Bull
envisaged circumstances where the norms of international society
could lead to intervention:
It is clear that the growing legal and moral recognition of human rights
on a world-wide scale, the expression in the normative area of the growing
interconnectedness of societies with one another, has as one of its 
consequences that many forms of involvement by one state or society in
the affairs of another, which at one time would have been regarded as 
illegitimate interference, will be treated as justifiable.65
It is on this question – whether or not military intervention can be
driven by norms such as human rights – that NATO’s military 
action over Kosovo has been most debated. It has been the most signif-
icant source of dispute amongst the conflict’s many interpreters. 
This type of intervention, a humanitarian one, is among the most
contentious as its claim to legitimacy can arguably supersede both
national sovereignty and the authority of the UN or any other 
legitimating international organisation. From the point of view of
contemporary European and international security, therefore, the
crucial issue is whether or not a right to humanitarian intervention
actually exists. 
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‘Humanitarian intervention’
James Mayall has observed that ‘the concept of humanitarian inter-
vention occupies an ambiguous place in the theory and practice of
international society’.66 Humanitarian intervention not only occupies
an ambiguous place but is also a concept steeped in controversy. Most
of the controversy centres on its ethics and legitimacy. In terms of
defining the concept, there is not yet a consensus on its meaning but
one factor seems to predominate, the issue of violation of human
rights. One of the most succinct definitions, in focusing on this raison
d’être of humanitarian intervention, is that of Sean Murphy, who has
defined it as being: 
The threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international
organisation primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the
target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized
human rights.67
Francis Abiew has defined humanitarian intervention in a way akin 
to that of Murphy: ‘humanitarian intervention, understood in the 
classical sense, involves forcible self-help by a state or group of states to
protect human rights’.68 Pressing this line of argument to its limits,
Mervyn Frost maintains that ‘humanitarian intervention must be
understood as directed at maintaining civil society – the global society
of rights holders which has no borders’.69
Not everyone, however, accepts the narrow rationale of just
protecting human rights. According to Oliver Ramsbotham, ‘humani-
tarian intervention means cross-border action by the international
community in response to human suffering’ more broadly.70 
Ramsbotham identifies various forms of humanitarian intervention
including ‘coercive’ and ‘non-coercive governmental humanitarian
intervention’ as well as ‘transnational, intergovernmental and non-
governmental humanitarian intervention’.71 Implicit in all of these 
are drivers of humanitarian intervention that go beyond upholding
human rights. 
These broader considerations are also sometimes evident where
the concept of humanitarian intervention has made its way into the
lexicon of policy-makers. For example, a Finnish security and defence
policy paper published in June 2001 defined humanitarian interven-
tion in a way that embraces a broader perspective:
Humanitarian intervention means military intervention by the interna-
tional community or some other actor in an internal or international
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conflict, if necessary without the consent of the country in question, in
order to save human lives, protect human rights and to ensure that
humanitarian aid reaches its target.72
The Finnish definition incorporates the related concept of 
‘military-civilian humanitarianism’. It suggests that the need to 
alleviate human suffering resulting from natural disaster, famine or
conflict provides still more reasons for humanitarian intervention than
simply thwarting human rights abuses.73 Overall, the heart of the
matter lies in how one defines ‘humanitarianism’ and how one
addresses the important paradox presented by lethal armed force being
applied in the name of saving life.74
The ethics of humanitarian intervention: 
the problem of criteria
Establishing a set of criteria to guide humanitarian intervention 
presents a difficult problem. Although analysts had long been willing
to provide criteria, politicians holding the reins of power and responsi-
bility had been more reticent, at least until the time of the NATO
intervention over Kosovo. In this context, it is worth exploring the
British example of an official and public discussion of criteria for
humanitarian intervention. 
The Kosovo crisis and the ongoing NATO air operations provided
the impetus and the spur for a key speech given by Tony Blair in
Chicago in April 1999. Here, he declared that ‘the most pressing
foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in 
which we should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts’. In
addressing this question, Blair suggested that there were ethical
considerations that took precedence over established norms of non-
intervention. In particular he argued that: 
The principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects.
Acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter. When oppression
produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle neighbouring coun-
tries, then they can properly be described as ‘threats to international peace
and security’.
Blair went on to outline a possible test, consisting of a series of ques-
tions, to determine the appropriateness of an intervention:
• First, are we sure of our case?
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• Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options?
• Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are
there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake?
• And finally, do we have national interests involved?75
The ‘Blair Doctrine’ was further elaborated nearly a year later by Robin
Cook, then Foreign Secretary. Cook raised what is the central question
concerning the ethics and criteria of humanitarian intervention – ‘how
can the international community avert crimes against humanity while
at the same time respecting the rule of international law and the sover-
eignty of nation states?’. Cook’s speech was clearly designed to
contribute to the debate regarding this question. In particular he
offered some ‘guidelines for intervention in response to massive viola-
tions of humanitarian law and crimes against humanity’. These were:
• First, any intervention, by definition, is an admission of failure of
prevention.
• Second, we should maintain the principle that armed force should
only be used as a last resort.
• Third, the immediate responsibility for halting violence rests with
the state in which it occurs.
• Fourth, when faced with an overwhelming humanitarian catas-
trophe, which a government has shown it is unwilling or unable to
prevent or is actively promoting, the international community
should intervene … It must be objectively clear that there is no
practicable alternative to the use of force to save lives.
• Fifth, any use of force should be proportionate to achieving the
humanitarian purpose and carried out in accordance with inter-
national law.
• Sixth, any use of force should be collective. No individual country
can reserve to itself the right to act on behalf of the international
community.76
Proving massive human rights violations or genocide to the point 
of initiating a humanitarian intervention is a daunting problem for
policy makers, however elaborate the early warning mechanisms that
can be put into place.77 Obtaining incontrovertible evidence is a 
difficult enough issue for individual governments, let alone amorphous
bodies such as the international community. Moreover, the conduct 
of military interventions since the Cold War has generated a number 
of dilemmas for the intervener, particularly ones in response to 
massive human rights violations. One of these significant intervention
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dilemmas is the contradictory desire of the populations of democratic
states to see human rights norms enforced whilst being unwilling to
pay a price, either in lives or treasure.78
Yet, against all the hurdles, the option of doing nothing, for those
governments and international institutions capable of undertaking
humanitarian intervention, does not seem credible. The legacy of the
terrible bloodletting of the twentieth century points to a higher moral
grundnorm that no civilised state or community of states can lightly
cast aside. Although it was certainly not the only factor, there was
undoubtedly a sense of this motivating NATO leaders in 1998 and
1999 towards the view that ‘something had to be done’ about the
humanitarian situation in Kosovo.
Establishing criteria for humanitarian intervention is centrally
about the problem of applying morality to politics and conflict. This is
certainly nothing new, as illustrated by the long-standing existence of
well-articulated principles of a ‘just war’ doctrine. These principles are
organised around jus ad bellum and jus in bello; meaning justice in
going to war and justice in the conduct of war.79 The criteria of just war
can be summarised as shown in Table 1.1 (p. 28).
What is striking about the criteria for humanitarian intervention
outlined by Blair and Cook, against the backdrop of the Kosovo crisis
and its aftermath, is the way in which they follow the principles of the
just war. The ideas propounded in Blair’s and Cook’s speeches empha-
sising last resort, proportionality and the legitimacy of the case, reflect
criteria of the just war doctrine. Because the just war doctrine is,
centrally, concerned with establishing moral criteria governing the use
of force, its applicability to the problem of establishing criteria for
humanitarian intervention should be readily apparent. Mona Fixdal
and Dan Smith, writing on ‘Humanitarian intervention and just war’,
emphasise that ‘in seeking a framework that is simultaneously both
ethical and political for discussing decisions to resort to force, the Just
War tradition seems a self-evident path to explore’.80 Taking a broader
view of the application of the just war doctrine to the post-Cold War
security environment, J. Bryan Hehir has stressed the factors that make
it relevant:
The post-Cold War setting for intervention is shaped by two realities: the
erosion of sovereignty and intensifying interdependence. These two
distinct features of international politics promise an increase in the kinds
of intervention and its incidence. To assess the moral character of inter-
vention will require an emphasis on the political aspects of the just war
ethic.81
NATO, KOSOVO AND ‘HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION’ 27
Lat 01  22/4/03  8:47 pm  Page 27
Not everyone, however, agrees that the just war doctrine provides
criteria to guide humanitarian intervention. Mervyn Frost argues that
‘humanitarian intervention is not best understood as an action which
fits into theories of just warfare, as they involve war between states.
The concerns of just war theory about proper authority, just cause and
just means are not readily applicable to humanitarian intervention’.82
Despite this caveat, just war doctrine has occupied a central place in the
debates on establishing criteria for humanitarian intervention.83 What
is more, analysts seeking to establish such criteria draw on the just war
doctrine whether or not they make an explicit link between it and their
criteria.84
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Table 1.1—Just war criteria
Jus ad Bellum – Justice in Recourse to War
Legitimate or Only legitimate governments or supranational authority
Right Authority can lawfully engage in war
Just Cause Defence against a violent, unwarranted aggression
against the state
Just Intention Goals must be just; restore peace to all parties engaged
in conflict
Last Resort Military force can only be employed after all other
options exhausted
Proportionality Means of war must be proportional to the offence;
recourse to war must lead to more good than harm 
Reasonable Hope The recourse to war must stand a reasonable chance of
success and not be undertaken in the absence of such
reasonable hope
Comparative Justice No state possesses absolute justice in pursuit of aims
Jus in Bello – Justice in the Conduct of War
Discrimination Non-combatants protected from direct or intentional
attack
Proportionality Military actions limited by necessity to achieve goals and
to avoid unnecessary suffering of non-combatants
Sources: A. Coates, The Ethics of War (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1997),
pp. 123–272; Major General The Rev. I. Durie, ‘Just War in an Unjust World’, unpub-
lished paper for the International Symposium in Military Ethics, Royal Norwegian Air
Force Academy, Trondheim, November 1999; M. Fixdal and D. Smith, ‘Humanitarian
intervention and just war’, Mershon International Studies Review (1998), 4.
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Not all criteria in the humanitarian intervention debate draw on
the just war doctrine.85 What is, however, characteristic of the strands
of the debate over criteria for humanitarian intervention is the desire
to establish an ethical basis for taking action. The fact that there is a
need to articulate ethical criteria highlights questions about the legal-
ity of humanitarian intervention (in terms of international law) and the
difficult political choices that humanitarian intervention presents to
members of the international community. Ultimately, the quest to
articulate ethical criteria for humanitarian intervention is a debate born
out of the contested legality and legitimacy of the phenomenon. 
The UN, NATO and the legality and legitimacy 
of intervention
NATO’s military intervention over Kosovo brought into bold 
prominence, as noted earlier, ongoing debates about the legality and
legitimacy of the Alliance’s action.86 One side of this debate has been
largely critical of NATO’s action, arguing that it lacked the legal basis
necessary to give it legitimacy. ‘NATO countries – ’, wrote The
Economist, ‘albeit with the best of motives – have put themselves, like
Mr Milosevic, outside the law’.87 Similarly, Mark Littman QC, in a
critique of the legality of NATO’s action, concluded that ‘given the
weight of opinion and legal authority against the NATO position … it
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the NATO action was illegal’.88
In his detailed analysis of humanitarian intervention and international
law, Simon Chesterman takes the view that ‘there is no “right” of
humanitarian intervention in either the UN Charter or customary
international law’.89 Friedrich Kratochwil generally takes a similar line,
coming to the conclusion that no right of humanitarian intervention
exists save in the cases of the ‘institution of the protection of nations’
or authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.90 As noted earlier,
major states such as China and Russia opposed NATO’s Kosovo oper-
ation over questions essentially related to its legality. The arguments
were not entirely one-sided. Other commentators maintained that
NATO’s action could in fact be justified under international law.91 On
balance, however, the debate on the legality of NATO’s action over
Kosovo for the most part supports the view that Operation Allied Force
lacked a firm grounding in international law. 
At the nexus of this debate stands the United Nations, the inter-
national organisation charged with ‘the maintenance of international
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peace and security’. The absence of a formal UN mandate for the
NATO air operation was problematic in this respect as the UN, with
its global remit and broad security and humanitarian roles, is widely
regarded as being the principal (some would say sole) international
legitimising agency for military action. 
The UN’s Charter stresses, as noted, the principle of non-
intervention and its legal superstructure is optimised for dealing with
interstate aggression rather than intervention in the affairs of a state.92
Indeed, some critics of the UN argue that these attributes of the
Charter make it less relevant to the current international security 
environment characterised, as it has been, by intrastate violence and
attendant human rights abuses.93 The UN Charter, however, does
emphasise the importance of human rights, even if the document does
not make upholding them an explicit function of the UN. This does
not necessarily mean that the UN and, in particular, its Security
Council is powerless to act in the face of massive human rights abuses
within states. A number of analysts have argued that, under Article 39
of the Charter, the UNSC could sanction intervention in the affairs of
a state on the strength of it posing a ‘threat to the peace’.94 Not all
agree with this view of the Security Council’s powers, arguing that
such an interpretation ‘is expanding the scope of its authority beyond
that originally envisioned’.95 Overall it may be said that, on the issue of
human rights, the UN is strong on norm articulation but weaker on
the instruments to ensure adherence to those norms. 
Ironically, perhaps, NATO members seemed to reaffirm the need
not to give up on the UN at the very moment that they were acting
without its explicit authority vis-à-vis Kosovo in the spring of 1999. At
the NATO Washington summit, held when Operation Allied Force was
in full swing in April, a deliberate effort seemed to have been made to
build UN-friendly language into the key declarations. Both the
Washington Summit Communiqué and the new NATO Strategic
Concept included affirmations that, ‘as stated in the Washington Treaty
[i.e. NATO’s founding treaty], we recognise the primary responsibility
of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security’. The Strategic Concept, in formally
setting out a new (in de jure terms) role for NATO of being prepared
to engage in ‘crisis management [and] crisis response operations’, 
stipulated that these would be undertaken ‘in conformity with Article
7 of the Washington Treaty’.96 This states that the treaty ‘does not
affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights
and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of
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the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security’.97
Various causal factors have been suggested in explanation of 
the inclusion of what seemed, at first sight, to be a clear statement 
of intent in Washington to ensure that NATO does not undertake 
military action without UN authorisation again. It has been argued
that the UN-friendly language was included at French insistence, with
the US acquiescing in order to preserve allied unity in the midst 
of the pressing crisis.98 Others have suggested that the failure of
Operation Allied Force to coerce Milosevic into backing down by the
time of the Washington summit had ‘tempered the interventionist urge
consid-erably’ amongst NATO members generally.99
Historically, however, NATO’s view of itself has been that of a
free-standing regional organisation not hierarchically subordinate to
the UNSC. Sure enough, voices have since been heard arguing that 
the overall tone of the 1999 Washington documents does not
suggest that NATO and its members will feel, in future, bound by
acceptance of UN primacy. Dick Leurdijk and Dick Zandee have
drawn attention to passages in the Washington Summit Communiqué
and Strategic Concept where NATO is described as ‘an Alliance of
nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations
Charter’. This form of words seems innocuous but, according to
Leurdijk and Zandee:
By thus binding itself once more to both documents, NATO appears to
give itself an equal position to the UN and not a subservient one …
Thereby NATO assures itself of an autonomous freedom of action, also in
those cases where an explicit consent by the Security Council would be
impossible. From a legal point of view it comes down to a lessening of the
importance of the UN as compared to that of NATO.100
In sum, the wording of the 1999 summit statements is ambiguous and
capable of being interpreted in different ways. As with many diplomatic
documents, such ambiguity is almost certainly intentional – if only to
satisfy the differing agendas of NATO member states. In considering
their response to future cases where military intervention might be
required, it is unlikely that NATO members – or at least the more
powerful among them – would regard their hands as being tied by
statements agreed to under the pressure of a major and ongoing crisis
in the spring of 1999.
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Conclusions
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo during 1999 was undertaken with
humanitarian reasons being among several factors driving the armed
action. Although the UN did not authorise the intervention in a de
jure sense, NATO’s action derived some legitimacy from prior UNSC
Resolutions. It gained more from the fact that it was clear to nearly all
outside observers that FRY forces had been responsible for serious
abuses of the human rights of the Albanian population in Kosovo. 
It was the moral and ethical dimension underpinning NATO’s
action, coupled with the employment of military coercion that led to
it being labelled a ‘humanitarian intervention’. The descriptor thus
gained a new currency as a result of the events of spring 1999. Kosovo
was, arguably, the first such action in Europe. The descriptor was 
not widely used at the time of the UN-sponsored international relief
efforts in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. Also, it can be argued that
these efforts did not qualify as ‘intervention’ in the sense in which the
term has been defined here. The UN did not seek at the time to
compel the various warring factions and their state sponsors to alter 
the behaviour (i.e. the civil war) which had produced the humanit-
arian crisis. 
The NATO action in Kosovo gave significant impetus to debates
about the nature, justification and relevance of such activities in the
post-Cold War European security environment. Interventions driven
by ethical considerations reveal important contradictions in the inter-
national system. On one level, as Nicholas Wheeler has observed,
‘humanitarian intervention exposes the conflict between order and
justice at its starkest’.101 NATO members’ efforts to justify their
Kosovo intervention also reflected the contradictions and frustrations
of attempting to uphold some norms (regarding human rights) while
seemingly violating others (relating to the legality or otherwise of the
use of armed force). 
The difficulties and contradictions have helped to ensure that, in
the minds of many analysts and commentators, the Kosovo crisis offers
a dubious precedent for future international intervention in Europe 
or elsewhere. Adam Roberts has suggested that, at most, NATO’s 
military response to the crisis ‘may occupy a modest place as one
halting step in a developing but still contested practice of using force
in defence of international norms’.102 Whatever one’s views of its
merits or otherwise, the controversies surrounding NATO’s action
over Kosovo are likely to help ensure that it continues to stand less as
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a precedent for future such interventions than as an exceptional
response to violence, human suffering and the perceived need to
restore security and stability in a particularly volatile region of Europe. 
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Chapter 2
Kosovo and NATO’s
post-Cold War adaptation
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been significantly reoriented
and retooled across the board. This process of change has been
captured under two main labels. Internal adaptation is NATO-speak
for looking at how the institution works, and whether it can be made
to work better and more effectively. The process has embraced the
possibility of creating procedures and structures whereby European
member states might undertake military operations without the front-
line participation of US forces. This aspect of the internal adaptation
will be discussed in Chapter 5. Under consideration here is a second
major element – the effectiveness of NATO’s integrated military
command and planning structures. Their performance during
Operation Allied Force will be examined in the first section. 
The external adaptation of NATO is a term that refers, fairly obvi-
ously, to the evolution of relations between NATO and its members,
and non-member states in Europe. The most important and contro-
versial element of the external adaptation has been the NATO enlarge-
ment process. Other elements include ‘outreach’ programmes such as
Partnership for Peace (PfP). The discussions in the second section here
assess the impact of the Kosovo crisis on NATO’s external adaptation,
with particular reference to its implications for enlargement.
The internal dimension: military command 
and political decision-making during the Kosovo crisis
During the Cold War years the integrated military command and 
planning structures of NATO were frequently lauded as constituting a
significant part of the core strengths of the institution. Typical in this
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respect were the remarks made by then Secretary-General Manfred
Wörner in London in November 1990. He declared that ‘one of
NATO’s unique historical achievements has been the integrated
defence structure’, adding that, without this, ‘the security guarantees
of the Alliance would sooner or later be seen to be illusory’. This was,
he claimed, ‘not simply because that structure maintains the nuts and
bolts of a functioning defence capability. Nations that merge their
defence signal their wish to act together in a common unity of
purpose’.1
The discussions in this section address the issue of how effective
the NATO military structures proved to be during Operation Allied
Force. A glance through official ‘lessons learned’ reports, scholarly
studies and media accounts since the spring of 1999 reveals that there
were some significant problems. Allegations were made by senior mili-
tary officers about the extent of ‘political interference’ in operational
decisions, especially over targeting issues during the bombing
campaign. A related controversy developed over the use of the so-
called national ‘red card’ by member governments. Finally, there was
the issue of the extent to which the US ran a parallel national
command and control structure separate from the multinational
NATO one during the course of operations.
The political–military decision-making interface
Undoubtedly, leading allied military officers were frustrated at the
degree of political interference, as they saw it. Two of them were
particularly outspoken in their criticisms. The then Chairman of the
NATO Military Committee, German General Klaus Naumann, went
so far as to give public expression to his concerns while still serving and
during the course of operations. This was an almost unheard of way for
a senior officer to express his views. In May 1999, Naumann was
quoted as saying that:
We need to find a way to reconcile the conditions of coalition war with
the principle of the use of surprise and the overwhelming use of force. We
did not apply either in Operation Allied Force and this cost time and
effort and potentially additional casualties. The net result is that the
campaign has been undoubtedly prolonged.2
Later, in retirement, Naumann elaborated upon his criticisms. He
reportedly blamed lack of political consensus amongst the nineteen
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NATO member states for preventing the military from striking more
widely at targets in Serbia from the start of the campaign (phase one of
Operation Allied Force was restricted specifically to the suppression of
enemy air defences). He also criticised their general refusal to counte-
nance ground force options at the beginning.3
The first criticism echoed comments made by US Air Force
(USAF) Lieutenant General Michael Short. As chief of NATO’s
Southern Europe Air Command, Short had run Operation Allied Force
under SACEUR, General Clark. In the autumn of 1999, Short was
widely quoted as assessing the air operation thus:
As an airman I would have done this differently. It would not be an incre-
mental air campaign or slow build-up but we would go downtown from
the first night so that on the first morning the influential citizens of
Belgrade gathered around Milosevic would have awakened to significant
destruction and a clear signal that we were taking the gloves off. If you
wake up in the morning and you have no power to your house and no gas
to your stove and the bridge you take to work is down and will be lying
in the Danube for the next 20 years I think you begin to ask ‘hey, Slobo,
what’s all this about?’.4
The implication behind the comments of Generals Naumann and
Short is that politicians prevented Operation Allied Force from being
run in a militarily optimal fashion. First, by requiring the bombing
campaign to commence with only limited strikes, and second by
shaping and constraining target selection throughout. To what extent
were these criticisms justified? 
During the earliest phase of the operation, in late March 1999,
there does seem to have been tight political control. Decisions, even
over individual targets, required the approval of all nineteen NATO
members in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Apart from the brief
experience of Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia three-and-a-half
years previously,5 member governments had no experience of running
a significant coercive military campaign through NATO structures.
Under these circumstances it was probably to be expected that they
would start with the assumption that everybody would be closely
involved. Then US Secretary of Defense William Cohen publicly
admitted as much. In testimony to the House of Representatives
Committee on Armed Services in mid-April 1999, he said that
‘because this is … the first type of operation NATO has conducted in
this fashion, I think initially there was some … confusion in terms of
how this is going to operate, in terms of whether or not individual
Members had to approve or disapprove’.6
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Later in the same hearings, Cohen stated that ‘we went through
some initial phases where perhaps there was too much delay in
approval and the process wasn’t working right. I think we have squared
that away now, where Wes Clark feels he has what he needs’.7 It is
significant that Cohen was talking in these terms less than one month
into the operation. Although the political element of NATO decision-
making was too cumbersome right at the start, with all nineteen
members expecting their say, it seems to have been quickly realised that
a more responsive and streamlined system was required. On 3 April
1999, less than ten days into the operation, The Times in London
reported that NATO political leaders had decided to ‘cast aside some
of the bureaucratic shackles that have limited NATO’s flexibility’.
Specifically they had reportedly decided that SACEUR ‘will now be
subject to political control by the leaders of America, Britain, France,
Germany and Italy and will no longer have to consult all 19 Nato
ambassadors about every decision’.8
Thereafter, political oversight on a day-to-day basis was exercised
by these major powers acting through what was called the ‘Quints’
group.9 The significance of the political concession made by the four-
teen NATO governments not represented in the Quints should not be
underestimated. Despite being relegated to a back-seat role, they were,
nevertheless, still expected to maintain NATO-wide political consensus
and solidarity behind the objectives of the bombing campaign. 
It is likely that there was a de facto trade-off involving participation
in the Quints and the level of a country’s contribution to the opera-
tion. The Quints between them provided over 80 per cent of the
almost 1,000 aircraft which were involved in its latter stages. The US,
UK and France reportedly functioned as an elite within this elite, based
on their operational contributions.10 A limited degree of involvement
in the day-to-day supervision of operations may also have suited some
NATO members politically. This was especially so in the case of Greece
and two out of the three new members (the Czech Republic and
Hungary), where public and political opinion was less solidly behind
the objectives of the campaign than in the other NATO states.11
On occasion, the full NATO membership in the NAC may simply
not have been asked for a decision. The British House of Commons
Select Committee on Defence concluded that this had been the case
with regard to at least one key issue. ‘We were told’, a report noted: 
that the [NATO] Secretary General authorised the transition from Phase
1 to Phase 2 on 27th March. To have moved to Phase 312 would have
required the full consent of the NAC. There is some ambiguity about the
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nature of the post-Phase 2 stage of operations … our informal discussions
would suggest that the formal decision to move to strategic bombing of
Serbia was never put directly, in quite those terms, to the NAC. Rather,
an extension of the delegation to the Secretary General was made on or
around 30 March [emphasis in the original].
The Defence Committee report also quoted the candid General
Naumann subsequently admitting that ‘phase three could have been
seen as an all-out war against Yugoslavia and … not all NATO nations,
were prepared to go as far … and for that reason we never took the risk
to ask the question knowing that we may run into some
problems’[emphasis added].13
Another mechanism for simplifying and, so the military and
Quints members hoped, making more effective the political decision-
making within NATO was the formal delegation of authority by the
NAC, in advance, to Secretary-General Solana. When giving evidence
to the House of Commons Defence Committee in May 2000, Sir John
Goulden, the UK’s then Permanent Representative on the NAC, was
asked whether NATO’s decision-making machinery had proved suffi-
ciently responsive to the pace of events. His reply was:
Yes … mainly because of what I described as the delegation to Solana.
Having agreed a plan we did not then constantly update it in the Council.
We gave it to the military and Solana helped with the interpretation of the
plan. He was completely up to date with the military. When they needed
fine tuning or a political issue needed clarification, they would come to us
and get it done on the day because the Council functioned daily … The
consultation was very intense. That helps to explain the speed with which
we were able to go from launching the campaign to going to phase two,
to going to the final targeting decision on 29 March. By 29 March we had
authorised all the powers that the military needed for the campaign,
within six days of starting.14
A picture is beginning to emerge. It is of a process, which got under-
way in the first days of the operation, informally to streamline NATO’s
decision-making structures and processes. Partly this was done via the
activation of the Quints group and partly via delegation of authority to
the Secretary-General, who was granted an important degree of flexi-
bility in determining whether and how to intensify the air operations. 
NATO political and military decision-making worked, to a signif-
icant extent, informally during the period March–June 1999. As
members of the House of Commons Defence Committee concluded,
when reflecting on a visit to NATO headquarters during 2000: 
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We formed the distinct impression that the idealised wiring diagrams and
flow charts reflecting NATO’s command and control arrangements, and
its associated staff procedures, had rapidly been thrown aside under the
pressures of a real operation, and that this was an operation in which the
element of political discretion was far higher than had ever been envisaged
within the mindset of the Cold War in which NATO had grown up.15
The limits of NATO authority: use of the ‘red card’
The concept of the NATO ‘red card’ was something that, before the
Kosovo crisis, had been familiar only to the cognoscenti. Consequently,
when it attracted media coverage during and after Operation Allied
Force, it may have appeared to the untutored eye as if something new
and debilitating had suddenly been introduced. 
In fact the extent of NATO ‘military integration’ had never been
as profound or significant as many had assumed. At no point in its
history had NATO been granted a formal supranational dimension 
by its member states. Members who have assigned forces to actual 
or potential NATO missions have been careful about the degree of
authority that they have been prepared to delegate. In military 
parlance, they have not been willing to delegate operational command
to NATO. Rather, allied commanders have been granted operational
control. The essential difference has been succinctly summarised by the
House of Commons Defence Committee: 
Operational Command gives a commander authority to do virtually what
he likes with the forces under his command, whereas Operational Control
only gives him authority to use those forces for the missions or tasks for
which they have been specifically assigned by contributing nations. The
effect of this is that if commanders with Operational Control wish to use
their forces for tasks different to those for which they were assigned, they
have to seek national approval.16
This requirement for national approval is what gives NATO members
red card – i.e. veto – rights. Operation Allied Force was the first occa-
sion on which the media and interested publics became aware of the
existence of this veto power. Within NATO, however, it was nothing
new and its use was dealt with in a more matter-of-fact way than
contemporary press coverage suggested. 
This is not to say that it did not become a contentious issue from
time to time. Tensions arose when people sought to make political
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mileage out of it. This was most clearly seen in a post-operation spat
between the US and France. In October 1999, the controversial
General Short was quoted in the press as singling out the French for
criticism on the grounds that they had allegedly played a major role in
constraining NATO targeting strategy during the later stages of
Operation Allied Force, by vetoing particular targets in Serbia.17 French
officials soon replied, again through the press, with counter-accusa-
tions that the US had conducted the operation in large part outside
NATO command structures.18
Long-standing Franco–US animosities over NATO made these
disputes appear more serious than they probably were. Besides the
French, other Quints group members had exercised vetoes over partic-
ular targets without attracting US criticism, at least in public. It is
known, for example, that the UK sometimes brandished the red card
in this area. The then Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Charles
Guthrie, confirmed it to the House of Commons Defence Committee
in the spring of 2000.19
The limitations imposed by NATO members’ reluctance to go
beyond giving operational control to allied commanders could be,
nevertheless, a source of frustration. Lieutenant General Sir Michael
Jackson, the first commander of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR),
reflected upon the problems that could result, from the perspective of
military command and planning, when looking back on the build-up
of NATO ground forces in neighbouring Macedonia early in 1999.
Jackson asserted that, ‘because transfer of authority to NATO
command only goes so far’, the national deployments to Macedonia
were somewhat chaotic and disorganised. What this meant on the
ground was that:
The great land grab [was] on … who’s going to get the best patch and
accommodation and workshops, and it can come down to who out-bids
whom. It’s not a very good way, but the militarily efficient way of doing
it is nobody enters the rear-area, in a period such as we are going through
now, and nobody takes a contract, without Headquarters … approval.
But that means that they would have to be under command, and once
again, without an Activation Order it can’t be done, because that is the
constitutional position of NATO.20
Jackson was centrally involved in the best-known red card incident 
of the entire NATO Kosovo campaign. This came right at the end of
Operation Allied Force, just as the deployment of KFOR was about 
to commence. Jackson was ordered by SACEUR to deploy a force to
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confront Russian troops who had made a ‘dash’ to the airport in
Pristina.21 He demurred and referred the matter to the British govern-
ment, which consulted the US government. The US, in turn, over-
ruled SACEUR. Jackson’s basis for refusing to carry out the order 
was that SACEUR was exceeding his operational control in attempting
to task NATO forces with a mission that no member government 
had agreed to. The US, in common with other NATO members, 
had not delegated operational command to any NATO officer.22
The incident has subsequently been confirmed in Clark’s memoir of
the crisis.23
For a time it appeared as if this incident had the potential to
develop into a major controversy. There were some in the US who
tried to ensure that it did. In the autumn of 1999, Senator John
Warner, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was
quoted as saying that ‘we can’t have second-guessing at every level of
command in a military organisation if it is to be effective’, and threat-
ening to hold Senate hearings on the matter.24 Subsequently, though,
the controversy petered out. Jackson himself made light of the matter.
He later wrote of ‘a little sideplay by the Russian contingent which had
us all amused. Especially the chain of command’, adding that Pristina
airport ‘formed no part of our initial plans … the whole thing frankly
was very much hyped up by the press’.25
The US and NATO: parallel structures
There is no doubt that the United States had run a parallel national
command and planning structure alongside the multinational NATO
one during Operation Allied Force. In its After-Action Report on the
operation, published in January 2000, the Department of Defense
described both structures in detail with accompanying wiring
diagrams!26 The key link at the top was General Clark. Since the
appointment of Dwight Eisenhower as the first SACEUR in 1951, 
the post – always held by an American – has been double-hatted. This
meant that in addition to serving as SACEUR, Clark, in common with
his predecessors, also served as Commander-in-Chief of US European
Command (USEUCOM); a national appointment.
The US government also operated a strict requirement for politi-
cal oversight of military decisions, based on the President’s constitu-
tional position as Commander-in-Chief. Other heads of government
would sometimes have a direct input into targeting decisions. Tony
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Blair, for example, did get ‘involved in targeting … but very seldom’
according to his Chief of Defence Staff.27 As for the French, they
reportedly ‘did exercise some restraining power on NATO planners,
particularly after the first couple of weeks … but the net effect was
generally to push back the bombing of some specific targets at most a
few days’.28 In the US case, all suggested targets generated by NATO
planners and hence sent up to SACEUR were passed on by General
Clark – wearing his USEUCOM hat – to the Pentagon which, in turn,
generally passed them all the way up to the President.29
It has also been claimed that the US refused to release key military
assets, even nominally, to NATO command. Richard Connaughton 
has written that ‘the conventional fighter effort was controlled by
NATO HQ. Bomber operations, B-52s from Fairford, Gloucestershire
and B-2s from Missouri, and Stealth fighter operations were not made
available for NATO tasking but tasked directly from the Pentagon’.30
James Thomas has noted one particularly important way in which
the existence of parallel military processes complicated matters for
NATO. As Operation Allied Force progressed, target selection was
increasingly being carried out by the US alone. Target approval, on the
other hand, remained a multilateral activity amongst the Quints.
According to Thomas, this dual approach was almost bound to cause
friction and delay, because ‘European countries found it difficult to
approve quickly targets which they had no hand in selecting, and
where they had to rely on US estimates of collateral damage’.31
Notwithstanding the existence of the parallel structures, and the
consequent extent to which the US could run a national dimension to
the operations, the degree of US control evidently did not go far
enough for some. In April 1999, Congressman Steven Kuykendall told
Secretary of Defense Cohen that ‘we are actually the hammer in
NATO, the rest of them [i.e. the European members] just come along
for the ride … we are the leader and we need to act like the leader. We
are not doing that in NATO right now’.32 Speaking in similar vein later
in the same month was Eliot Cohen, a respected American defence
academic. He told the House Armed Services Committee that ‘the
challenge really is for the United States, which is the leader of this
operation, which is probably now supplying something like three-
quarters or more of the effort, to really dominate it’.33 Reviewing the
course of operations early in 2000, General Short said that the US
should have told its NATO allies that ‘we will take the alliance to war
and we will win this thing for you, but the price to be paid is we call
the tune’.34
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On the other hand, there were some powerful American voices
raised in support of the view that the existence of parallel military
structures during Operation Allied Force had complicated efforts to
attain unity of command – a key goal of the military in any operation.
Speaking to the Brookings Institution, a leading think tank, in June
2000, General Clark conceded this point. Having put up a wiring
diagram of the parallel structures, he stated that: 
When you hear a lot of different opinions about this from military people,
and you hear people say well, they weren’t quite sure what was happen-
ing, why was this done, why was that done, it should not surprise anyone.
This is about as complex a command structure as anyone would ever fear
to see. But we had it and we worked it.35
The Pentagon’s After-Action Report also conceded the point in stating
that ‘parallel US and NATO command-and-control structures compli-
cated operational planning and unity of command. These structures
are well defined but had not been used previously to plan and conduct
sustained combat operations’. The report suggested that the US 
and its NATO allies should, in future, ‘develop an overarching
command-and-control policy and agree on procedures for the policy’s
implementation’.36 This could, of course, mean trying to get
Europeans to agree that the US should command ‘NATO’ operations
unhindered, as suggested by General Short and others.
NATO as a ‘degraded’ institution?
Speaking before the House Armed Services Committee in April 1999,
retired USAF General Charles Link said, discussing NATO’s decision-
making and command arrangements during Kosovo operations:
I think the key thing to remember here is that this is an arrangement that
would have worked well when NATO was under attack because one could
assume a community of interests among all the then 16 nations. When we
use NATO in the way that it is being used now, that particular command
construct really gets blurred because, as we have seen, each of the member
nations may have, since they are not concerned about their own security
in a direct way, they may have other economic, political or social interests
that color their views towards the central theme of action.37
NATO’s taking on of missions not directly connected with the defence
of its member states’ territory (which had been its exclusive Cold War
role) thus carried the seeds of a potential degrading of the institution’s
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effectiveness. This could happen as agreement and consensus on
controversial issues become more difficult to achieve. It is a danger
which NATO members seemed aware of during the Kosovo crisis.
Hence the premium which was placed on ‘solidarity’, ‘unity’ and
‘cohesion’ at the time. This meant that member states accepted
constraints on their individual attitudes and behaviour.
Tim Judah has recounted a story that nearly illustrates the practi-
cal impact of these considerations during the air operation:
NATO commanders wanted to destroy the Podgorica air base. But first,
they had to get past France’s opposition to bombing Montenegro. At a
morning intelligence briefing, Clark was informed that Yugoslav artillery
in Montenegro was shelling northern Albania. ‘Forget the French!’ Clark
thundered, according to the participants. ‘No, no, no, wait! Hold off on
that’, he said. ‘I’ll get French permission. I’ll get it’. Within hours, Clark
and three of the Clinton administration’s top players – [Secretary of State
Madeleine] Albright, national security adviser Samuel R. ‘Sandy’ Berger
and defense secretary William S. Cohen – dialed their counterparts in
Paris. By the next morning, Clark had political approval for the strike.38
Whether or not this story is literally true in all its details, it is plausible.
It illustrates two important things. First, US reluctance to act unilater-
ally when a row with a major NATO ally threatened. At the same time,
it illustrates the reluctance of the French to persist in blocking an
airstrike when to do so might have fractured NATO cohesion.
In their report on the Lessons of Kosovo, the House of Commons
Defence Committee wrote about a ‘paradox … at the heart of the
lessons to be learned’ and placed this part of their text in bold print for
special emphasis:
Although Alliance unity was only one factor amongst those which even-
tually enabled NATO to prevail, it was a necessary condition for the others
to have effect. Unity was, in the end, the Alliance’s greatest strength. At
the same time it was NATO’s weakest point … the maintenance of its
unity was the factor which most significantly restricted the military
options open to the Alliance to pursue an efficient and successful coercive
strategy against Milosevic.39
It is almost certain that the Milosevic government had calculated that,
if they could ride out the early waves of airstrikes, NATO’s cohesion
would begin to fray and ultimately crumble. This did not happen
during the more than two months that the bombing campaign 
ultimately had to be prosecuted. The decision-making and military
command procedures during the operation were both fraught and
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messy, but they ultimately ‘worked’ in that no member state broke
ranks and nobody dropped out. Milosevic was thus, eventually, the one
who conceded defeat.
The external dimension:
security assurances in South East Europe
The term ‘NATO enlargement by stealth’ can be used to describe a
situation whereby countries that have not legally acceded to its treaty
nevertheless evolve a set of enduring political, operational and institu-
tional links with NATO. These develop to the extent that key aspects
of their practical relations with it are, to all intents and purposes, as
significant and well established as those of the formal members. The
discussions in this section ask whether such a process has been hastened
in South East Europe by the Kosovo crisis. 
Formal NATO enlargement entails new members signing the
Washington Treaty and so acquiring the security guarantees contained
in its Article 5 (‘an attack on one member state shall be considered an
attack on them all’). The official position of existing members has been
that such guarantees are available only to countries that have been
through a constitutional accession process. Fear that the guarantees
might be diluted led member states to ring-fence them by refusing 
to consider suggestions for formal ‘associate membership’ of NATO.40
As the officially endorsed Study on NATO Enlargement put it in
September 1995, ‘there must be no security guarantees given or
members within the Alliance that are “second tier” and no modifica-
tions of the Washington Treaty for those who join’.41
It could be argued, at least before 11 September 2001, that, with
the end of the Cold War, the Article 5 guarantees of joint territorial
defence of members were no longer very important. Yet, as Paul
Cornish has asserted, ‘it is not easy to conceive of a military alliance of
sovereign states being, at bottom, anything other than collective and
territorial. Residual and symbolic it may be, but if the ‘Three
Musketeers’ collective defence commitment were to be removed, the
Alliance could collapse politically and militarily’.42 Notwithstanding
the ending of the Cold War that first brought it into being, the Article
5 foundation thus remains essential if NATO is to continue in business.
Notwithstanding the stated intention of current NATO members
not to permit any association arrangements, the distinctions between
members and non-members have become increasingly blurred, most
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especially in the South East European region. There are a number of
reasons for this. Some of them pre-date the Kosovo crisis, whilst others
are a direct consequence of it.
The impact and influence of Partnership for Peace
The NATO PfP programme was developed primarily by then US
Defense Secretary Les Aspin during 1993 and formally adopted at a
NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994. As outlined in the official
summit documents, the objectives of PfP have been to ‘promote closer
military cooperation and interoperability’ between NATO and
‘partner’ states. This would be achieved through joint training and
exercising, with a particular focus on potential peacekeeping and
related operations, together with the ‘facilitation of transparency in
national defence planning and budgeting processes’. As a further,
crucial, incentive to prospective partner countries to sign up, the
NATO members also declared that ‘active participation in Partnership
for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the
expansion of NATO’.43 By 2002, twenty-seven non-NATO European
countries were participating.
Istvan Szonyi has argued persuasively that, as it has developed, 
the attitudes and behaviour of both NATO members and non-member
partners have been increasingly ‘socialised’ by their participation in PfP: 
Socialization in this context means that the various participants in PfP
[have] engaged in a process of thorough and mutual adaptation. The
process of adaptation was manifold because it involved all the partners
concerned in PfP. The important point in this respect is that it was not
only the ‘Eastern’ countries which adapted to ‘NATO’ requirements but
NATO states also adapted to the needs and concerns of the former.44
Szonyi supports his contention by arguing that NATO member 
states have supported the PfP financially, through hosting military
exercises and, perhaps most importantly, by ‘involving the Partners in
the process of consultation, planning and review’.45 Partner countries,
meanwhile have adapted through hosting exercises, developing 
military co-operation amongst themselves within the overall PfP
framework and becoming ‘familiarized with NATO standards and
procedures even beyond the scope of peacekeeping’.46 It is on the basis
of this ongoing process of mutual socialisation that the importance of
the role of PfP in South East Europe begins to emerge.
KOSOVO AND NATO’S POST-COLD WAR ADAPTATION 51
Lat 02  22/4/03  9:07 pm  Page 51
The PfP has played a particularly important role in the evolution
of NATO involvement in Albania. This hardly seemed likely during
early 1997 when, with Albania collapsing into civil turmoil and conflict
sparked off by the pyramid investment scandal,47 the United States not
only refused to intervene but, with the support of the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG) and the UK, also prevented NATO from doing
so.48 It was left to Italy, with support and contributions from France
and Greece, to put together an ad hoc multinational force for
Operation Alba, a four-month humanitarian assistance and political
stabilisation mission in the period leading up to Albanian parliamentary
elections in the summer of 1997.
These events gave rise to some strong criticisms of NATO’s appar-
ent lack of collective interest; with arguments being made that this
demonstrated the institution’s unsuitability for dealing with post-Cold
War security crises in the wider Europe. More specifically, the limita-
tions of PfP as a promoter of stability amongst the partner states were
criticised.49 Although by no means all observers took this view,50
NATO members evidently felt prompted into action. 
Responding to a request from the Albanian government in August
1997, NATO staffers and planners set to work on devising a special PfP
‘action plan’ covering the reconstruction of the Albanian armed forces,
which had virtually disintegrated earlier in the year. According to the
director of the project in the NATO International Staff, no less than
twelve teams of NATO advisers were dispatched to assess the situation
on the ground and make recommendations to the Albanian Defence
Ministry.51 The challenge of Albania during the second half of 1997
became for NATO a matter of upholding its post-Cold War credibility
and that of the PfP. 
Although NATO’s interest in Albania was not, therefore, initiated
by events in neighbouring Kosovo, from early 1998 it did come
increasingly to be driven by its members’ wider concern with the devel-
oping crisis there. NATO foreign ministers, at their NAC meeting in
May 1998, issued an important Statement on Kosovo, their first signifi-
cant reference to the province. Amongst other things this document
identified the ‘security and stability’ of both Albania and Macedonia as
being a concern of NATO’s. 
Further to this, specific initiatives were announced which were
designed to have a deterrent effect against any temptation, which
might have existed on the part of the Milosevic government, to
threaten either of these countries. The Statement on Kosovo announced
that ‘we are launching NATO-led assistance programmes to help
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Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to secure
their borders, based on enhanced PfP activities and on bilateral assis-
tance’. With regard to Albania, the statement announced the opening
of a ‘NATO/PfP Cell’ – in effect a NATO office – in the capital,
Tirana, as well as a major air-force exercise and a port visit by NATO’s
Standing Naval Force Mediterranean over the summer.52 By publicly
stating a NATO interest in the security and stability of these two coun-
tries, the Statement on Kosovo granted both Albania and Macedonia de
facto NATO security assurances, if not formal legal guarantees. This
was even before the build-up of NATO forces on their territories began
as the Kosovo crisis escalated from the autumn of 1998. 
The Statement on Kosovo also promised enhancements to
Macedonia’s PfP-based co-operation with NATO. In the Macedonian
case, the statement announced the ‘upgrading’ of a PfP exercise – 
Co-operative Best Effort – scheduled to take place in the country in
September 1998, and contained a promise to consider establishing a
PfP training centre, which would be the first of its kind, in Krivolak.
More immediately, in mid-June, the promised NATO air exercise –
Determined Falcon – took place over Albania and Macedonia. This
involved the participation of eighty-three aircraft from thirteen NATO
member states and it was explicitly intended to send a deterrent signal
to the Milosevic government.53
NATO forces on the ground in Albania and Macedonia
When Operation Allied Force was launched in March 1999, nearly
500,000 Kosovar refugees crossed into Albania. The Albanian govern-
ment demanded NATO help to cope with the influx and this was
forthcoming. In early April, it was announced that the Allied
Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) – a multinational high-
readiness brigade-strength force – would be deployed to Albania on
Operation Allied Harbour. Its mission would be to construct 
accommodation and provide security and some semblance of order in
the refugee camps.54 For this mission it would be known as the
‘Albania Force’ (AFOR).
AFOR stayed on after the end of Operation Allied Force and the
return of the refugees in June 1999. Initially its mission was to 
facilitate the safe and orderly return of the refugees (in so far as that
was possible given the eagerness of many to return immediately,
despite AFOR’s advice to wait). Once the vast majority of the refugees
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had gone home, most of the troops assigned to AFOR remained. Its
new role, having been renamed ‘AFOR II’, was to help safeguard the
logistics tail and act as a reserve for the NATO-led forces in Kosovo
itself. By the spring of 2000, during the course of its operations in
Albania, AFOR had built or repaired over 200km of road, modernised
Tirana Rinas airport and the airfields at Kukes and Korce, and greatly
expanded the capacity of Durres as a port.55 In October 2001 there
were still 2,400 NATO troops in Albania.56
The Albanian government did not object to this continued pres-
ence, far from it. Albanian leaders could see that the physical deploy-
ment of a NATO force on their territory would help to ensure the
continuation of the security assurances given in the Statement on
Kosovo, and confirmed at the NATO summit in Washington in April
1999. In Washington the NATO assurances had been specifically
linked to potential acts of aggression against countries in the region
hosting NATO forces. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that in the
autumn of 1999 the Speaker of the Albanian Parliament should refer
to his country as a ‘de facto ally’ of NATO and state that a ‘long term’
NATO military presence was desirable. Nor was it surprising that the
then Prime Minister should say that his country was ‘open to the
continuation of’ the deployment of NATO forces.57
The NATO military presence on the ground in Macedonia had
predated that in Albania. From the autumn of 1998, troops from
European NATO states had begun to arrive in the country. Officially
their task was to serve as the Extraction Force (XFOR), in case the
OSCE’s KVM got into trouble. There were doubts about the military
utility of XFOR for the task at hand. It was pointed out that it was too
small and poorly configured for the rescue of any but very small groups
of OSCE personnel.58 Given also that the force was being deployed in
a somewhat haphazard fashion, a case can be made that the primary
purpose behind the deployments was political signalling. This repre-
sented a continuation of the approach adopted earlier in the year by
NATO with the air and naval exercises in Albania and Macedonia. The
intention was to send a deterrent message to Milosevic. 
Understandably the Macedonian government, like its counterpart
in Albania, wanted something concrete in return for agreeing to host
this force; i.e. a specific reiteration of the security assurances from
NATO which it had originally obtained in May 1998. This was forth-
coming when Solana and Clark visited Macedonia in November of that
year in order to secure the in-principle agreement of the Macedonians
to the deployment of XFOR. The Macedonian Foreign Minister
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subsequently told his colleagues at a meeting of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) – the PfP’s supervisory body – of 
‘the expected support, on a mutual basis, that has been reaffirmed
during the recent visit of Secretary General Solana and General Clark
to our country’.59
The NATO XFOR did not have to be used for the mission for
which it was initially designated, as the KVM was withdrawn without
hindrance from Kosovo in early March 1999. Nevertheless the force
remained based on Macedonian territory for the duration of Operation
Allied Force and indeed its numbers grew. During the NATO air 
operation it performed similar roles to the parallel AFOR in providing
accommodation and order for the thousands of Kosovar refugees 
who arrived in Macedonia. It was also to form the basis for the first
deployments of KFOR in June. In the autumn of 2001, around 5,000
troops were still being maintained under NATO command in
Macedonia in order to contribute to KFOR’s logistics tail and also to
act as a reserve if required.60 The Macedonian government had
welcomed these continuing deployments. 
Going further, Macedonian co-operation with NATO in this area
has been seen, by its political leaders, as valuable preparation for even-
tual NATO membership. This rationale was summed up by the
Macedonian Foreign Minister in front of his EAPC colleagues at the
end of 1999, when he spoke of:
the experience we are gaining through the co-operation with NATO and
its member countries, as well as the Partners, particularly as a host country
of the logistic base for the NATO peace forces in Kosovo, facilitating the
largest part of the transit activities for the Kosovo peace operation and
with the other activities and efforts … contribute to the continuous and
substantial progress in our relations with NATO, which have thus gained
a new quality.61
By early 2001 NATO and its member states, for their part, seemed to
be becoming ever more deeply committed to Macedonia’s security.
Following an outbreak of guerrilla activity by ethnic Albanians on the
Kosovo-Macedonia border in March, NATO Secretary-General Lord
Robertson stated that ‘I want to emphasise that NATO is fully comm-
itted to supporting the security, stability and territorial integrity of the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’.62 These words were backed
up by action. KFOR stepped up patrols on the Kosovo-Macedonia
border with the aim of stopping Albanian guerrillas or their supplies
from moving across it. By June 2001, 400 KFOR personnel were
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reportedly part of ‘Task Force Juno’ patrolling the border region.63 It
was apropos of this task that KFOR’s US contingent had fired its first
shots since deploying to Kosovo nearly two years previously.64
More generally, NATO co-operation with the Macedonian
government was stepped up. Robertson announced that a ‘Senior
Representative’ from NATO would be seconded to the Macedonian
capital, where he subsequently established a ‘NATO Cooperation and
Coordination Centre’. In May 2001, the NAC noted that ‘improved
military coordination and the exchange of military information with
the Ministries of Defence and Interior’ in Macedonia had also been
established.65 Later, in the summer, a task force of several hundred
troops from European NATO member states was deployed, on
Operation Essential Harvest, to supervise the disarming of Albanian
rebels as part of a political agreement with the Macedonian govern-
ment. A follow-on NATO force remained in the country on Operation
Amber Fox. In sum, by 2002 NATO had not only maintained but had
further developed its significant relationship with the Macedonian
government that had been begun during the Kosovo crisis. This rela-
tionship was, via the presence of the Senior Representative and other
NATO officials and teams not to mention the military task forces,
more overt and obvious than that which the institution maintained
with many of its own member states.
NATO’s credibility
Probably the strongest overall reason why NATO has become so
deeply entangled in underwriting security and stability in South East
Europe is because the institution and its member states believe that
they have so much credibility tied up there. This sense pre-dates the
Kosovo crisis and has been apparent since at least the summer of 1995.
The stance of the United States has been crucial. Conventional
accounts of the reasons why the Clinton administration decided to
intervene actively in the Bosnian imbroglio in 1995, reversing previous
American reticence, stress the importance of domestic politicking.66
Such accounts underestimate or ignore the importance, for the then
President and his senior foreign policy advisers, of NATO’s credibility.
That the very future of the institution was under threat if the Bosnian
civil war was not stopped was clear to numerous observers during 1994
and early 1995, as evidenced by the number of pessimistic articles and
commentaries which were being published at that time.67
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The US-inspired NATO decision to launch Operation Deliberate
Force in Bosnia from late August 1995 was mainly brought about 
by American concern to demonstrate, to both internal and external
audiences, the cohesion, strength and effectiveness of NATO. This can
be gleaned simply by looking at the relevant official statements of 
the time. On 30 August 1995, for example, a statement issued in the
name of the Secretary-General declared that a key objective behind 
the decision to launch the strikes was to ‘convince all parties of the
determination of the Alliance to implement its decisions’. A similar
statement issued a week later reiterated these words and added that
‘no-one can now doubt our resolve to see this matter through’.68
Following the Bosnian Serbs’ agreement to a ceasefire, and the
opening of the negotiations for a peace deal in Dayton, Ohio in
October 1995, NATO credibility remained a central part of the US
agenda. Senior Clinton administration officials made public reference
to it coupled, naturally, with references to how important the role 
of the US was in underpinning the credibility of NATO. The then
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, warned of ‘the end of 
NATO’ if the US was not prepared to help implement a Bosnian 
peace agreement by deploying troops on the ground. Then Defense
Secretary William Perry, meanwhile, told a congressional committee
that the successful implementation of an agreement would ‘demon-
strate the credibility of NATO’. Finally the President himself, in a 
television broadcast to the American people designed to put pressure
on Congress to acquiesce in the sending of US troops to Bosnia, 
said that ‘if we’re not there, NATO will not be there; the peace will
collapse … and erode our partnership with our European allies’.69
Concerns about NATO’s credibility have proved enduring.
Following the initial deployment of some 20,000 US troops from late
1995 as part of the Bosnian Implementation Force (IFOR), the
Clinton administration successively extended the deployment period
and effectively forgot about periodic assertions that US troops were
only in Bosnia for a finite period of time. It was clear to some as early
as the spring of 1996 that the NATO-led forces in Bosnia could not
simply be withdrawn according to some pre-determined timetable.
Doing so would ‘deal a blow to NATO’s long-term credibility, given
the prestige it [had] invested in IFOR’.70
Various deadlines for US withdrawal were, therefore, effectively
fudged by the Clinton administration (and by Congress), and this
practice continued into the Bush administration. In late 2001 there
were still 3,500 US troops in Bosnia.71 The Bush administration had
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gone quiet on previous ‘promises’ to seriously reduce or even eliminate
the US military contribution to the NATO-led forces in both Bosnia
and Kosovo. 
The underlying robustness of commitments was demonstrated by
the extent to which the NATO and US military presence remained
essentially intact in the months following 11 September 2001. In the
immediate aftermath, there was speculation that the Bush adminis-
tration would denude its forces in South East Europe and give priority
to the ‘war on terror’. In fact, the US presence was only marginally
adjusted. Six months after 11 September, the number of US troops in
Kosovo was 5,300, which was just 100 below the level of the previous
October.72
In July 2002, over 1,000 US troops were airlifted into Kosovo in
a major exercise designed, according to KFOR commanders, to
demonstrate the continuing strength of American commitment; not
just in terms of forces on the ground, but also with so called ‘over-the-
horizon’ troops (i.e. rapidly-deployable reinforcements). This exercise
was quickly followed by a visit from the Chairman of the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, USAF General Richard Myers. He declared that whilst
the US did face a challenge in ‘trying to balance operations like here in
the Balkans that is so vitally important in this region and the global war
on terrorism’, nevertheless, ‘the Balkans is still a high priority with the
US administration of President Bush’.73
Some have predicted that a NATO military presence in South East
Europe will be required for ‘20 years or more’.74 This bears out the
validity of the argument made by Lawrence Freedman back in 1995: 
It is far easier to send troops in than to extricate them at a later date …
By then, the credibility of the intervener and probably the sponsoring
institution – the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
European Union, United Nations or NATO – will have been invoked.
Reputation, or saving face, becomes an extra interest … the agonizing
over a decision to admit failure and withdraw can be extremely intense.75
By the time the Kosovo crisis moved to the top of its agenda in 1998,
NATO’s credibility was already significantly invested in South East
Europe; most especially in the maintenance of the Bosnian settlement
which it was policing. 
In this context it was certainly no coincidence that the first
substantive NATO Statement on Kosovo, in May 1998, should open by
stating that: 
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We are deeply concerned by the situation in Kosovo. We deplore the
continuing use of violence in suppressing political dissent or in pursuit 
of political change. The violence and the associated instability risk jeopard-
ising the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and endangering
security and stability in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia [emphasis added].76
Humanitarian concerns were mentioned in this statement, but the
overall tone made clear that they were not of primary importance at
the time. Rather, the worry was that unimpeded Serb activity in
Kosovo might embolden both the Milosevic government in Belgrade
and the Serbs in Bosnia to challenge the Dayton peace accords. Kosovo
and Bosnia were linked together in the minds of many at NATO 
principally for this reason.
The preservation, or preferably enhancement, of NATO’s credi-
bility in South East Europe constituted a key stated objective – one
might say an additional war aim – for western leaders during Operation
Allied Force. In this context, ‘credibility’ came to depend increasingly
on two factors. The first was the obvious one of ‘winning’, in the sense
of compelling Milosevic to comply with the various demands which
NATO had formulated. The second was the vital means to this end;
maintaining the cohesion and basic political and diplomatic unity of all
NATO members (whether they contributed aircraft to Operation
Allied Force or not) behind the overall objectives of the campaign. 
The extent to which the preservation of NATO’s credibility
became a distinct war aim in itself can be easily documented. For
example, one week after the start of Operation Allied Force, Robin
Cook was quoted as saying that ‘the whole credibility of NATO is at
stake – not just loss of face after earlier commitments, but confidence
in our own security. It is in the national British interest to maintain
NATO’s credibility’. Shortly thereafter, Senator John McCain, an 
early challenger for the Republican presidential nomination in the
United States, was quoted as saying that ‘credibility is our most
precious asset [in this campaign]. We have purchased our credibility
with American blood’.77 In the Pentagon’s After-Action Report on
Kosovo operations, ‘ensuring NATO’s credibility’ was explicitly 
identified as being one of the ‘primary interests’ of the US and its allies
in conducting operations.78 In May 2000, the British House of
Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs suggested that the
humanitarian imperatives usually cited as the primary reason for the
NATO intervention were at least partly a cover, to provide legitimacy
for operations designed principally to underpin NATO’s credibility.
KOSOVO AND NATO’S POST-COLD WAR ADAPTATION 59
Lat 02  22/4/03  9:07 pm  Page 59
NATO considered this cover necessary, in the Committee’s view,
because ‘it is difficult to imagine a legal justification based upon the
need to support any organisation’s credibility’.79
Former SACEUR Clark, finally, has provided a good rationale for
the prime role that the institution’s credibility played in the calcula-
tions of NATO governments and leaders during the Kosovo crisis:
Once the threat surfaces … nations or alliances are committed. Following
through to preserve credibility becomes a matter of vital interest.
Credibility is the ultimate measure of value for states and international
institutions. Inevitably, sacrificing credibility carries long-term conse-
quences far greater than the immediate issue, whatever it is.80
Conclusions
In terms, first, of its internal workings, it would be over-simplistic to
suggest that NATO’s performance during Operation Allied Force
demonstrated that it ‘doesn’t work’ in a real crisis. To be sure, many of
its formal decision-making structures and procedures were quickly
downgraded or sidelined and informal methods developed in their
stead. This, however, suggests that the real value of ‘NATO’ lies not so
much in its physical structures and processes as in the social networks
and habits of working together that have built up around them. The
conduct of Operation Allied Force suggested that the latter can be 
separated from the formal institutional structures and still function
effectively.
Sir Michael Alexander sat as the UK’s Permanent Representative
on the NAC during the 1990–91 Gulf crisis. NATO was not formally
involved in responding to this. Nevertheless, in Alexander’s view a key
role in facilitating the response of the US and its European allies was
played by the informal habits of co-operation developed around
NATO’s structures. As he recalled:
What really mattered was the existence of the enormous and very robust
network of contacts and relationships between capitals, between military
commanders, between logisticians and so on. This meant that it was very
easy for people to pick up the telephone and speak to somebody else
whom they have known and been exercising with and so on over the years.
The whole habit of working together is so deeply engrained that problems
always seemed soluble, they always looked manageable.81
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The same core NATO strengths were present, and utilised to ulti-
mately successful effect, during Operation Allied Force nine years after
the Gulf campaign. 
Moving on to the external dimension, the term ‘enlargement by
stealth’ may not, in the final analysis, be the most appropriate one to
use to describe what has been happening because of its inherently
conspiratorial connotations. It implies that the institution and its
member states have had some kind of secret and sinister plan to extend
its boundaries and power as far as possible throughout Europe. In
reality, however, NATO has been sucked into a progressively wider and
deeper involvement in South East Europe on an incremental, ad hoc
and crisis-led basis. 
Perhaps, therefore, the process could better be described as ‘infor-
mal’ or ‘virtual’ NATO enlargement. Albania and Macedonia have
been given security assurances in the context of a NATO presence in
the region that seems set to endure. The Kosovo crisis, whilst it did not
initiate the process of NATO engagement in South East Europe, was
nevertheless instrumental in spawning the security assurances that have
been given. The preceding crisis in Bosnia had produced no corre-
sponding assurances.
Overall, its response to the crisis in Kosovo revealed more about
NATO’s underlying strengths as a highly interdependent and co-oper-
ative security community, than it did about its apparent structural limi-
tations. This explains why the crisis has not led directly to much in the
way of structural reform or change at NATO. The crisis, which some
had suggested might lead to the debilitation, or even demise, of
NATO instead seems to have reinforced and further entrenched its
status as the core institution underpinning post-Cold War security in
the wider Europe.
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Chapter 3
South East European settlements?
Democratisation, nationalism and
security in former Yugoslavia
The end of the conflicts in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) created
for NATO an important place in the post-conflict ‘peace-building’ that
represents a sustained effort to create a new international order in
South East Europe. The idea that such peace-building efforts involve
attempts to inculcate norms and values is a key feature of the process
and a significant source of controversy. Just as NATO’s ‘humanitarian
intervention’ over Kosovo highlighted the normative tension between
the doctrine of non-intervention in sovereign states versus efforts to
promote respect for human rights that transcend state boundaries, the
subsequent efforts at peace-building have revealed other normative
conundrums. For NATO and other international institutions, this has
made South East Europe a normative labyrinth where democracy,
‘stateness’, identity and security are difficult to bring together. Oliver
Richmond argues that the resulting tension creates ‘a normative
discourse … focusing on humanitarianism, culture and identity, and
motivated by a need to regain “order” and protect the status quo on
the part of the dominant actors of the international system’.1
NATO has taken a prominent security role in the international
attempts to make work the political settlements in Bosnia, Kosovo and,
to a lesser extent, Macedonia. It is worth considering the prospects 
for the long-term success of the Alliance’s objectives of underwriting
military security in the region while at the same time upholding 
the norms aimed at developing democratic states with multicultural
identities that lay at the heart of these settlements. This chapter will
examine the international attempts at peace-building in the former
Yugoslavia2 by focusing on the challenges to efforts to bring lasting
stability posed by democratisation, ethnic nationalism and the promo-
tion of security.
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NATO’s peace-building roles in Bosnia, Kosovo 
and Macedonia
The deployment of the NATO IFOR to Bosnia in 1995 in the wake of
the Dayton agreement and associated UNSC Resolutions marked the
beginning of the Alliance’s role in peace-building in the region.
Reaching peak strength of 60,000, IFOR existed for a one-year
mission before transforming itself into the smaller Stabilisation Force
(SFOR) in December 1996. SFOR was initially given a mandate for
eighteen months but this has been extended repeatedly, giving the
operation a virtually open-ended timeframe. The improving security
situation has allowed significant reductions in SFOR. Between 1996
and 1999 it stood at 32,000 personnel, with its deployed level in early
2002 standing at about 20,000. This represented about one-third of
the original IFOR strength.3
The second major, and now concurrent, peace-building operation
for NATO began in June 1999 with the deployment of KFOR, at an
initial strength of nearly 50,000 and an open-ended time commitment
in its peace-building role.4 Three years after its initial deployment,
KFOR strength had dropped to approximately 35,000 with further
reductions to around 30,000 being mooted.5 In addition to SFOR and
KFOR, NATO deployed troops to Macedonia from the summer of
2001 to assist in ending the insurgency in that country and to support
the implementation of the internal political settlement.6 Although
small in overall numbers, the Macedonian deployments form part of a
much larger pattern of NATO troop commitments in the region. 
NATO’s considerable investment in manpower, resources and
time in the former Yugoslavia is directed, as noted, toward the overall
objective of peace-building. This concept originated in former UN
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s report called An Agenda
for Peace, first published in 1992. In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-
Ghali defined peace-building as ‘action to identify and support struc-
tures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid
a relapse into conflict’.7 It is clear that the essence of this definition has
shaped that employed by NATO, which states that: 
Peace building covers actions that support political, economic, social, and
military measures and structures, aiming to strengthen and solidify polit-
ical settlements in order to redress the causes of conflict. This includes
mechanisms to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate
peace, advance a sense of confidence and well being, and support
economic reconstruction.8
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A more succinct definition describes peace-building as having the
overall aim ‘to transform conflicts constructively and to create a
sustainable peace environment’.9
It is clear from these definitions that peace-building embraces a
broad spectrum of activity in the military, political, social and
economic spheres. Charles-Philippe David has argued that the full
gamut of peace-building activity falls into three key areas: ‘security
transition’, ‘democratic transition’ and ‘socio-economic transition’.10
The broad agenda of peace-building is well illustrated by the
declaratory aims of NATO’s engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo. For
example, the published statement of the SFOR mission in Bosnia takes
the NATO forces into areas of peace-building not strictly militarily
orientated:
The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) will deter hostilities and stabilise the
peace, contribute to a secure environment by providing a continued mili-
tary presence in the Area of Responsibility (AOR), target and coordinate
SFOR support to key areas including primary civil implementation organ-
isations, and progress towards a lasting consolidation of peace, without
further need for NATO-led forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.11
A similar pattern of broad involvement in peace-building can also be
seen in the mission of KFOR. Key elements include to:
• establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including
public safety and order
• monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the
conditions of the Military Technical Agreement and the UCK
[KLA] Undertaking [to disarm]
• provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), includ-
ing core civil functions until they are transferred to UNMIK.12
From the missions of both SFOR and KFOR several important
features can be observed. Although the missions are broadly couched
to support an array of peace-building activity, the role of SFOR and
KFOR in the ‘security transition’ constitutes the core activity.
Deterring a resumption of hostilities and the demilitarisation and
demobilisation of warring parties are security functions which both
SFOR and KFOR have played major and positive roles in carrying
through, particularly in the early phases of their deployment. SFOR
and KFOR have also played a part in ensuring public safety and order,
although this is only an explicit part of the mission in the case of
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KFOR.13 What is especially striking about these forces’ place in the
security transition in Bosnia and Kosovo is the range of levels at which
NATO forces contribute to the maintenance of security. The impact of
the Alliance’s part in peace-building touches the regional, state, sub-
state and individual levels of security.14
Although NATO is contributing to the ‘socio-economic transi-
tion’ dimension of peace-building in both Bosnia and Kosovo, it is the
political settlement or ‘democratic transition’ that is central to the
success or failure of peace-building efforts. The political dimension is
shaped above all by a set of norms that provide the essential framework
of the peace-building process and give the most important criteria for
measuring success. The security and socio-economic aspects of peace-
building support this normative component of the political settlement.
Therefore, NATO’s contributions to peace-building in the region have
to be measured against the prospects of success or failure in the estab-
lishment of the norms inherent in the political transition. For the
success of the overall efforts at peace-building, establishing and
entrenching the norms is the crucial variable. As David has stressed,
‘the merit of peace building thus hinges on its capacity to change a
potential or actual strife-ridden situation to a state of durable peace’.15
Normative underpinnings: 
from Dayton to the Stability Pact
Dayton agreement: 
democracy, human rights and multiculturalism for Bosnia?
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, initialled in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 and
formally signed in Paris one month later, brought to an end the armed
conflict and initiated a process of peace-building in Bosnia. The
Dayton agreement as it has since been known, provided for a compre-
hensive political settlement to the bloodiest European conflict 
since the end of the Second World War. The conflict had resulted in
thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands displaced from their
homes by ethnic cleansing and physical destruction of property and
infrastructure on a scale not seen in Europe for forty years. In addition
to ending the violence, the Dayton agreement sought the promotion
of long-term stability by attempting to reverse the bitter legacy of the
Bosnian conflict. It was this raison d’être that led to the norms of
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democracy, human rights and multiculturalism being woven into the
fabric of its text. 
Annex 4 of the agreement, detailing the ‘Constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina’, clearly envisaged the creation of a post-conflict
democracy. It stated that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a demo-
cratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and
democratic elections’. The human rights regime in Bosnia was to be
uncompromising in its rigour of application. ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina
and both Entities’, stated Annex 4, ‘shall ensure the highest level of
internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms’.
All of these aims were consistent with trends in the international settle-
ment of post-Cold War conflicts that made democratisation and
enhancement of human rights important elements of the post-conflict
peace-building process. Given the Bosnian conflict’s large-scale ethnic
cleansing, another key normative feature embedded in the Dayton
agreement was the re-building of a multicultural society. To this end,
Annex 4 made constitutional provision that ‘all refugees and displaced
persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin’.16
Another annex created a number of mechanisms to foster the
return of refugees and displaced persons. The mechanisms contained
in Annex 7 included measures against discrimination and harassment
with international monitoring by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).17 This strong commitment to
rebuild a multicultural Bosnia, however, suffered from an inherent
contradiction within the General Framework Agreement insofar as it
made legitimate two separate ‘entities’ with their own political institu-
tions within the Bosnian state.18 In a de facto way, the entities reflected
the outcome of the conflict in terms of ethnic cleansing and popula-
tion displacement.19 It was difficult to disguise the fact that the federal
structure of Bosnia contained in reality two separate states with two
separate armies. Richard Holbrooke, who played a key role in the
reaching of the Bosnia settlement, considered this aspect of the Dayton
agreement a ‘flaw’.20 The confederal structure of the Bosnian state has
worked against the unitary norms at the heart of the Dayton political
settlement.
Democratisation and a multicultural society in Kosovo?
In June 1999, UNSC Resolution 1244 initiated the peace-building
process for Kosovo. The end of the conflict there yielded not so much
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a final settlement as a skeleton process that was supposed to lead, even-
tually, to a political settlement. Despite a paucity of detail, Resolution
1244 nevertheless planted much the same normative seeds as the
Dayton agreement. The main text of the Resolution stressed that 
the ‘international civil presence’ had the role of ‘protecting and
promoting human rights’ and ‘assuring the safe and unimpeded return
of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo’. The
implications of this requirement were to restore the pre-conflict multi-
cultural society in Kosovo such as it had existed (with around 90 per
cent of the population being ethnic Albanians). 
Annex 2 of Resolution 1244 contained the most substance as
regards an ultimate political settlement. Here it was made clear that
establishing democracy was part of the international community’s
intention for Kosovo’s future. This annex provided for the:
establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the
international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be
decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim
administration to provide transitional administration while establishing
and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all
inhabitants in Kosovo.
It would seem, therefore, that ‘democratic self-governing institutions’
were to be established within a Kosovo forming part of the FRY. The
context was, in fact, not so clear cut. Elsewhere in the text of Annex 2,
the eventual context for the development of democracy in Kosovo was
more ambiguous. It foresaw: 
a political process towards the establishment of an interim political frame-
work agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo,
taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK.
Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or
disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.21
It is important to remember that the Rambouillet accords held out the
possibility of eventual independence for Kosovo. The reference in
Resolution 1244 to the ‘principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries
of the region’, however, suggested otherwise with its implicit tilt
toward the maintenance of the territorial status quo and hence Kosovo
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in the FRY. This contradictory element regarding the political and
territorial future of Kosovo injects a major degree of uncertainty. The
Dayton settlement arguably created too many entities or states in the
context of Bosnia, but in the case of Resolution 1244 there is no clear
determination on the future status of Kosovo in terms of potential
statehood. 
The question of the future of Kosovo is tied to wider problems 
in the region. Resolution 1244 linked the resolution of the issue of
Kosovo to the need for a region-wide approach. This found expres-
sion in the creation of the so-called ‘Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe’.
The Stability Pact: aims, process and democratic agenda
During the 1990s, the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia sent
tremors of potential instability throughout the wider South East
European region. The consequences for neighbouring states of the
Yugoslav conflicts could be seen in such things as the economic costs
associated with loss of trade and the social pressures of having to host,
in some cases, sizeable refugee populations. It was this wider perspec-
tive of regional problems that prompted the international community
to launch the Stability Pact process in 1999. It was designed to do two
things. First, to address the issues facing the South East European
region as a whole and not simply particular areas such as Bosnia and
Kosovo. Second, to initiate a process that would effectively integrate
the peace-building and stability-enhancement efforts of interested
governments and international and non-governmental organisations. 
The normative dimension of the Stability Pact signifies an exten-
sion of those norms embedded in Dayton and the Kosovo agreements.
At the heart of the Stability Pact, launched on 10 June 1999 in
Cologne, are norms of democracy, multiculturalism and human rights.
The major difference from earlier peace-building initiatives is the
broader political agenda to impart them in the region. In the eyes of
the pact’s promoters, the norms are viewed as essential building blocks
to a more stable and secure order both within and between states in
this part of Europe. 
The European Union was the initiator of the Stability Pact process
on the eve of the end of Operation Allied Force. Its Cologne summit
sought to bring into existence an integrated and comprehensive
approach to political, social and economic reconstruction.22 In the
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summit’s final communiqué, the central and certainly ambitious stated
aim of the Stability Pact was to achieve ‘lasting peace, prosperity and
stability for South Eastern Europe’. The Stability Pact process is meant
to operate as a ‘framework for co-ordination’ for the multifarious
participants engaged in the project. Organisationally, the Stability Pact
created four ‘Working Tables’. They are: the South Eastern Europe
Regional Table; the Working Table on Democratisation and Human
Rights; the Working Table on Economic Reconstruction,
Development and Co-operation and, finally, the Working Table on
Security Issues. The Regional Table is the co-ordinating body for the
other three tables.23 The Stability Pact process received the endorse-
ment of its regional participants a month later in a follow-up summit
in Sarajevo, which formally launched its organisational machinery.
Tasked with the role of providing over-arching direction for the
process was a Special Co-ordinator appointed by the Council of the
European Union but coming under the auspices of the OSCE on a
day-to-day basis. Bodo Hombach, a German diplomat, was appointed
as the first Special Co-ordinator at the Sarajevo summit.24
The introduction of democracy, economic prosperity and security
into the South East European region thus form the core objectives of
the Stability Pact. Moreover, the Stability Pact’s ‘headline goals’
embrace a number of other norms related to democracy; including
human rights, multiculturalism and the fair treatment of national
minorities. The Cologne summit communiqué illustrated the central-
ity of these norms in the Stability Pact’s goals. It spoke of the aims of
the pact being to:
• bring about mature democratic political processes, based on free
and fair elections, grounded in rule of law and full respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of
persons belonging to national minorities, the right to free and inde-
pendent media, legislative branches accountable to their
constituents, independent judiciaries [and the] deepening and
strengthening of civil society
• preserve the multinational and multiethnic diversity of countries in
the region, and protecting minorities
• ensure the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons
to their homes.
In a sweeping vision of the democratic ambitions of the Stability Pact
process, the summit document also unabashedly concluded that
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‘lasting peace in South Eastern Europe will only become possible when
democratic principles and values, which are already actively promoted
by many countries in the region, have taken root throughout, includ-
ing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’.25
The most important vehicle for the accomplishment of these
normative aims is Working Table I, on Democratisation and Human
Rights. Working Table I sets out the following as its primary task in its
work plan:
The main strategic aim of the Working Table on Democratisation and
Human Rights is to anchor democracy and respect for human rights
throughout the region, including by institutionalising OSCE commit-
ments and principles in the countries in the region, also through member-
ship of the Council of Europe, including accession to its Convention on
Human Rights and implementation in practice of its political and human
rights codes, where appropriate.26
In order to deliver on these aims, the Working Table has created a
number of ‘task forces and initiatives’ covering areas such as human
rights and national minorities; good governance; gender issues; media;
education and youth; refugee returns and parliamentary exchange.27
This ambitious agenda requires resources and, as a consequence,
Working Table I obtained initially 165 million Euros (£100 million) to
finance its projects.28 As indicated above, Stability Pact norms, rather
unsurprisingly, reflect the democratic and human rights norms embed-
ded in the major international treaties and agreements of the OSCE
and the Council of Europe. The significance of this link is to ground
them in the wider norms of the international system. 
The Stability Pact’s democratic and multicultural norms, like those
enshrined in the Dayton and Kosovo settlements, are being promoted
in a region that has recently experienced the brutal consequences of
ethnic nationalism. This ethnic nationalism in South East Europe must
be reckoned with in attempts to impart democratic norms to build
stability. The introduction of these norms brings into sharp focus an
important challenge. The success or failure of attempts to impart
democratic norms depends on how nationalism is understood by both
the norm givers and their recipients. Therefore it is necessary to
examine the meaning of ideas of nationalism and ethnicity and how
they impact on the democratic and multicultural norms which are the
foundation of international peace-building efforts in the former
Yugoslavia.
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Friend or foe? 
Nationalism’s relationship to democratic norms
Nationalism remains a field of study that is ‘vast and ramified’.29 Yet,
despite the varieties of meanings and academic approaches involved in
the study of nationalism and ethnicity, there is a dominant orthodoxy.
It sees national or ethnic identities as being ‘situational’ and the ‘prop-
erty of individuals rather than of collectivities’.30 According to this
view, national identity and ethnicity are secondary issues, able to be
swept aside by more potent universal forces such as social class,
economic development, global interdependence or secularisation.31
Anthony Smith, in his examination of the major strands of this domi-
nant ‘modernist’ and ‘instrumentalist’ school has summarised them in
the following manner: 
First, nations and nationalism are regarded as inherently modern – in the
sense of recent – phenomena; that is, they emerged in the last two
hundred years, in the wake of the French Revolution. Second, nations 
and nationalisms are treated as the products of the specifically modern
conditions of capitalism, industrialism, bureaucracy, mass communications
and secularism. Third, nations are essentially recent constructs, and
nationalisms are their modern cement, designed to meet the requirements
of modernity. Finally, ethnic communities, or ethnies, to use a convenient
French word, though much older and more widespread, are neither
natural nor given in human history, but are mainly resources and instru-
ments of elites and leaders in their struggles for power.32
For the instrumentalists, the nation is seen as the ‘imagined commu-
nity’ of Benedict Anderson’s highly influential study of nationalism.
This seductive phrase encapsulates the artificiality of nations and
nationalism in the eyes of this school of thought. Anderson has argued
that ‘the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal
diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of
imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for
the modern nation’.33
‘Primordialism’ stands in complete contrast to the instrumentalist
school of thought. The primordial school, although of many hues,
generally maintains that nations and consequently nationalism, are
more deeply rooted in history and can be seen as organic; part of the
naturally occurring order and representing unbreakable social bonds.
Proponents of primordialism consider that ‘ethnic identities have
biological and even genetic foundations, and that the motivation for
ethnic and kinship affiliation comes from these socio-psychological
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forces internal to the individual and related to primordial human needs
for security and, more importantly, survival’.34
The primordialist position has gained some fresh credibility as a
consequence of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia but it has also
been heavily criticised for its determinism.35 The primordialist camp
certainly embraces a broad spectrum of views. Primordialist thought
can encompass both ethnic nationalist extremists and more gentle
academic observers. The common ground of this range of views is that
nations and nationalism are seen to have qualities that are deeply
rooted and unchanging.
Some work falls between the instrumentalist and primordialist
schools. The work of Anthony Smith defines nationalism ‘as an 
ideological movement, for the attainment and maintenance of self-
government and independence on behalf of a group’.36 Seen from 
the perspective of instrumentalism, his definition is entirely consistent
with similar instrumentalist views. He sees the nation, nationalism 
and ethnicity as changeable and changing phenomena. Smith departs
from the instrumentalist approach with his views concerning the 
deep-rooted and durable cultural qualities of national identity. He
believes that these are firmly rooted in early modern ethnic commun-
ities, which he calls ‘ethnies’. He considers many cultural attributes,
but for him language is clearly one of the most important elements of
national identity:
Authenticity and dignity are the hallmarks of every aspect of ethnic
culture, not just its ethno-history. Of these the best known and most
important is language, since it so clearly marks off those who speak it from
those who cannot and because it evokes a sense of immediate expressive
intimacy among its speakers. The outstanding role played by philologists
grammarians and lexicographers in so many nationalisms indicates the
importance so often attached to language as an authentic symbolic code
embodying the unique inner experiences of the ethnie. Though language
is not the only significant aspect of the nation … it remains a vital
symbolic realm of authentication and vernacular mobilisation.37
Smith’s thinking has some important implications. He underscores 
the diversity and staying power of nations and nationalism. While the
instrumentalists see nationalism as a transitory phenomenon, over-
taken by new forces such as globalisation, and the primordialists see
nationalism as part of an enduring natural order, Smith argues that 
it is something that continues to have necessity and function within a
‘modern plural world order’.38 Moreover, Smith views nationalism as 
a phenomenon that is too complex to fit neatly into one distinct 
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category or another. The broadness of Smith’s thinking was well
reflected when he wrote that ‘no nation, no nationalism, can be seen
as purely the one or the other, even if at certain moments one or the
other of these elements predominates in the ensemble of components
of national identity’.39
Applying a specific understanding of nationalism to problems in
the international arena can have enormous implications. Yet, one of the
reoccurring and trenchant criticisms of the international relations field
concerns the relatively little attention that has been given to the
problem of nationalism.40 Although the volume of literature on ethnic
conflict has undoubtedly increased,41 it nevertheless is deficient in
considering the basic assumptions about how nationalism is under-
stood in the context of these conflicts. It is clear, however, that instru-
mentalist thinking dominates analysis of the international challenges
posed by nationalism. This has important implications, not least for
those attempting to measure the prospects of success or failure 
in introducing democratic norms in an area stricken with ethnic
conflict. Importing norms based on an understanding of nationalism
alien to the region might lead to some significant difficulties for the
norm givers.
Nationalism, democracy and the state
The state stands at a significant crossroads in the debates on the issues
related to democratic norms and nationalism. As Linz and Stepan have
argued, ‘modern democratic governance is inevitably linked to state-
ness, without a state, there can be no citizenship; without citizenship,
there can be no democracy’.42 The notion of citizenship is also central
to the idea of ‘civic nationalism’; in a civic national identity it is one’s
citizenship that determines national identity. Where civic nationalism
prevails, the focus is on the individual rather than any collective ethnic
identity:
In a liberal democracy the individual is taken as the cornerstone of the
deeply divided society while ethnic affiliations are ignored by the state. All
individuals are accorded equal civil and political rights and judged by
merit. They compete and are free to mix, integrate, assimilate, or alterna-
tively form separate communities as long as they do not discriminate
against others. The privatization of ethnicity in liberal democracy maxi-
mizes individual rights but minimizes collective rights.43
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Examples of countries that embrace civic nationalism are the United
Kingdom and the United States. These states possess a civic national
identity where democracy, citizenship and national identity are closely
intertwined with the state. With the individual’s rights at the centre,
the combination of democracy and civic nationalism is meant to
minimise the potential conflict within the ethnic, cultural and linguis-
tic diversity contained within the state’s borders. This model, however,
has broader implications beyond the borders of particular states where
civic nationalism prevails. 
Civic nationalism is also reflected in the international norms 
relevant to democracy and national identity. In terms of the ‘interna-
tionalisation’ of minority rights, the emphasis on the individual rather
than collective rights has prevailed in the post-Second World War
period.44 Previously, in the broad sweep of history, the evolution of
international minority rights law was grounded in the treatment of 
religious minorities; suggesting more of a collective thrust to minority
rights than one centred on the individual.45 Nevertheless, present-day
norms largely reflect the experience of states possessing a civic form of
nationalism. This reality raises some important questions about civic
nationalism. How effective is it in preserving ethnic identity while
preventing inter-communal conflict among disparate groups within the
state? Can democracy only exist alongside civic nationalism?
In addressing the first question, the record of democratic states
possessing a civic nationalism is seen as being generally good. They are
seen as being inclusive of minority groups while integrating them into
an overarching civic nationalist identity. Not all analysis, however, sees
civic nationalism as being completely benign in its treatment and
respect for the identities of ethnic minorities. Indeed, some critics have
identified serious shortcomings in the democratic-civic nationalism
model. Hans Köchler has argued that:
The traditional nation-state is based on an authoritarian ideology in terms
of the ethnic, religious and regional status of the individual (the citizen).
This ideology corresponds to a centrist power structure and to the regret-
table fact that population groups which differ from majority populations
(in terms of their ethnic, religious, cultural orientation and so forth) do
not enjoy equal rights.46
What is clear is that under the civic nationalism model, the majority
group has the ability to impose a collective identity at the expense of
other ethnic groups in the state. 
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Anthony Smith has gone further, in arguing that civic nationalism
offers no better alternative than its ethnic counterpart on the crucial
matter of its treatment of minorities:
The common view fails to grasp the nature of civic nationalism. From the
standpoint of affected minorities, this kind of nationalism is neither as
tolerant nor as unbiased as its self-image suggests. In fact, it can be every
bit as severe and uncompromising as ethnic nationalisms. For civic nation-
alisms often demand, as the price for receiving citizenship and its benefits,
the surrender of ethnic community and individuality, the privatization of
ethnic religion and the marginalization of the ethnic culture and heritage
of minorities within the borders of the national state.47
The ‘price for receiving citizenship’ is expensive in terms of group
identity according to Smith. He argues that it ‘delegitimizes and deval-
ues the ethnic cultures of resident minorities … and does so
consciously and deliberately’.48
The conventional wisdom regarding the second question suggests
that democracy and civic nationalism have a symbiotic relationship.
The existence of democracy in conditions of ethnic nationalism is seen
as problematic, if not contradictory. In his Politics in Eastern Europe,
George Schöpflin observed that: 
The nation in its ethnic dimension functions in politics as a category that
is connected primarily to the state and to definitions of identity. It is not
the medium through which the multiplicity of cross-cutting and contra-
dictory interests find articulation and, it is hoped, aggregation. Rather,
the nation is a relatively static entity, as it must be if it is to act as the foun-
dation of the community, and one that transcends everyday politics. The
nation is sacralised and cannot be the subject of the bargains and
compromises needed for the smooth functioning of democracy.49
Schöpflin, however, does not dismiss nationhood, or more specifically
‘ethnicity’, as unimportant to democracy. Indeed he argues that
‘democratic nationhood is composed of three key, interdependent
elements: civil society, the state and ethnicity’. The central thrust of his
argument is that ‘ethnicity, far from being an exaggerated or patho-
logical condition is essential to certain aspects of nationhood and thus
to democracy’.50
Jeff Richards has similarly argued against the view that only civic
nationalism is compatible with liberal democratic norms. Not viewing
this as credible, Richards has stressed that:
The attempt to make a rigid distinction between ‘good’ civic nationalism
which is liberal democratic and ‘bad’ ethnic nationalism, which is organic,
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democratic is neither accurate nor helpful. One must synthesise rather
than dichotomise between civic and ethnic/organic democracy.
Ultimately the test of democracy is respect and toleration for individual
choice and rights. In considering the relationship between citizenship and
national identity the cognate concepts of ethnicity, nationality and citi-
zenship must not be fused together. The tendency to do so, given the
underlying assumptions of nationalism and the rationale of the nation-
state, is very strong.51
Richards’ and Schöpflin’s departure from the conventional wisdom 
is supported by the fact that states exist that are practising ‘ethnic
democracy’, a model that combines ‘a real political democracy with
explicit ethnic dominance’.52 Many examples can be identified of
democracy and ethnic nationalism existing together successfully. The
post-Second World War FRG, Israel and the post-Communist Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia all bring together strong
ethnic national identities and ‘real political democracy’. In these 
examples democratic aggregation of interests takes place in a largely
monocultural ethnic state. 
Despite what these examples suggest about the possibility of
democracy operating successfully other than alongside a civic national
identity, the most commonly held assumptions see civic nationalism 
as benign and argue that modern democracy cannot exist alongside
anything but this type of nationalism in the international system. 
These assumptions form the foundation of the international norms
concerning democracy and ethnicity as applied to peace-building in
South East Europe. This is well illustrated by the example of a report
spawned by the Stability Pact process. Working Table I produced a
draft report on The Promotion of Multi-Ethnic Society and Democratic
Citizenship in South Eastern Europe in February 2000. A team of 
advisors from the Council of Europe drafted this report, which was to
form the basis of an ‘action plan’. During its preparation the team
enjoyed the co-operation of the OSCE High Commissioner on
National Minorities and included a consultation process that saw a
delegation travel to four states in South East Europe; Albania, Bosnia,
Croatia and Macedonia.
The report’s section headed ‘basic concepts and general objectives’
clearly contained certain assumptions regarding the type of nationalism
best associated with democratisation:
The concept of ‘multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society’ is put forward as
an important avenue for overcoming the problems which have resulted
from an – often ethnocentric – thinking in rigid categories: a heritage of
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exclusivity, exclusion and compartmentalisation which did not allow for a
genuine dialogue between all people, [or] a common forum (both in a
political and in a social sense) for the articulation of the different wishes
and needs and a common ground for living together.
The paper emphasised the need for the normative element outlined
above to be moved into the realm of policy; ‘it is now urgent to move
forward and re-create the pillars of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
society’. This, it was argued, ‘should be done not in an ad hoc manner
but through a principled approach on the basis of existing common
European standards that are directly relevant and should be applied 
in each country’. As a consequence of these basic principles, two objec-
tives were set out to guide Working Table I; ‘the promotion and,
where necessary, rehabilitation of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
society, and the development of democratic citizenship’. 
The report envisaged that these things be developed hand in hand;
‘these two objectives have to be seen in conjunction: multi-ethnic and
multi-cultural society must be firmly rooted in a common effort to
promote democratic values, especially equal citizenship rights and 
the equal empowerment of all citizens for sharing responsibility for the 
life of the country as a whole’. Multiethnic society and democratic 
citizenship, in the view of the report’s authors, have to be seen as
‘mainstreaming concepts’ and an ‘integral part of decision-making in
all policy areas’.53 What this Stability Pact report demonstrates, when
stated in the simplest terms, is that civic nationalism is regarded as
good and ethnic nationalism as bad when juxtaposed against the
entrenching of democracy.
The model suggested in the Stability Pact report concentrates only
on the first of the three pillars (civil society) postulated in Schöpflin’s
model of democracy and nationhood. Although the desirability of
constructing a healthy civil society is much in evidence in the report,
the inter-relationship with the state and ethnicity is conceived as a
problem. The fact that states in South East Europe are weak – or have
failed in some cases in former Yugoslavia – is attributed to a lack of
legitimacy linked to the deleterious effects of ethnic nationalism. 
The lack of legitimacy that underpins the weak or failed states in
the region may not be a product of ethnic nationalism per se but,
rather, the weakness of states and civil society in accommodating it.
Hence ethnicity only becomes a ‘disease’ when other components of
the body of the state are weak.54 The fixation on the civic model, more-
over, may make it more difficult to establish democracies in conditions
where ethnic nationalism prevails. While no one can deny the savagery
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that has attended ethnic nationalism in parts of the former Yugoslavia,
to see ethnic nationalism as illegitimate and, in normative terms, as
needing to be transmogrified into a civic identity assumed compatible
with democracy in practice has produced its own difficulties. Indeed,
the risk of imposing particular approaches or models in promoting
democracy in post-conflict situations is increasingly recognised.55 How
likely is it that these ‘mainstreaming concepts’ will succeed in building
democracy and pushing into the background ethnic identity in the
cases of Bosnia and Kosovo?
Democracy, nationalism and security in Bosnia and Kosovo
Bosnia
In the case of Bosnia, the construction of a multicultural democratic
state, where ethnic nationalism has been supplanted by the supposedly
more benign civic national identity has made very limited progress.
Evidence of this can be seen in the poor rates of repatriation of
refugees and internally displaced persons to areas across the inter-entity
lines (dividing the Serb Republic from the Muslim-Croat Federation).
According to official statistics this has been very limited. 
Statistics collected by the UNHCR or the Office of the High
Representative (in effect the internationally appointed governor of
Bosnia) do not always make clear how many people are refugees
returning to Bosnia and how many are moving back to areas from
which their group had been ethnically cleansed during the conflict.
Despite this caveat, the reports of the High Representative to the UN
Secretary-General from 1996 to 2002 do not give the impression that
much progress has been achieved. Efforts to restore something akin to
the pre-conflict multiethnic settlement pattern have not made signifi-
cant progress toward meeting the normative goals.56
Although a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) argues
that there has been some positive movement, most press reports argue
that change has been more modest in scope.57 Indeed, pessimism
seems to prevail as indicated by a Washington Post report that quotes
an ICG official as saying that ‘the ethnic cleansers are winning the
battle to shape postwar Bosnia’.58 Between 1995 and 1999, only
80,000 people out of the 600,000 that had returned to Bosnia had
‘gone to areas where their ethnic groups are in the minority’.59
Statistics published in a March 2002 report by the High Representative
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show ‘minority’ returns increasing, but it is too early to assess the
significance of any apparent trend.60
NATO’s role in the military implementation of the Dayton agree-
ment undoubtedly has registered important gains. The disarming of
the warring parties, cantonment of weapons and the continued pres-
ence of SFOR have insured against any regression into conflict.61 In
terms of establishing a longer-term basis for peace and stability in
Bosnia, based on democratic norms and the promotion of a civic
national identity, the progress has been far less encouraging, however.
And, as David Bosco has perceptively commented, ‘for Bosnia, demo-
graphics is destiny’.62
The difficulties in establishing a multicultural civic national iden-
tity in Bosnia clearly impact on NATO’s efforts at peace-building,
particularly if they are based on unaccepted norms. This has led to a
major debate over whether the normative underpinnings of Dayton
should be altered. In the case of Bosnia, it is an ‘integration or 
partition’ debate. Some commentators have argued that partition, or
accepting ethnic separation, is the only viable solution after a terrible
‘ethnic war’.63 Others see such an approach as abhorrent, arguing 
that it legitimates ethnic cleansing and does not bring lasting stability.64
Pragmatic policy-makers, who have experience with Bosnian problems,
see no option but to persist; with the present arrangements being 
the least bad option in terms of the risk of rekindling the conflict.65
In academic circles there has been a similar debate on the merits of
integration versus partition. This has highlighted both the difficulties
with the existing Dayton settlement and the risks of embarking on a
new course.66
Kosovo
NATO’s and others’ efforts to restore and promote a multicultural
Kosovo have met with even less success so far. With the entry of KFOR
into Kosovo there followed a Serb exodus spurred on by fear and
violent attacks on Serbian cultural and religious sites. This replaced the
earlier flight of Albanians from Kosovo, before and during Operation
Allied Force.67 It is estimated that around three-quarters of the pre-
conflict Serb population has left the province, with approximately
100,000 Serbs remaining and living in a few enclaves.68 The tensions
between the two communities inside Kosovo are violently symbolised
by the sporadic conflict in the divided city of Mitrovica.69
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In the face of the de facto separation or departure of the Serb
population, some members of the international community continue
to make vigorous efforts to keep remaining Serbs in situ or entice 
back those who have departed.70 Significantly, the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo has been cautious about
promoting the too-rapid return of Serb refugees in the absence of a
secure environment.71 The demographic reality in Kosovo today makes
the Albanians an absolute majority; making up approximately 95 per
cent of the population. Kosovo thus possesses an ethnic uniformity
that few states in Europe can claim. 
As in the case of the integration versus partition debate concern-
ing Bosnia, Kosovo has generated a similar discussion, more along the
lines of ‘autonomy versus independence’.72 Separation from the FRY is
a possibility included in UNSC Resolution 1244 as discussed earlier.
The issue of statehood for Kosovar Albanians has huge implications
not only for Kosovo, but also for the whole South East European
region.73 Addressing this issue requires facing the possibility of redraw-
ing the boundaries of at least one state in South East Europe. It is a
prospect the international community traditionally has been reluctant
to contemplate in addressing minority (or even majority) rights.74
Overall, the international projects to create or restore multicultural
societies in Bosnia and Kosovo have seen little measurable progress to
date. Similarly, the efforts to cultivate democratic citizenship have
registered only modest gains in the face of collectivist ethnic identities
and questions of self-determination. In Bosnia, the Dayton settlement
at least provided for a state that could bestow citizenship on its
peoples. Despite the retention of a common state structure with a
common citizenship, however, individual identification remains
strongly tied to ethnic groups and/or neighbouring states or nations
such as Croatia and Serbia. Only the Muslim community has any clear
affinity with the Bosnian state.75 In the case of Kosovo, the central
obstacle to cultivating democratic citizenship is structural; if citizen-
ship requires a state, then it is a basic condition currently lacking for
the inhabitants of Kosovo. Kosovo is in a de jure sense still part of a
Yugoslav state. This is a circumstance that has little or no legitimacy in
the eyes of Kosovar Albanians. According to the conventional wisdom
discussed earlier, democratic citizenship and the state are inextricably
linked. Yet this is precisely what the Kosovar Albanians currently lack
and the international community is not showing much desire to
bestow statehood in the foreseeable future.
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Conclusions
The sustained efforts of NATO and the international community 
to build a new and more peaceful international order in South East
Europe raise some serious questions regarding the relationship
between democracy, nationalism and ultimately security. The apparent
difficulties in introducing democratic reforms and cultivating the 
civic national identity called for in the Dayton and Kosovo settlements
and the Stability Pact can be attributed to the obduracy of ethnic
nationalism. 
General Jackson, the first commander of KFOR during 1999,
offered some sobering thoughts on the difficulties of introducing
democratic norms tied to a civic understanding of nationalism in the
Kosovo context:
We have soldiers living in Serb apartments where they are isolated. We
have permanent guards on all Orthodox churches and monasteries
without which they would be burnt and bombed. We even escort little 
old ladies to the bread shop to buy their bread, but on the way a Kosovar
Albanian teenager will give the sign of throat-slitting to her face. In 
terms of what outside intervention in the sense of soldiers, and policemen
and civil administrators can achieve, what this tells me is that there is a
limit: we’re talking about people’s attitudes, people’s perceptions – and
that’s what needs to be changed if we are to achieve the concept which
underpins 1244 of a new Kosovo: democratic, liberal, reconciled, multi-
ethnic. I’m afraid that my deduction is that there’s a very long way to go
indeed.76
Despite the stubborn persistence of ethnic nationalism in the face of
international efforts to introduce a new normative base, analysts are
sometimes dismissive of its importance and power. Susan Woodward, a
well regarded observer of the Yugoslav conflicts, wrote that ‘the 
label of nationalism is not sufficient to describe a situation or predict
behaviour … because of its empty-vessel character – its absence of
programme outside the insistence on political power for some 
imagined community’.77 The difficulty in making inroads with interna-
tional norms in places like Bosnia and Kosovo suggests that ethnic
nationalism is far from being an ‘empty-vessel’ and it is an identity that
will not easily be replaced. If this is the case, then it is likely to give
international peace-building efforts in South East Europe a decidedly
long-term character.
For NATO and other agencies engaged in peace-building, finding
a means of making democratic norms accessible to those possessing an
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ethnic identity is the key to effectively tackling the security problems of
the region. In this regard, a more differentiated approach to norm
transmission may yield better long-term prospects for security and
stability. It may also entail moving away from conventional western
notions of multicultural society. Where ethnic groups have become
separated by violence, it may be more desirable and practical to attempt
to build democracy in a monoethnic context. The application of a 
solution based on such an approach could apply to the two entities of
Bosnia and to Kosovo. Such solutions have been adopted in the past
and they may be the only viable option.78
NATO’s efforts to try to prevent ethnic conflict from leading to
civil war in Macedonia suggest that separation is not the first option to
pursue if ethnically mixed communities remain mostly intact and not
traumatised by brutal violence. Accepting ethnic separation as the
starting point for introducing democratic norms in failed states and
societies, however, is driven by the need to bring security not only to
regions and states but also to individuals. If the need for individual
human security and the promotion of democratic norms are best
advanced together in a monoethnic setting, then the prize of long-
term stability may prove less elusive. By matching norms to realities,
the structural problems that have hitherto impeded international
peace-building efforts in South East Europe could yet be swept away,
to the benefit of security and stability in this troubled part of the world. 
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Chapter 4
Kosovo, NATO and Russia
In the eyes of some observers, the Kosovo crisis posed the greatest
threat to relations between Russia and NATO since the end of the
Cold War. It also, according to some, seemingly demonstrated the
impotence and marginalisation of Russia as an actor in European 
security affairs. In order to test and explore the validity of these propo-
sitions the discussions in this chapter first chart the course of Russian
policy towards, and involvement in dealing with, the Kosovo crisis.
Following this, attention will turn to an examination of the longer term
impact of the crisis on relations between Russia and NATO.
Russia and the Kosovo crisis
Drifting apart from NATO, September 1997–March 1999
Russia and the leading NATO members were extensively engaged 
in discussing what to do about the developing crisis in Kosovo during
1997 and 1998. Two main forums were utilised for the conduct 
of these conversations, which produced a greater degree of agree-
ment than is sometimes supposed. They were the Contact Group and
the UNSC.
Kosovo was first discussed at a specially convened meeting of
Contact Group foreign ministers on the sidelines of the annual session
of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 1997. In 
a brief statement, they voiced ‘deep concern over tensions in Kosovo’
and warned both Serbs and Albanians ‘against any resort to violence 
to press political demands’. No sanctions were threatened in the 
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statement, should either side – or both – fail to heed this warning.
Nevertheless the western participants and Russia managed to reach
agreement on their preferences for the future status of Kosovo. They
stated that ‘we do not support independence and we do not support
maintenance of the status quo. We support an enhanced status for
Kosovo within the FRY’.1 In effect this would have restored the status
quo ante of the period up to 1989, before President Milosevic removed
much of the autonomy formerly enjoyed by Kosovo within
Communist Yugoslavia. 
When Russia and the NATO members began to disagree, it was
over the possible use of coercion in order to impose a settlement on
Milosevic. The Contact Group considered the imposition of sanctions
at a meeting in London in March 1998, in the face of worsening
violence in Kosovo. The proposed sanctions were:
a. A ‘comprehensive arms embargo against the FRY, including
Kosovo’.
b. A ban on supplying ‘equipment to the FRY which might be used for
internal repression, or for terrorism’.
c. ‘Denial of visas for senior FRY and Serbian representatives respon-
sible for repressive action by FRY security forces in Kosovo.’
d. A ban on ‘government-financed export credit support for trade and
investment … in Serbia’.
The London statement noted that ‘the Russian Federation cannot
support measures ‘c’ and ‘d’ above for immediate imposition. But if 
there is no progress towards the steps called for by the Contact Group,
the Russian Federation will then be willing to discuss all the above
measures’.2
Russia had thus not simply opted out of imposing sanctions as
some observers subsequently claimed.3 Its opposition was focused on
those elements of the proposed sanctions package that were directed
specifically against the Serbs. Elements ‘a’ and ‘b’ were not opposed.
This was because they would impact upon the KLA as well as Serb
forces, if weapons and repressive equipment were prevented from
entering the FRY ‘including Kosovo’. Even with regard to the sanc-
tions directed specifically against the Serbs, the statement carefully
noted that Russia might be willing to impose these too if the Milosevic
government proved intransigent.
UNSC Resolution 1160, passed in March 1998, imposed a
comprehensive arms embargo on the FRY ‘including Kosovo’, as called
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for by the Contact Group. It also threatened ‘the consideration of
additional measures’ should the FRY authorities not prove willing to
enter into a serious political dialogue over the future of Kosovo.4 This
resolution invoked Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which provides for
‘action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and
acts of aggression’. The invocation of Chapter 7 was regarded in some
important quarters at NATO as opening the door to potential military
enforcement action if the arms embargo did not prove sufficient. 
The Russian government supported Resolution 1160. According
to Russian press commentary, it did so for two reasons. First, in order
to send what it hoped would be a final warning to Milosevic and,
second, because its government did not want Russia to be isolated
within the Security Council.5 None of this meant, however, that the
Russian government was happy to countenance the use of force.
Indeed, the differences on this crucial issue, which began to loom large
during the second half of 1998, became the major source of division
and discord between Russia and NATO over the subsequent handling
of the Kosovo crisis. 
In September 1998, the Security Council passed Resolution 1199.
This made a series of specific demands of the FRY government and 
the leaders of the Albanian community in Kosovo. For the first time 
it called for ‘international monitoring’ on the ground in the province 
in order to verify compliance with these demands. As with the prede-
cessor Resolution 1160, it threatened ‘to consider further action 
and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in
the region’.6
The fact that its government also supported Resolution 1199
provoked some dissent inside Russia, chiefly on the grounds that 
the resolution’s terms might be used by NATO countries as cover 
for military action, without further recourse to the UN.7 But, as
Catherine Guicherd has pointed out, UNSC Resolutions providing for
consideration of ‘additional measures’ did not give carte blanche to
member states. Rather, they ‘have usually been interpreted as requiring
further action by the Security Council to allow military action’. This
understanding was given added clarity and weight in the cases of
Resolutions 1160 and 1199 by the fact that ‘Russia and China both
had accompanied their votes by legally valid declaratory statements
spelling out that the resolutions should not be interpreted as author-
ising the use of force’.8
An assumption that NATO members would return to the Security
Council to request authorisation to use force seems naive in retrospect
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given Russian opposition. Yet, it should be recalled that, up to this
point, NATO had treated Russia as a full and equal partner in its efforts
to tackle the Kosovo crisis. Indeed, Russia’s role and input had been
greater than that of most NATO members, due to its status on the
Security Council and membership of the Contact Group.
Subsequently, however, the Russians scarcely helped their own cause –
or the UN’s – by making clear that they would, under no circum-
stances, entertain any possibility of approving NATO military strikes in
the Security Council. 
Tim Judah has recounted a story from Richard Holbrooke which,
even if apocryphal in some details, nevertheless does fairly illustrate the
essential rigidity of the underlying Russian position. Holbrooke
described an informal Contact Group discussion in October 1998
between the then German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, and his
Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov:
Ivanov said: ‘If you take it [the issue of using force] to the UN, we’ll veto
it. If you don’t we’ll just denounce you.’ Kinkel says he wants to take it to
the Security Council, as do the British and French … So, Kinkel says:
‘Let’s have another stab at it.’ But Ivanov says: ‘Fine, we’ll veto it.’ And
Kinkel asks again and Ivanov says: ‘I just told you Klaus, we’ll veto it.’9
This confirmed the public line from Ivanov that, if NATO sought a
UN mandate for military action, Russia would ‘undoubtedly exercise
its veto’.10
In a 2000 report, the Independent International Commission on
Kosovo concluded that Russia’s ‘rigid commitment to veto any
enforcement action’ constituted ‘the major factor forcing NATO into
an unmandated action’ in its subsequent bombing campaign.11
The inflexibility of the Russians (and Chinese) on the Security Council
was even criticised – albeit indirectly – by the UN Secretary-General.
In his annual report to the General Assembly in September 1999, Kofi
Annan stated that ‘the choice, as I said during the Kosovo conflict,
must not be between … Council division, and regional action’. He
added that ‘the Member States of the United Nations should have
been able to find common ground in upholding the principles of the
Charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity’.12 Oleg
Levitin, a former Russian Foreign Ministry official who worked on its
Balkan Desk and in the Contact Group, subsequently argued that
Russian policy on Kosovo generally had been inflexible and unimagi-
native during this period.13
The Russian government may also have believed at this time that
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it had an additional veto over what NATO might do. On 29 January
1999, the Contact Group issued its summons to the Serbs and
Albanians to attend negotiations at Rambouillet. This was followed by
a session of the NATO NAC on 30 January, which agreed that:
NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary in the light of
both parties’ compliance with international commitments and require-
ments, including in particular assessment by the Contact Group of the
response to its demands, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, by compelling
compliance with the demands of the international community and the
achievement of a political settlement. The Council has therefore agreed
today that the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes against
targets on FRY territory [emphasis added].14
This ratcheting-up of the NATO airstrike threat provoked little protest
in Moscow at the time. The Russians may have thought that the 30
January statement, suggesting that NATO members would act only if
the Contact Group determined that the FRY government was being
obstructive, gave Russia, as a Contact Group member, a de facto veto
over any use of force.
Significant deterioration in relations between Russia and NATO
did not become apparent until after the Rambouillet meeting got
underway. Over the course of the negotiations, which broke up and
then reconvened the following month in Paris, the souring of relations
was pronounced, however. Marc Weller, who was present at
Rambouillet as an adviser to the Albanian delegation, has provided a
succinct summary:
Throughout the talks, significant rifts in the Contact Group were visible,
relating to the political settlement, to the implementation force and to the
threat or use of force as a tool of achieving a settlement. These divisions
became more pronounced towards the conclusion of the conference,
when a collapse of the talks appeared likely. In fact, one might say that
towards the end, the talks were less about Kosovo and more about rela-
tions within the Contact Group.15
Perhaps the key bone of contention between the Russian representa-
tives and their western counterparts was over the Russian perception
that, not only was NATO biased against the Serbs, it was actively
seeking to engineer a situation whereby the talks would fail, with the
Serbs being blamed. NATO would then have a pretext to begin
bombing.16 Some western observers, for their part, suspected the
Russians of not only being partisan in favour of the Serbs, but of acting
as the latter’s de facto representatives at Rambouillet.17
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As it became increasingly clear that an agreement would not be
reached in France, the prospect of NATO military action began to
loom large. It was made clear by the United States that NATO
reserved the right to launch airstrikes without consulting Russia, the
UN or anybody else.18 In February and March 1999, the prospect of
airstrikes was moving up the agenda and Russian opposition to them
was simultaneously becoming sharper and more vocal. 
Operation Allied Force, March–June 1999
The launch of Operation Allied Force on 24 March 1999 followed 
the final breakdown of negotiations. In New York, Sergei Lavrov,
Russia’s Permanent Representative on the UNSC, told a specially
convened meeting of the council that his country was ‘profoundly
outraged’ by the launch of airstrikes. In the view of the Russian
government, he said:
Those who are involved in this unilateral use of force against the sovereign
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – carried out in violation of the Charter of
the United Nations and without the authorization of the Security Council
– must realize the heavy responsibility they bear for subverting the
Charter and other norms of international law and for attempting to estab-
lish in the world, de facto, the primacy of force and unilateral diktat.19
It was arguable, as noted above, that Russia itself bore part of the
blame for ‘subverting the Charter’ in this instance. Because it had been
making clear for months that any attempt by NATO to use the UN
would be doomed to failure, the Russian government, in effect,
colluded with those NATO countries that were hardly predisposed to
involving the UN in the first place.
The Russian government, under Boris Yeltsin, severed most of its
institutional links with NATO on the day the bombing began. Much
was made of this in both the Russian and western media, where it 
was frequently suggested that Russia had ‘broken off links with the
West’. In reality the Russian action was carefully calibrated and
targeted and it did not amount to anything so drastic. The Yeltsin
administration resisted calls from the Russian Communist Party
amongst others to terminate its military presence in Bosnia as part of
the NATO-led SFOR.20 The government opted instead to make
limited and symbolic ‘adjustments’ to its SFOR contingent. These
included withdrawing its deputy commander21 and two signals officers
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responsible for communications with NATO.22 In this way Russia
could indicate its displeasure whilst maintaining the substance of its
military co-operation with NATO forces on the ground in Bosnia. On
the wider diplomatic front, the Russian government maintained
normal diplomatic relations with all NATO governments, including
the United States.
Although its immediate rhetorical response was subsequently
described as being ‘of a pitch unheard in the entire post-Cold War
period’,23 the Yeltsin government was clear from the start and explic-
itly that its practical response to the NATO ‘aggression’ would be
circumscribed. Following the initial bombing raids on the FRY, Ivanov
stated that ‘Russia does not intend to take any [military] countermea-
sures with respect to NATO’.24 It was clear that Russia lacked the
means to take such measures even if it had wanted to. The only mili-
tary response was to deploy an intelligence collection ship, the Liman.
A rumoured deployment of warships from the Black Sea Fleet never
materialised.25
There were, in addition, three reasons behind this policy of
limited disruption of relations. First, the Yeltsin government felt that it
could not afford – literally – to take any action which might jeopardise
the financial and economic support that it received from western coun-
tries and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).26 In spring 1999 the Russian economy had barely begun to
recover from the effects of a currency crisis the previous summer.
Second, there was an underlying fear of being isolated, or rather in this
case of Russia isolating itself. President Yeltsin expressed this clearly
one month into the bombing. ‘In spite of NATO’s aggressive actions,
we cannot break with the Western countries’ he said, ‘we cannot lead
ourselves into isolation because we are in Europe and no one will kick
us out of Europe’.27 In some quarters, finally, there was a sense of
impotence; that there was nothing Russia could do to stop the
bombing anyway.28
In his initial response to the bombing, on 24 March, Yeltsin, whilst
announcing the suspension of institutional links with NATO, was
careful to keep the door open in one particularly important area. He
stated that ‘the sooner negotiations are resumed, the greater the
chance the international community will have of finding a political
settlement. Russia is prepared to continue working closely with the other
members of the Contact Group for the sake of achieving this goal’ [empha-
sis added].29 From the very beginning of Operation Allied Force, the
best opportunity for Russia to avoid becoming isolated or marginalised
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and to demonstrate that it was not completely impotent, lay in the
diplomatic sphere. Thus it was scarcely surprising that, from day one,
Russian leaders concentrated their energies on efforts to broker a
diplomatic settlement and to make their country an indispensable
partner in doing so.
First off the mark was the then Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov.
Primakov put special effort into cultivating the French and, especially,
the German governments. This was shrewd diplomacy. Primakov was
almost certainly calculating that the chances of an acceptable settle-
ment package being constructed would be enhanced if he could build
a sympathetic coalition inside NATO generally, rather than dealing
exclusively with the United States. In addition, he probably calculated
that these two continental European countries would be more
amenable to according Russia a key role in the diplomacy than the US.
By cultivating them, therefore, Russia might thus better establish itself
as a vital factor in the diplomatic equation.
The latter element of Primakov’s strategy soon began to yield
results. At the end of March, Rossiiskaya Gazeta quoted ‘French diplo-
matic sources’ as saying that ‘the small door leading to peace in the
Balkans has one key, it is in Russia’s hands’.30 One week later, the
German Foreign Ministry stated that ‘the German government
believes that a solution to the conflict in Kosovo can be found only
through close cooperation with Russia’.31
Following these initial ‘successes’, President Yeltsin decided to
become more directly involved. He did so on 14 April 1999 by
appointing former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to be his
‘special representative for the conflict in Yugoslavia’. In effect this
meant that Primakov was being sidelined. The latter, indeed, was to be
sacked by Yeltsin as Prime Minister the following month. Yeltsin’s deci-
sion to shuffle his pack was prompted by several concerns. One was
domestic politicking.32 As Russian commentator Vladimir Baranovsky
noted, ‘the coming parliamentary and presidential elections are always
present in a very conspicuous way in nearly all the steps taken by the
leading Russian politicians in connection with the Yugoslav develop-
ments’.33 By the spring of 1999, Yeltsin had evidently decided that he
did not want Primakov to succeed him as President. Thus, the latter’s
power base was progressively undermined. 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta identified other reasons for Yeltsin choosing
Chernomyrdin. It opined that ‘the President had to put all national
efforts to resolve the Yugoslav crisis into the hands of a man who
would be completely under Boris Yeltsin’s control’. Chernomyrdin
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was, in addition, ‘so well known in the world that he can negotiate as
an equal with Western and Yugoslav leaders’.34
By the middle of April, three weeks after the start of Operation
Allied Force, Russian leaders had succeeded in securing a role in the
diplomatic negotiations that would eventually contribute to a settle-
ment of the Kosovo crisis. In assessing the nature and extent of the
influence that Russia had on the terms of the final settlement, it is
necessary first of all to consider NATO’s own starting point, which was
agreed just before Chernomyrdin’s appointment. In a statement
released after a NAC meeting on 12 April, the member states set out
five demands which President Milosevic was expected to meet before
the bombing could be called off. They were:
• a verifiable end to Serb military action and repression in Kosovo
• the withdrawal from Kosovo of Serb military, police and paramili-
tary forces
• the stationing in the province of an ‘international military presence’
• the unconditional and safe return of refugees and displaced persons
and ‘unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations’
• willingness to work, on the basis of the draft Rambouillet agree-
ment, on a settlement of the political status of Kosovo.35
Two days after these five points were agreed, ironically on the day that
Chernomyrdin was appointed to his special envoy’s job, Primakov’s
efforts with the German government yielded their most tangible fruit.
A German ‘peace plan’ was unveiled. Actually this description,
although widely used in the media, was inaccurate on two counts.
First, the proposals did not amount to a ‘plan’ as such. Rather, they
were presented as a series of suggested steps by which a settlement
might be reached. Second, the proposals were not exclusively German.
They had been agreed jointly by German and Russian diplomats. The
vital importance of Russian involvement was repeatedly stressed on the
German side, although it suited the Russians to have the proposals
presented formally by the FRG in order to increase the chances of a
positive reception within NATO.36
The de facto Russo-German proposals incorporated NATO’s 
five demands, but there were also four significant additions. First, it
was proposed that the Group of Eight (G8) provide the framework
within which the eventual proposals to be put to Milosevic be agreed.
This reflected the obvious Russian interest in institutionalising 
Russia’s involvement as a full and equal participant in the international
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diplomatic efforts. The Contact Group was evidently seen as a busted
flush, having more or less fallen apart in France. The membership of
the G8 was virtually identical however; with Canada and Japan sitting
alongside Russia and the five leading NATO members. Thus it seemed
to offer a comparable forum. 
The second key element in the Russo-German proposals was
United Nations involvement. The UN had not been mentioned in
NATO’s 12 April statement, other than in a passing reference to any
final settlement of the status of Kosovo being ‘in conformity [with] …
the Charter of the United Nations’. In the Russo-German proposals,
however, the UN was assigned major roles. In the first place, any
agreement should, it was proposed, be implemented via a UNSC
Resolution. It was further suggested that the UN should be in charge
of the ‘transitional administration’ of Kosovo pending a final settle-
ment of its status.
The third new element was the proposal that any settlement must
include agreement on demilitarising the KLA, which had not figured
at all in NATO’s 12 April demands. Ensuring that this was part of 
any eventual settlement was motivated by the long-standing Russian
view that NATO was biased against the Serbs. Finally, a bombing pause
was proposed once the withdrawal of Serb military and other forces
had begun; this to be made permanent once the withdrawal was
completed.37
The initial response from NATO collectively to these initiatives
seemed frosty. At the Washington summit in late April, NATO’s five
demands were simply repeated verbatim and, for good measure, it was
stated that ‘there can be no compromise on these conditions’.38
Behind the scenes, however, things were more fluid. According to then
US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, Yeltsin put through a
telephone call to President Clinton towards the end of the summit (the
five demands had been reaffirmed on the first day). During this conver-
sation, it was agreed that Chernomyrdin should negotiate directly with
the US on forming an agreed position, which could then be presented
to Milosevic. 
Talbott, who was designated by Clinton as Chernomyrdin’s chief
interlocutor on the American side, subsequently stated that:
I think [this] can be seen as a bit of a turning point, because until Viktor
Chernomyrdin engaged on behalf of President Yeltsin and the Russian
government, the Russian position was basically kind of just say no … But
when President Yeltsin decided to dispatch Mr Chernomyrdin, who was a
close ally and associate of his, and had been his prime minister for a long
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time … it represented an attempt to use the prestige of Russia and the
diplomatic energy of Russia and the skills of Mr Chernomyrdin to see if
despite our disagreement over the need for the bombing campaign, we
could agree on the terms by which the bombing campaign could come to
an end.
Talbott acknowledged that there had been pressure on the western
side, at the summit, to accommodate the Russians. He recalled ‘a real
sense of tension building’ and a ‘widespread feeling that [Kosovo] was
going to spoil much else of what was going on between the US and
Russia, between the West and Russia, between NATO and Russia’.39
Following the NATO summit, things began to move quickly.
From late April, Chernomyrdin and Talbott began a series of meetings
designed to flesh out a common negotiating position. In early May,
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari joined them, as the representative
of the European Union. It was widely recognised that the initial
Chernomyrdin-Talbott talks represented the opening of a new phase 
in diplomatic efforts to end the crisis.40 It was accepted on all sides 
that the Russians were not there purely for form’s sake or to make up
the numbers. 
Chernomyrdin’s presence in the newly formed diplomatic troika
fulfilled two key functions. First, by late April and after a month’s
worth of bombing, the Clinton administration had come round to the
view, as Erik Yesson has put it, that ‘NATO could not bring to bear
sufficient leverage on Serbia by itself; other actors had to participate’.41
The best-placed ‘other actor’ seemed to be Russia, with its historic
engagement in South East Europe and sympathy for the Serbs.
Chernomyrdin played on this, telling his western interlocutors that ‘if
you want to persuade Milosevic you have to convince me first’.42
Second, Chernomyrdin was able to develop a ‘good cop/bad cop’
approach with Ahtisaari in what Talbott called the ‘hammer and anvil’
strategy. As the Deputy Secretary of State explained, ‘the notion was
that Chernomyrdin would be the hammer and would pound away on
Milosevic, and President Ahtisaari would be the anvil against who the
pounding would take place, so that Milosevic would know what he had
to do in order to get the bombing stopped’.43
It is noteworthy that Talbott himself did not travel to Belgrade
during the diplomatic endgame in late May and early June. Rather, he
left it to Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari to execute their hammer and
anvil strategy. For this to work it was essential that all three negotiators
had reached solid agreement on a common negotiating position in
advance. The Americans had to be sure that the Russians were firmly
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on board. Otherwise there was a chance that Chernomyrdin might
depart from the agreed script in Belgrade. As Talbott later put it, ‘the
logic of … the tri-lateral diplomacy among President Ahtisaari, Mr
Chernomyrdin and ourselves was to basically close down the gaps that
existed among the various parts of the international community’,
which otherwise President Milosevic might have been able to exploit.44
It is an inaccurate caricature to – as some have done45 – portray
Russia as having been little more than the ‘messenger boy’ or ‘post
office’ transmitting NATO’s demands to Milosevic. The demands that
were transmitted differed in significant respects, and not just ‘in
nuance’,46 from those that NATO had originally laid down on 12 April
1999. None of NATO’s original demands were deleted. The differ-
ences lay in what was subsequently added in. These additions were the
best measurement of Russia’s diplomatic influence and success.
The principles upon which the eventual settlement was based were
agreed at a meeting of G8 foreign ministers on 6 May 1999. Use of
the G8 forum in itself reflected a concession to Russian (and German)
requests as put forward in their joint proposals of 14 April. The G8
principles incorporated the 12 April NATO demands but amplified
them in significant ways. In so doing they also reflected key elements
of the 14 April Russo-German proposals. The main additions were:
• The ‘international presences’ to be deployed in Kosovo following a
Serb withdrawal should be both ‘civil and security’. 
• These presences should be ‘endorsed and adopted by the United
Nations’. 
• The G8 statement agreed on the ‘establishment of an interim
administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of
the United Nations’. 
• The ‘demilitarization of the UCK’ (KLA) was identified as an inte-
gral part of an overall political settlement.47
Overall, as Dov Lynch has noted, the G8 settlement ‘contained impor-
tant elements of success for Russia’.48 Of course the Russians had to
agree some compromises in return, as is normal practice in diplomatic
intercourse.49
Jockeying for position, June–July 1999
One key issue had not been resolved before Milosevic accepted the
NATO/G8 demands. This was the nature and extent of a Russian 
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military presence, working with NATO, in post-settlement Kosovo.
Chernomyrdin had accepted that the international security presence
should be NATO-led. This was incorporated into UNSC Resolution
1244, which put into place the agreed settlement.50 The specific ques-
tion of Russian participation was effectively set aside for subsequent
consideration, in order to prevent it from holding up the overall deal.51
What happened next demonstrated that, for all their diplomatic co-
operation since the end of April, substantial underlying distrust
remained between Russia and NATO.
On the day after Resolution 1244 was passed, some 200 Russian
troops detached themselves from the Russian SFOR contingent 
in Bosnia. They undertook a pre-emptive march to the airport in
Pristina, arriving before the first NATO troops from the newly formed
KFOR. Various explanations for the ‘dash to Pristina’ have been put
forward. In the West, conspiracy theorists suggested that Serb forces,
on their way out of Kosovo, had arranged to give back to the Russians
military equipment that the latter had covertly supplied during 
the conflict. A variation on this theme had the Serbs handing over 
the wreckage of the highly sensitive US F-117 ‘stealth’ fighter, which
had been shot down early on in the NATO bombing campaign.52
In Russia, meanwhile, some explanations focused on the perceived
need for Yeltsin (assuming that the dash was, indeed, ordered by 
him) to pull off a dramatic gesture to distract attention from political
travails at home.53 Others argued that it was designed to reinforce the
point that Russia remained an important player in South East Euro-
pean affairs.54
Still others have argued that the dash represented only the initial
deployment of an intended substantial force. Its purpose was allegedly
to occupy the northern part of Kosovo, where the majority of its
Serbian population lived, and assist the Milosevic government in effec-
tively partitioning the province. This particular conspiracy theory has
enjoyed high-level support. Former National Security Adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski advanced it, in hearings before the US Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations in October 1999.55 In his memoir of
the Kosovo crisis, General Clark makes clear that he also believed that
partition was the Russian objective.56 Yet, as Clark also noted in his
memoirs; ‘if the Russians really wanted to enter and establish a sector
in the north of Kosovo, they could simply drive across the border [i.e.
from Bosnia through Serbia], even if we blocked the airfield, and plant
their flag. Reinforcements could be flown in to airfields in Serbia and
driven in’.57 Why, therefore, dispatch a symbolic force to a high-profile
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site in the provincial capital when a more substantial force could have
been dispatched directly to northern Kosovo?
The most likely explanation is that the Russian bottom line was
about ensuring that they had some actual military presence, however
small, in the heart of Kosovo at the start of the post-conflict phase
and were not, therefore, frozen out completely by NATO. The nature
of the Russian involvement in KFOR had not yet been agreed, as
noted. Many in Russia evidently felt that, when the crunch came, they
could not trust NATO to ensure that Russia’s views would be
adequately respected in Kosovo unless Russia itself moved to establish
facts on the ground before NATO arrived. Thereafter, and like it or
not, NATO members would be compelled to negotiate a mutually
acceptable Russian role in KFOR. This, in essence, is what subse-
quently happened.
By July 1999, it was clear that relations between Russia and the
West had survived the Kosovo crisis essentially intact, if far from in
rude health. The discussions above have demonstrated that at no time
during the crisis had there been a complete breakdown in relations.
There certainly did exist a substantial mistrust of NATO amongst
Russian political and military leaders, as evidenced by the pre-emptive
dash to Pristina. But the prevailing Russian view was summed up in
Vremya MN:
During the Balkan war, Russia made the most important choice in our
country’s recent history. We didn’t ally ourselves with NATO, but, thank
God, we didn’t become its enemy either. Now, Russia and the West can
become partners who may not have any reason to love each other, but
have to work together if only because there’s no getting away from each
other.58
Russia and NATO since the Kosovo crisis
The period between June 1999 and September 2001 was characterised
by a deliberate Russian policy of gradually and incrementally restoring
those links and co-operation with NATO that had been broken off at
the start of Operation Allied Force. This process was begun during the
last months of the Yeltsin administration. Co-operation in KFOR59
necessitated re-establishing some kind of institutional channel of
communication between Russia and NATO at the political level, to
allow for the discussion of Kosovo-related issues. 
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On 23 July 1999, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
(PJC) met for the first time since before the start of Operation Allied
Force. The PJC had been established in the summer of 1997 to provide
a forum for consultation between Russia and the NATO members. It
had, however, failed to live up to expectations with Russia and NATO
both investing relatively little political capital in the forum. On the
other hand, for all its limitations the PJC was the only extant politico-
diplomatic structure for the carrying on of Russia–NATO discussions.
Therefore, the use of it was more by default than Russian desire.
The Russian side was at pains to make clear that PJC meetings
would not wipe the slate clean and did not signal a return to business
as before. Rather, the Russian government emphasised that the PJC
was being reactivated solely for the purpose of discussing issues ‘in a
clearly defined sphere: interaction within the framework of KFOR’.60 A
moderate upgrading was announced two months later when the
Russian government decided to send back its chief military representa-
tive to NATO. However, it declared that this signalled no change in its
basic approach of restricting contacts to those deemed necessary in
order to maintain Russia’s voice in KFOR.61
No further progress was possible during the remainder of the
Yeltsin Presidency, seemingly bearing out the predictions of pessimists
who had argued that Russia–NATO relations were unlikely to ever be
restored to their pre-crisis levels.62 At the least, it was widely assumed
inside Russia during the second half of 1999 that no further progress
on restoring relations with NATO was possible until after the forth-
coming parliamentary and presidential elections.63
Balancing this, however, was the view, widely expressed by Russian
political leaders, that Russia would have to learn (again) to live with
NATO on the European stage. As Igor Ivanov expressed it in October
1999: ‘like it or not, NATO is a reality in today’s international arena,
primarily in Europe but also in the world in general’. Four months
later, Primakov expressed a similar view when he said that ‘we have to
talk, as NATO is a real force and this should be taken into account’.64
Once the elections were out of the way, therefore, and a new President
installed in office, it seemed likely that, notwithstanding the bitterness
left by the Kosovo crisis, Russia’s political leaders would continue –
and perhaps accelerate – the process of gradually re-establishing ties
with NATO.
President Yeltsin announced his resignation at the end of 1999
having, it was widely assumed, manoeuvred his preferred successor,
Vladimir Putin, into pole position for the forthcoming presidential
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election. Putin wasted little time, early in 2000, in making clear his
interest in not only continuing with the incremental restoration of links
with NATO, but in moving them forward in qualitative terms. In
February, Lord Robertson visited Moscow on the first high-level
NATO official trip to Russia since Operation Allied Force. He met with
Putin and Ivanov. The two sides agreed on a statement pledging to
‘intensify their dialogue in the Permanent Joint Council … on a wide
range of security issues that will enable NATO and Russia to address
the challenges that lie ahead and to make their mutual cooperation a
cornerstone of European security’.65 In other words, consultations
within the PJC would, from henceforth, take place on other issues in
addition to those relating to KFOR.
Robertson was, sensibly, careful to avoid the appearance of
triumphalism over this agreement. He restricted his public assessment
to the understated comment that ‘we’ve moved from permafrost into
slightly softer ground’.66 Nevertheless, there was little doubt that this
was the most significant step forward since the end of Operation Allied
Force. In Russia, Segodnya asserted that ‘it’s safe to say that the crisis in
Russia–NATO relations has been overcome, or almost overcome’.67 It
is important to note, however, that the moves made between June
1999 and February 2000 resulted in the restoration of the status quo
ante; i.e. the Permanent Joint Council. No thought appeared to have
been given by NATO members to developing new and better consul-
tative machinery with Russia. To be fair, prior to the severe jolt
induced by the events of 11 September 2001, it was not easy to see
what a better alternative to the existing PJC-based framework might
look like.68
In March 2000, Putin made headlines both at home and abroad
following a British television interview. Most of the attention focused
on his response to a question about possible Russian membership 
in NATO. ‘Why not?’ was Putin’s reply. This was widely interpreted 
as a strong political signal to the NATO members that Putin wanted 
to see relations further improved and developed, in a qualitatively
significant way.69
In Brussels, Robertson, in a statement, said that although ‘at
present Russian membership of NATO is not on the agenda’, never-
theless, NATO recognised ‘the need for partnership between the
Alliance and Russia, and will work hard to build on our existing
links’.70 The indications by Putin that the ‘existing links’ were not
sufficient and should be superseded by something more did not elicit
a NATO response at this time. 
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The impact of 11 September 2001
Initially, in the days and weeks following the terrorist strikes on New
York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001, it seemed as if their
effect would be felt more in confirming the objectives that Putin had
already signalled rather than in ushering in anything dramatically new.
In late September, the Russian President was quoted as calling on
NATO to admit Russia to membership; a clear echo of his television
interview eighteen months previously.71 Putin seemingly wanted to
take advantage of western – especially US – interest in constructing 
the broadest possible international coalition for the impending ‘war 
on terror’ in order to persuade NATO members to respond more
dynamically than hitherto to his signals in favour of enhanced relations
and more co-operation. Following a meeting with Robertson in early
October, Putin was quoted as saying that ‘we have got the impression
that our signals in favour of closer co-operation have been heard’.72
Positive mood music had also been picked up at a PJC meeting at 
the end of September.73 Thus far, however, there had been little more
than words. 
The prospects of this situation changing seemed especially prom-
ising in November. Amongst NATO members there was talk that
Russian representatives might be given co-decision-making rights – in
effect a veto – in a new ‘council of twenty’ at NATO headquarters.
Tony Blair was publicly credited with the initiative behind this idea,
perhaps because he was reckoned to have a particularly good personal
relationship with the Russian President.74 In fact, on a visit to Moscow
that month, Lord Robertson attributed similar ideas to the US, FRG,
Italy and Canada.75
Robertson’s public remarks on his visit to Russia were most note-
worthy for his candid admission of the lack of substance in Russia–
NATO relations to date. In a speech to the Diplomatic Academy 
in Moscow, Robertson said that ‘the current state of NATO–Russia
relations is not sufficient to deal seriously with the new security 
challenges that confront us today and tomorrow’. He added that:
Our Partnership has remained a nervous one … Fundamental differences
in perception persist, above all regarding the future of the European 
security architecture, and the respective roles NATO and Russia should
play within this architecture. The 1999 Kosovo crisis exposed these
fundamental differences in perception.76
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In effect, Robertson used his November 2001 visit to formally propose
the ‘council of twenty’ to the Russian government. He gave it a provi-
sional name – the ‘Russia-North Atlantic Council’ (RNAC). This new
body, he explained:
would involve Russia having an equality with the NATO countries in
terms of the subject matter and would be part of the same compromising
trade-offs, give and take, that is involved in day-to-day NATO business.
That is how we do business at 19. The great United States of America, the
mighty France and Germany, the United Kingdom have an equal voice to
tiny Luxembourg and even tinier Iceland. But we get compromises. 
We build consensus. So the idea would be that Russia would enter that.
That would give Russia a right of equality but also a responsibility and an
obligation that would come from being part of the consensus-building
organization. That is why I say a new attitude is going to be required on
both sides if this is going to work. But if it works, it obviously is a huge
change, a sea change in the way in which we do business.77
From these remarks, it was clear that Robertson envisaged the RNAC
serving, in significant part, to ‘discipline’ the Russians. This might
prevent them from repeating what some westerners regarded as a 
dilettante approach under the ‘Founding Act’ (the name given to the
1997 agreement on Russia–NATO relations, which had established the
PJC). By 2001, NATO officials could point to a number of instances
where Russia had obstructed the implementation of the Founding
Act’s provisions; by, for example, repeatedly holding up the opening of
a NATO military liaison mission in Moscow. 
Consensus-building has achieved an almost mystical status
amongst NATO member states. This was evident during the course 
of Operation Allied Force. As noted in Chapter 2, constant reference
was made throughout the campaign to the primary importance of 
maintaining allied solidarity and cohesion. That this was maintained
was regarded within NATO, and elsewhere, as a major – if not the
prime – reason why Milosevic eventually conceded. According to
NATO officials subsequently, there was never any significant prospect
of consensus-breaking. This, they explained, was because of the 
strenuous efforts made in developing basic consensus on NATO’s
objectives before military operations were launched. Once achieved, the
consensus was something that no member – large or small – would
lightly break.78 Thus, one can understand the idea that bringing
Russian representatives into the consensus-building process would
have positive effects in encouraging them to engage more seriously and
constructively with NATO than hitherto.
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NATO foreign ministers formally endorsed the RNAC proposal 
at their meeting in December 2001. They stated that the aim of 
establishing a new council would be to ‘identify and pursue opportu-
nities for joint action at 20’, by creating ‘new, effective mechanisms 
for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint
action’. Significantly, by promising to create ‘new, effective mecha-
nisms’, NATO members were tacitly admitting that their existing 
co-operative arrangements with Russia had been ultimately ineffective.
The ministers were careful to reaffirm that Russia was being offered 
a more substantial voice but ultimately no veto over core areas.
‘NATO’, they stated, ‘will maintain its prerogative of independent
decision and action at 19 on all issues consistent with its obligations
and responsibilities’.79
As the year 2002 began, representatives from NATO and Russia
set to work on trying to turn the RNAC idea into reality. The talks got
underway against the general background – certainly in Russia – of a
sense that whatever ‘bounce’ had been given to the country’s relations
with the West in general, and the United States in particular, by 11
September had substantially dissipated. In January 2002, an editorial
in Izvestia argued that ‘everything [is] just like it was before … Sept.
11 changed nothing. The Americans are the same as they were before.
Russia and its president need not expect a special approach, leniency or
solidarity on the part of the sole superpower’.80 Vremya MN, mean-
while, noted that ‘the latest illusory honeymoon in relations with the
US lasted less than five months’.81
At first, the course of negotiations in the spring of 2002 appeared
to confirm the suspicions of the Russian pessimists. For their part,
Russian negotiators seemed to some in the West to be unable or
unwilling to break away from an approach which alternated between
making over-ambitious demands and putting forward ideas seemingly
designed to weaken and undermine NATO.82
The NATO position reportedly hardened at this time, under 
pressure from a divided Bush administration.83 In February 2002, a
widely cited report in the Financial Times claimed that NATO
members had reached agreement on restricting the scope of Russian
input. Reportedly, Russia would not be offered decision-making 
rights on matters pertaining to ‘the vital interests of any one Nato
country’ or ‘issues that involve military decisions’. It was also reported
that NATO members had agreed on a ‘retrieval’ mechanism, allowing
them to withdraw an issue from the new council ‘if consensus proves
impossible’.84
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A sense of approaching impasse was apparent at this time. In early
March, the Russians were reported to have ‘submitted a proposal
which focused very heavily on substance’, whereas NATO members
‘had agreed a position that focused on … structure, modalities and
principles’. As a result, ideas for the new council were ‘still at a rela-
tively early stage of exploration’.85 In an interview published in The
Times, Igor Ivanov revealed that negotiations ‘were not going well’, a
situation that he attributed to ‘the refusal by some to overcome Cold
War stereotypes’.86
Yet, the December 2001 NATO meeting had pledged that the
new council would be ready at, or even before, the next foreign minis-
ters’ gathering which was scheduled for May 2002 in Reykjavik. This
imposed a deadline that would have been highly politically and diplo-
matically embarrassing – for both sides – to have missed. Thus, in
Reykjavik the NATO ministers announced the creation of what was
now to be officially known as the ‘NATO-Russia Council’ (NRC) to
replace the existing PJC. 
According to press reports, the NRC would give Russia co-deci-
sion-making rights in nine issue areas, including significant ones such
as military crisis management, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and theatre missile defence. This
appeared to confound pessimists who had speculated that nothing of
substance would emerge from the Russia–NATO negotiations. As
such, it provoked enthusiastic media commentary. The Times, for
example, called the NRC ‘the most far-reaching change in the North
Atlantic alliance since Nato was founded in 1949’.87 The Guardian was
only slightly less enthusiastic in describing the new arrangement as
‘one of the most fundamental shifts in European security since the
collapse of communism’.88
Important provisos were, however, reportedly included in the new
arrangement. One was the retrieval mechanism, allowing NATO
members to withdraw an issue from discussion in the NRC if the
prospects for consensus being reached with the Russians looked poor.
This opened the door to potential disagreements over who should
decide when such an impasse had been reached. There was also
reported ambiguity over whether or not NATO members would
reserve the right to formulate common positions in advance of meet-
ings with the Russians.89 This was an important issue. It had been one
of the main complaints from the Russian side in the PJC since 1997.
Two weeks after the Reykjavik meeting, leaders from the nineteen
NATO member states met in Rome with President Putin to formally
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set the seal on their new council. Their agreed communiqué was
upbeat and effusive. The nine areas for co-operative endeavour, which
had been flagged up in Reykjavik, were confirmed. It was stated that
the NRC would ‘provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-
building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member
states of NATO and Russia’.90 NATO officials stressed the importance
of the consensus-building element, confirming that a significant part 
of the institution’s intention with the new council was to educate their
Russian interlocutors in the ways of responsible multilateral decision-
making.91
If this sounded somewhat patronising, it also represented perhaps
the best hope of NATO members taking the new council seriously 
in the sense of really intending to develop joint decision-making 
and implementation procedures with the Russians. The Rome commu-
niqué appeared quite clear on this score, stating that ‘the members 
of the NATO-Russia Council … will take joint decisions and will 
bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implemen-
tation’. Taken at face value this seemed unequivocal. The recent
history of Russia–NATO relations cautioned against taking such 
statements at face value however. The 1997 Founding Act – the 
first attempt to create a lasting Russia-NATO institutional relationship
– was also supposed to provide the means ‘for joint decisions and 
joint action … to the maximum extent possible’.92 But this had never
been developed. 
In substantial part, the failure of the Founding Act had been due
to the approach of the Russians, as noted earlier. However, NATO
members must also bear part of the blame. They had never been
willing to engage in genuinely thorough-going multilateral consulta-
tions, preferring instead to formulate common positions amongst
themselves in advance of PJC meetings and then engage in rather
desultory and non-binding conversations with the Russians. As a result
of the failure by all parties to invest more political capital and effort in
it, the PJC was effectively moribund even before its failure to perform
any useful role during the Kosovo crisis.93
What were the prospects of the new NRC turning out differently?
There could be no guarantees. However, optimists could point to two
differences with 1997. First, there was some evidence that both sides
had learnt from the failure of the PJC. NATO leaders in 2001–02
explicitly stated their willingness, from the start of negotiations, to
bring Russian representatives into their hallowed consensus-building
practices. The Russians, for their part, accepted the implied obligation
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that this placed on them to participate constructively and positively in
the often frustrating and laborious task of building consensus amongst
different countries. 
There was also the prospect of the new arrangements being insti-
tutionalised to a greater degree. Russia was to maintain a permanent
mission at the NATO headquarters, as opposed to just sending repre-
sentatives to meetings, as had been the case with the PJC. The 2002
agreement also pledged that a ‘Preparatory Committee’ would be
established to undertake the necessary staff-work in advance of NRC
meetings. This apparently innocuous administrative announcement
belied a more profound potential change. The Preparatory Committee
would include ‘Russian representation at the appropriate level’. This
would, if implemented in good faith, allow the Russians to be involved
at the crucial agenda-setting and preparation stages of the consultative
process. It would make it more difficult for NATO members to present
them with pre-cooked ‘alliance positions’.
Underlying this, second, was an emerging perception that western
– and especially United States – policy towards Russia was now in the
process of undergoing a sea-change as a result of the events of 11
September 2001. In Rome, Lord Robertson spoke of the:
expectations that this will not be just another glizty protocol event, but a
real breakthrough. Expectations that the new NATO-Russia Council will
not just talk but will act, not just analyse but prescribe, not just deliberate
but take decisive action … and if we need a reminder of why, then there
is a simple answer. There is a common enemy out there. The man and
woman in the street, be it Petrovka Street or 66th Street, knows it, feels it
and they expect us to address it. 11 September 2001 brought death to
thousands of people in one act of terrible, criminal violence. But it also
brought a message to the leaders of the democratic world. Find solutions
and find them together.94
In the wider domain, opinion was more mixed. Some observers 
and commentators continued to argue that Russia–NATO relations
were as they had always been – hollow and lacking substance – and 
that the new NRC was unlikely to change that. In the UK, the
Guardian, adopting in its editorial a markedly cooler tone than had 
its reporter at Reykjavik, wrote of the ‘phoney piazza of platitudes’ 
in Rome.95
For a growing number of commentators, however, a more positive
and important change was underway. In an insightful commentary, The
Economist argued that ‘America’s relations with Russia are better than
at any time since the end of the second world war and are improving’.
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Three reasons were cited in support of this contention. The first was
renewed concern in the US that terrorists or ‘rogue’ states might gain
access to ex-Soviet nuclear materials, either through theft or covert
Russian sales, unless the Russians were persuaded and/or helped to
secure their stockpiles. Second, the Bush administration was reported
to be taking a renewed interest in Russia’s role as a major producer 
of oil and gas. As such, a closer US partnership with Russia might 
help reduce the former’s level of dependence on energy supplies 
from the Middle East. Third, and most direct, the administration
wanted to maintain, for the long haul, the practical co-operation and
assistance which Putin had been giving to the war on terror since the
autumn of 2001.96
Conclusions
The story of Russia’s involvement in the Kosovo crisis tells us impor-
tant things about its status and role in post-Cold War European 
security affairs. Most important, from the evidence of the crisis Russia
has not been as weak, in terms of diplomacy, and its relations with
NATO not as unbalanced as is sometimes supposed. In the period
April–June 1999, it played a key diplomatic role in bringing about the
Kosovo settlement. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that during the crisis Russia had
effectively used its diplomacy to make up for a measurable decline 
in influence and power overall. The diplomatic success cannot easily
disguise Russia’s general decline as a power. In this context, Lawrence
Freedman has written that ‘if [Russia] continues to be treated as a 
great power, that is because others choose to do so, not because 
they must’.97
In 2000, Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon argued that the
long-term impact of the Kosovo crisis on Russia–NATO relations was
likely to be ‘modest’.98 Events since then have confirmed the validity
of their conclusion. Relations between Russia and the West, and in
particular between Russia and the United States, have been much more
profoundly affected by the events of 11 September 2001.
Notwithstanding this, relations have, so far, remained ultimately
unfulfilled. Neither side has clearly identified to the other – nor, in 
all probability, worked out for itself – what it wants from the relation-
ship. The Russian government has, at various times, been vocal and
clear in asserting what it did not want; chiefly the eastward enlarge-
ment of NATO’s membership and unilateral military action over
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Kosovo. But it has proved vaguer and more reticent when it has come
to identifying and fleshing out the nature and parameters of its rela-
tionship with the institution. 
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Chapter 5
The EU’s military dimension:
a child of the Kosovo crisis?
One of the most frequently cited ‘lessons’ of the Kosovo crisis has 
been the alleged extent to which it spurred West European leaders to
address a perceived need for Europe to do more for its own military
security. Member states of the European Union decided to establish 
a ‘European Security and Defence Policy’ (ESDP) in the months
following Operation Allied Force. Daalder and O’Hanlon have written
that ‘the growing consensus on the need for a European defense 
capability is a direct consequence of the Kosovo crisis’.1 Others have
argued in similar vein.2
The discussions in this chapter will critically examine this view.
They will consider the long- and short-term origins of the ESDP and
assess the extent to which the Kosovo crisis was the key driver leading
to the decisions by EU members formally to create it in 1999.
The long-term evolution of the ESDP
The Cold War years
The most basic of what may be called the ‘permissive facilitators’ for
the development of the ESDP can be found in the nature of the
European Union itself. The idea encapsulated in the concept of 
‘functional integration’ (sometimes called the ‘Monnet method’) has
exercised significant influence on political leaders in continental EU
countries. The impact has been most especially important in France
and the FRG because these two countries have traditionally acted as the
main ‘motor’ driving forward the process of European integration.
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Functional integration thinking suggests that the process of ‘construct-
ing Europe’ is one of continuing forward movement based on the 
so-called ‘spillover effect’. The completion of a major integrative
endeavour in one sector opens the way to the launch of new efforts in
others. The original Treaty of Rome in 1957 famously did not define
an ultimate end-point for what was then called the European
Economic Community (EEC). Rather, the stated overall objective was
the construction of an open-ended ‘ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe’.3
The potential for developing a military dimension to the European
integration process has been present since the formative decade of the
1950s. Indeed, in the early part of that decade, there was a serious plan
to create an integrated military capability by the six states that were
later to become founder members of the EEC.4 This was the proposed
‘European Defence Community’ (EDC), first advanced by the French
government in 1950. It collapsed in 1954 when the French National
Assembly refused to ratify the treaty setting it up. The EDC proposal
failed for a variety of reasons including political instability in France,
fears about the consequences of German rearmament and American
and British ambivalence.5 Thereafter, attention amongst ‘the Six’
shifted to an alternative next step,6 the development of a ‘Common
Market’. The Treaty of Rome initiated this in 1957. For the remainder
of the Cold War era, European military integration, other than in
NATO, remained off the agenda. The EEC developed a kind of insti-
tutional aversion to military issues. As Walter Hallstein, the first
President of the European Commission, noted, ‘[we] don’t waste time
talking about defence. In the first place we don’t understand it. In the
second place we’ll all disagree’.7 Yet the logic of functional integration
ensured that the prospect of eventual military integration was never
totally lost. 
During the early 1980s an attempt was made to ‘reactivate’ the
Western European Union (WEU). At that time the WEU was a group-
ing of seven EEC members that had originally been established, as the
Western Union, back in 1948 as a forum for co-operation in various
areas, including military security. Although they had made a start on
developing some collective military infrastructure during the early
Cold War years, it is doubtful that any of its founding members8 really
believed that they could mount a credible joint defence effort against
the Soviet Union by themselves. Rather, they wished to demonstrate a
willingness to make an effort in order to lever the United States into a
transatlantic military alliance. This effort proved successful with the
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signing of the Washington Treaty in April 1949. Thereafter, the puta-
tive Western Union military infrastructure programmes were simply
taken over by NATO.
The revived WEU achieved little of consequence in an operational
capacity during the 1980s but it did perform one important political
role. It became a repository for keeping alive the dream of ultimately
adding a military dimension to the process of European integration. In
1987, WEU members issued a Platform on European Security Interests,
which opened with the statement that ‘we are convinced that the
construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as
it does not include security and defence’.9 For as long as the Cold War
order remained in place, these words were not likely to produce any
kind of action. But change was coming.
After the Cold War: marking time with the WEU
From the early autumn of 1990, following the collapse of Communist
rule in Central Europe, the WEU began to assume a more significant
status in the plans of some important West European governments.
They saw in the strategic upheavals the opportunity to move ahead
with the development of a military dimension to the European 
integration process. In September 1990, the first public proposal 
was made. Italy’s then foreign minister came forward with a suggestion
to prepare the WEU for rapid absorption by the then European
Community (EC).10 This, if effected, would give EC members 
a mutual security guarantee under Article V of the WEU’s Brussels
Treaty. The EC would also acquire a ready-made collective defence
infrastructure – albeit an underdeveloped one – based upon the 
WEU’s political and military consultative committees.11 The Italian
proposal was, subsequently, supported by France and the FRG in
December 1990.
As for the UK, then Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd gave the first
public expression of the view of John Major’s government in Berlin in
the same month. Hurd said that his government supported the case for
‘a revitalised WEU’, one which could ‘bring a clear European view …
to discussion within the [NATO] alliance’. He also held out the possi-
bility of European military operations being conducted under the
auspices of the WEU; but only in situations when NATO did not or
could not act itself.12 This was a significant qualification on the extent
to which the UK was prepared to see things develop, and there was
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nothing in Hurd’s remarks to suggest that the UK favoured trans-
planting the WEU into the EC. Yet the British had crossed a Rubicon
of sorts. As Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler have noted, all WEU
member governments by the end of 199013 ‘accepted that NATO
[would] have to be ‘Europeanised’ to some degree’.14
In the autumn of 1991 the Italians and British agreed upon a
compromise proposal. This envisaged that the WEU would be estab-
lished as a kind of ‘bridge’ between a new European Union and
NATO, whilst retaining its own institutional identity. In this way,
according to the Anglo-Italian Declaration on European Security and
Defence issued in October, the WEU could act as ‘the defence compo-
nent of the [European] Union and as the means to strengthen the
European pillar of the [NATO] Alliance’.15
The compromise that was most evident in this joint statement was
the Italian one. The Italians had abandoned their previous position
supporting the direct development of an EU military component.
Instead, under the bridge formula, the EU would need to request 
an autonomous institution to undertake military operations on its
behalf. But the UK had also made important concessions. As suggested
by Booth and Wheeler, the Major government had, in effect, conceded
that an effective NATO monopoly of European military affairs was 
no longer tenable now that the Cold War was over. The British
accepted in principle that the EU could develop a defence component,
albeit indirectly.
Despite the rhetorical posturing of the time, no other member
government was really prepared to develop a direct EU military
component. The Anglo-Italian bridge formula was accepted virtually
word-for-word as the basis of the agreements on defence matters
reached at the Maastricht summit in December 1991. Overall, the
contents of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) were a severe 
disappointment to those who did favour quick or decisive progress 
on the military front. A declaratory breakthrough was contained in
Title V Article J.4, where it was stated that, for the first time, the 
new Union’s ‘common foreign and security policy shall include all
questions relating to the security of the Union’. Previously, under the
terms of the Single European Act of 1987, only the political and
economic dimensions of security had been included, with the military
element deliberately left out. Yet Article J.4 was vague in the extreme,
noting only an aspiration towards ‘the eventual framing of a common
defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’
[emphases added].16
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Nevertheless, after the TEU was signed, moves were quickly set in
hand to develop the operational capacity of the Western European
Union. It was decided to establish a military planning cell at its head-
quarters, which was to move from London to Brussels at the beginning
of 1993. WEU member states also decided at their meeting in the FRG
in June 1992 on potential operational tasks for the organisation. These
were in the areas of humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and ‘tasks of
combat forces in crisis management’.17 Furthermore, the WEU was
quickly tasked with taking on a real operation, in South East Europe.
In retrospect, the July 1992 decisions to dispatch separate 
NATO and WEU naval flotillas to the Adriatic, to monitor compliance
with UN sanctions against the combatants in the Bosnian civil war,
represented the beginning of an ultimately terminal decline in the
WEU’s reputation. The WEU deployment was a premature attempt,
apparently instigated by the Italian government, to demonstrate that
there was substance behind the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ which had been
agreed the previous month. Whereas the NATO operation could rely
on its established multinational command structures and standing
naval forces, the WEU one was an improvised affair which, although
under the ‘political direction’ of the WEU’s Ministerial Council, in
practice relied on Italian command and control structures. Far 
from confirming its utility, this only served to demonstrate the WEU’s
relative lack of operational capacity. Moreover, the deployment of two
flotillas to do the same job attracted unfavourable media attention
suggesting that western governments were more interested in arcane
institutional competition rather than in making a serious effort to deal
with the developing Bosnian crisis.18
In 1993 it was decided to fuse the two operations under NATO
command. Although in theory they would now come under the 
political direction of both the NAC and the WEU Ministerial Council,
in practice it would be NATO that from now on would call the tune.
The 1993 decision was prompted by considerations of operational 
efficiency and, specifically, by the changing nature of relations between
France and NATO. This mattered because hitherto the French govern-
ment under President François Mitterrand had been widely regarded
as the most determined to see the WEU develop real operational capa-
bilities and roles; to the detriment, some suspected, of NATO itself. A
developing France-NATO rapprochement, begun under Mitterrand
but especially evident from 1995 under his successor Jacques Chirac,
thus had the consequence of helping to ensure that momentum was
lost in the operational development of the WEU.19
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This is not to say that the WEU was simply left to wither and die.
However, it was striking that the success or otherwise of efforts to
empower it would rest substantially in the gift of NATO, and especially
the United States. The first attempt was announced at the NATO
summit in Brussels in January 1994. Here member states agreed to
create ‘Combined Joint Task Forces’ (CJTF) with the stated purpose,
amongst others, of providing for ‘separable but not separate military
capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU’.20 The
CJTF agreement represented in effect a tacit acceptance by WEU
member states (who were also all members of NATO) that further
attempts to conduct operations separately from, or even in competition
with, NATO were ruled out. If the Brussels agreement were imple-
mented, future WEU operations would take place on the basis of
resources and assets provided by NATO.
The adoption of the CJTF concept thus represented a trimming of
sails on the part of WEU member states. Reduced ambitions were 
also evident in their refusal seriously to consider further significant
operational commitments. In December 1992, the WEU’s then
Secretary-General, Willem van Eekelen, suggested possible ground-
force deployments in Bosnia.21 His suggestion was ignored. Two years
later it was the turn of the French to be rebuffed when they reportedly
urged their WEU partners to intervene militarily in Rwanda.22 WEU
member states were also castigated by the institution’s own
Parliamentary Assembly, which published a report stating that: 
The theoretical framework exists, but apparently the political will among
the changing coalitions of member states to implement a policy to which
everybody has agreed is still lacking. The reluctance to act, which is partic-
ularly manifest in the time-consuming beating around the bush and
procedural battles in the Council, is tarnishing the image of the organisa-
tion. This is especially exasperating when it concerns limited operations
such as [in the Bosnian town of] Mostar where swift action would be
possible with a coalition of the willing.
Member state behaviour was, in short, according to this report, char-
acterised by ‘shuffling, reluctance, and hesitant, slow actions’.23
Another attempt was made to sort things out at a NAC meeting in
Berlin in June 1996. The Berlin meeting implicitly acknowledged that
the CJTF concept had failed to get off the ground. The Berlin state-
ments were thus effectively a reaffirmation, in beefed-up language, of
what had already supposedly been agreed. NATO ministers pledged
concrete support for the ‘development of the European Security and
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Defence Identity within the Alliance’. They also stated that ‘this iden-
tity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by
appropriate military planning’ which would ‘permit the creation of
militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the
political control and strategic direction of the WEU’. Furthermore, the
ministers promised that they would ‘prepare, with the involvement of
NATO and the WEU, for WEU-led operations’. There could be a
double-hatting of officers within NATO command structures in order
that they could quickly take command of WEU-led operations if
required. Finally, NATO members pledged to undertake ‘at the
request of and in coordination with the WEU, military planning and
exercises for illustrative WEU missions identified by the WEU’.24
These agreements seemed to hold out the prospect of a solid insti-
tutional relationship being developed between the WEU and NATO;
one in which the two institutions could function in future division-of-
labour operations as two distinct and equal partners. Press coverage of
the Berlin meeting was mostly positive. Many reports used phrases
such as ‘a turning point for NATO’ in suggesting that the decisions in
some way significantly reduced the role and power of the United States
within the institution and concurrently increased the scope and poten-
tial for Europe-only military operations.25
Once the dust had settled, however, an equally striking consensus
formed amongst academic analysts and observers that Berlin did not
represent the great ‘rebalancing’ of US–West European relations that
many had at first assumed. Paul Cornish, Philip Gordon and John
Ruggie all examined the Berlin decisions and their likely impact on
both NATO and the WEU; and all came to the same basic conclusion.
By providing for the evolution of a European Security and Defence
Identity within NATO, dependent upon NATO member states agree-
ing to ‘loan’ operational assets to the WEU and release double-hatted
personnel, the Berlin decisions guaranteed a de facto US veto over
future WEU-led military operations. More generally, they made it
‘most unlikely that a serious rival to NATO could now develop’ as
Cornish put it.26
A number of French leaders, including Laurent Fabius, Paul
Quiles and Gabriel Robin, were (or claim to have been) aware all along
that the Berlin decisions were less radical than they at first appeared.27
However, the Chirac government was prepared to give the US a
chance to prove its good faith, although it was disappointed when it
became clear that the Berlin decisions might not be all that they had
seemed. Although the sense of let-down did not lead the French to
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terminate any of the various elements of their 1995–96 rapprochement
with NATO, it certainly helped to slow down development of the
CJTF concept.28
The new push forward, 1998–99
The discussions in the first section here have shown that the idea of a
military dimension to the overall process of European integration had
never completely died since the failure of the EDC project in 1954. On
the other hand, nor had a decisive push towards creating one yet been
successfully made. Developments in the years 1998 and 1999 were to
take matters further than they had ever been taken before in this
respect. This time-period, of course, coincided with the Kosovo crisis
coming to the boil and the US-led NATO response. 
This proximity of timing has, in itself, been sufficient to convince
some observers that the crisis must, therefore, have been solely, or at
least largely, responsible for the new push towards the ESDP. In order
to test and explore this assessment, the discussions in this section focus
upon the two EU member states that have been the main movers
behind the process. They are the United Kingdom and France. In 
each case the relative importance of the Kosovo crisis in shaping 
their attitudes and policy will be determined, vis-à-vis other potential
causal factors.
The United Kingdom
The most significant catalyst for the new push forward was the change
in British policy. This was not immediately apparent after the Blair
government took office in May 1997. Initial statements suggested
continuity from the previous Conservative administration. One of
Tony Blair’s first tasks following his election was to attend the EU’s
Amsterdam summit in June 1997. The resulting Treaty of Amsterdam
effectively reaffirmed, using slightly different language, the existing
understandings on military issues dating back to the 1991 TEU,
including the British-inspired bridge role for the WEU.29 British
leaders made it quite clear at that time that they were strongly opposed
to any change in the status quo. On his return from Amsterdam, Blair
told the House of Commons that ‘getting Europe’s voice heard more
clearly in the world will not be achieved through merging the
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European Union and the Western European Union or developing an
unrealistic common defence policy. We therefore resisted unacceptable
proposals from others’. Then Defence Secretary George Robertson
was subsequently quoted as saying that it would be a ‘Trojan horse in
NATO to give the EU a role’. As late as May 1998, Robin Cook stated
that ‘we do not see the European Union becoming a defence organi-
sation … we will be working for better co-operation between the EU
and the WEU but not for merger between them’.30
The Prime Minister first revealed a willingness to change this 
line at an ‘informal’ EU summit meeting in Pörtschach, Austria in
October 1998. Blair did not unveil a fully formed proposal here.
Rather, he signalled a willingness to drop the inflexible opposition to
reconsidering the role of the WEU and its relationship with the EU
that had characterised British policy since Maastricht. ‘I simply want to
start the debate,’ he said in a press conference after the meeting.31
Perhaps the most popular interpretation of Blair’s motives for
signalling a change in British policy has been that he was seeking to
assert British leadership with regard to EU military affairs in order
to compensate for non-participation in the single currency project.
Support for this view can be adduced from the timing. The Pörtschach
meeting took place just over two months before the EU’s single
currency was due to be officially launched on 1 January 1999. Minds
in London were bound to be concentrated on the potential fall-out
from the UK’s non-participation in the project of the moment. Taking
a lead in revisiting military questions would, on this argument, make
sense for the UK, as military matters were things which it was widely
regarded as being ‘good at’ by its European partners. Blair hinted that
a compensation strategy was in his mind. At his Pörtschach press
conference he stated that ‘we need to allow fresh thinking in this and
it is important for Britain to be part of that thinking and not for us
simply to stand there and say we are not’ [emphasis added].32
Such a compensation strategy had not seemed necessary before
about the middle of 1998. The British had assumed that, despite their
refusal to join the single currency at the beginning, they would not lose
influence within the EU. This was reflected in the Blair government’s
expectation that the UK would be a full participant in the institutional
structures overseeing the new currency. In the spring of 1998,
however, after a sometimes acrimonious debate, the UK had to agree
that the key forum for managing the currency on a day-to-day basis –
the so-called ‘Euro-11’ group – would only permit non-participants to
attend as observers. 
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Having been rebuffed in this area, the British government set
about, as a matter of some urgency, trying to find a means to shore 
up its position within the EU and, indeed, provide a foundation for
Blair’s stated desire to ‘lead in Europe’. The timeframe was tight, with
1 January 1999 as an immutable deadline. This may help to explain 
the impression that the UK was making policy ‘on the hoof’ for a 
time during the second half of 1998.33 There had simply not been
time, prior to Pörtschach, to work up a more concrete or detailed
policy in an area that would require significant change in the traditional
British position.
More flesh was put on the bones six weeks later at an Anglo-
French summit in St Malo. Blair and Chirac agreed that:
The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the
international stage … To this end, the Union must have the capacity for
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to
decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to inter-
national crises … In order for the European Union to take decisions and
approve military action where the [NATO] Alliance as a whole is not
engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity
for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for rele-
vant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account
of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with
the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have
recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated
within NATO’s European pillar or national or multinational European
means outside the NATO framework).34
This agreement codified and confirmed the nature and extent of the
shift in the British position. For the first time, the UK was agreeing to
the EU developing its own military dimension, based on concrete
planning structures, and to member states assigning armed forces for
potential EU military operations. The fact that Blair had chosen to
advance matters in partnership with the French was significant and
points to a second element in his overall European leadership agenda;
a desire to establish the UK as co-equal with the traditional Franco-
German motor within the EU. Blair had identified a window of oppor-
tunity. Not only did the UK have the opportunity to initiate a new
proposal, but to do so in collaboration with one of the parties in the
traditional EU motor. 
President Chirac had provided a de facto opening in August 1998.
In an address to French ambassadors in Paris, Chirac reiterated that: 
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For France, [the WEU] is destined to become the European Union’s
defence agency, progressively integrated into its institutions, while, of
course, retaining its links with NATO. In this context, we shall have to see
whether we need to establish, when the time comes, a Council of EU
Defence Ministers to affirm our solidarity in this sphere.35
In 1998 the WEU’s Brussels Treaty in effect reached its expiry date
(Article XII stipulated that it was to remain in force for fifty years).36
That year was, therefore, an opportune time to consider once again the
future of the WEU and, indeed, whether it should have one as a
distinct institution. Chirac’s response was to try to revive interest in the
incorporation of the WEU into the European Union. In 1990–91, this
idea had been set aside chiefly because of British opposition. In 1998,
on the other hand, the French revived the notion at precisely the time
that the Blair government was looking for a ‘big idea’ for a potential
compensation strategy. 
The fact that its treaty ran out in 1998 also drew attention to the
extent to which the WEU had seemingly outlived its usefulness. It had
not developed any significant operational capabilities during the
1990s, following the adoption of the ‘bridge’ formula in Maastricht.
Undoubtedly, the major portion of blame for this failure belongs to
the member states. They had not displayed the necessary collective
political will to, for example, deploy ground forces in Bosnia, intervene
to halt the genocide in Rwanda or deal with the collapse of order in
Albania during the spring of 1997. The reluctance to seriously consider
a WEU intervention in this last instance was seen as being a particular
blow to the institution’s credibility.37
The complicated triangular relationship into which the WEU 
had been bound with the EU and NATO at Maastricht was largely a
consequence of British initiative, as noted. Thus, the WEU’s perceived
lack of utility in places like Bosnia and Albania was an especial embar-
rassment to the British government and further evidence that the UK
was a reluctant, indeed obstructive, European. It could be argued that
the UK had deliberately engineered, at Maastricht, the creation of
arrangements that it knew all along would prove to be unworkable 
in practice.
British disenchantment with, and sense of embarrassment about,
the WEU was a supporting consideration in inducing the Blair 
government to become more flexible about its future. At an informal
meeting of EU defence ministers in November 1998, Robertson
publicly referred to the existing NATO-WEU-EU triangle as ‘cumber-
some’38 Later, Richard Hatfield, Policy Director at the Ministry 
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of Defence, told the House of Commons Select Committee on
Defence that:
A major part-impetus for [the] developing [British] policy came from the
Ministry of Defence because the purely practical arrangements that had
been developed did not give us a great deal of confidence. You had a
system where the EU, as one political organisation, although a very
important one, was going to, if it got into crisis management … avail itself
of another organisation, the WEU, which had a very limited military infra-
structure and capability, which, in turn, would turn to a third organisa-
tion, which we all think is a very good organisation – NATO. Essentially,
the Ministry of Defence started to think about this, and our view was we
ought to try and simplify this into a pragmatic arrangement and get a
proper relationship between the two big players. That played into a wider
debate that was going on inside government and that, in brief, led to the
start of the process we have got now.39
In alluding to the ‘wider debate that was going on inside government’,
Hatfield’s testimony suggested that the Ministry of Defence had acted
opportunistically in seizing a political moment (created by Blair’s
search for a compensation strategy) to simplify a cumbersome and
impractical institutional arrangement. The Defence Committee was
somewhat sceptical of this assertion however. It noted that ‘Mr
Hatfield’s attempt to pass off the latest European defence initiative as
a purely practical response to some institutional problems seems a
(perhaps deliberate) understatement of its significance. No choices
about the future of the [NATO] Alliance are made on pragmatic
grounds alone’.40 The scepticism seems justified. There can be little
doubt that the principal underlying reasons for the British policy shift
were political rather than pragmatic. 
The role of the Kosovo crisis
A number of academic analysts have argued that a further significant
source of pressure for change in British policy came from the Prime
Minister’s alleged dismay at the European Union’s impotence in the
face of the emerging crisis in Kosovo. This, they note, had begun to
move up the agenda during the British Presidency of the EU between
January and June 1998.41
During the UK Presidency, EU members, acting through their
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) mechanism, issued three
statements and agreed on two ‘Common Positions’ with regard to
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Kosovo. The purpose of this activity was clear: ‘to put pressure on
Belgrade to find a peaceful settlement to the Kosovo problem’. This
objective was declared in March 1998, when the EU adopted a
Common Position imposing a range of military and economic sanc-
tions on the Milosevic government.42 Yet this activity did little other
than point up the EU’s impotence in situations where economic and
political pressure was insufficient to change the behaviour of recalci-
trant leaders. 
Three months later, another CFSP statement conceded that, far
from diminishing following the imposition of EU sanctions, Serb activ-
ities in Kosovo had reached ‘a new level of aggression’. To all intents
and purposes EU member states conceded their own inability to do
anything further to stop this aggression. They stated that ‘the EU
encourages international security organisations to pursue their efforts
… and to consider all options, including those which would require an
authorization by the UNSC under Chapter VII’. In effect, the EU was
inviting NATO to sort things out, by force if necessary.43
One should not underestimate the motivational effects that a blow
to the pride, prestige and credibility of leaders on the international
stage can have. Alexander Vershbow, the US Ambassador to NATO,
subsequently attributed Blair’s policy shift mainly to what he called the
‘Holbrooke effect’: 
The Kosovo experience, and the Bosnia experience before that, drove
home the harsh reality that, at the present time, only the United States has
the ability to marry military power to diplomacy as a means of managing
– and resolving – crises. Diplomacy backed by force was the secret to Dick
Holbrooke’s success. 
Vershbow added that ‘the lesson for the EU was clear: without more
military muscle to back it up, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security
Policy could never duplicate the Holbrooke effect’.44
Without using the term itself, senior government ministers in the
UK articulated a desire to see the EU develop the means to bring its
own version of the Holbrooke effect into play; with the UK naturally
playing a leading role. This was clearly expressed by Blair in what was
probably the most significant European speech of his first premiership;
delivered in Warsaw in October 2000. Having asserted that ‘for Britain
… being at the centre of influencing Europe is an indispensable part of
influence, strength and power in the world’, Blair described the kind
of Europe that he had in mind:
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In a world with the power of the USA; with new alliances to be made with
the neighbours of Europe like Russia; developing nations with vast popu-
lations like India and China; Japan, not just an economic power but a
country that will rightly increase its political might too; with the world
increasingly forming powerful regional blocks … Europe’s citizens need
Europe to be strong and united. They need it to be a power in the world.
Whatever its origin, Europe today is no longer just about peace. It is about
projecting collective power [emphasis added].
The Prime Minister went on to offer a sound-bite summary of his core
message; ‘such a Europe can, in its economic and political strength, be
a superpower; a superpower, but not a superstate’.45
In summarising the motivations of the British government – the
key player in making possible the decisions to finally develop an ESDP
during 1998–9946 – it can be stated that influence and leadership were
the predominant considerations. This applied in the sense of both
British leadership within the European Union, and EU influence in the
international arena. Most immediately and particularly, however, the
Blair government was concerned to ensure that self-exclusion from the
Euro did not lead to a diminution in the UK’s status and influence
within the EU. 
The emerging Kosovo crisis provided the backdrop, during 1998,
for the reformulation of British policy. It undoubtedly helped to focus
attention and concentrate minds in London. It is unlikely, however,
that it was the decisive factor for the UK. Given the other, political,
pressures on the Blair government it is highly likely that the
Pörtschach/St Malo initiatives would have been developed anyway.
France
Earlier discussions in this chapter have noted the development of a
rapprochement between France and NATO under the Chirac
Presidency from 1995. This was premised on substantial reforms of
NATO’s structures and procedures – most especially on the military
side. These were not, in French eyes, sufficiently realised in the period
following the NATO Berlin meeting in 1996. As a result, the
rapprochement petered out short of full French reintegration into the
NATO military structures from which President Charles de Gaulle had
withdrawn in the 1960s.
The issue of ‘Europeanisation’ in military affairs was very much in
play for the French before the Kosovo crisis. Attention during the
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period 1995–97 was focused on developing a significant European
Security and Defence Identity within NATO rather than a military arm
for the EU. What changed the focus for France were not any perceived
lessons of the Kosovo crisis. Rather, there existed a sense of disap-
pointment, and indeed betrayal, caused by the failure of NATO and
the United States, as French leaders saw it, to proceed in the spirit of
the Berlin decisions. 
Supplementing this, the year 1998 was significant in that, as noted
above, the WEU’s Brussels Treaty expired. This provided a natural
opportunity for reflections on its future and President Chirac had
attempted to reopen an old debate in his remarks to the French ambas-
sadors in the summer, where he proposed that the WEU be absorbed
into the European Union. Thus, as Chirac stated in June 1999, ‘as far
as the discussion on the need for a European defence dimension is
concerned, it had begun well before the Kosovo crisis’.47
This had also been partly due to the influence of the functional
integration view on official French thinking. It has long been reflected
in official thinking in France to a significantly greater extent than in the
UK, with the result that French statements can sound somewhat
discordant, or dreamy, to Anglo-Saxon ears. President Chirac provided
a good example when addressing the NAC in June 2001. He stated
that ‘the progress of European defence is irreversible since it is part and
parcel of the general and far-reaching process of building Europe. The
advent of a European Union, occupying its full place on the interna-
tional scene, is ordained by history’.48
The impending launch of the Euro at the beginning of 1999
produced a key convergence of views between France and the UK.
Their two governments were, to be sure, approaching this event from
different angles. For the French the Euro’s launch created opportun-
ities to consider what the next steps in the ‘process of building Europe’
should be. For the British, as discussed above, the emphasis was much
more on developing a compensation strategy. The convergence found
tangible expression at the December 1998 St Malo summit.
The role of the Kosovo crisis
Although the Kosovo crisis was not, therefore, decisive – or even very
important – in reviving their interest in what French leaders liked to
call ‘Defence Europe’, it did provide highly useful ammunition against
those who argued that France envisaged this developing in opposition
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to, or with a view to weakening, NATO. Since 1998 there has been a
distinct exemplary dimension to the French approach. In other words,
French leaders have consistently and deliberately sought to allay fears
and suspicions, in the US and elsewhere, that they are motivated at
bottom by an anti-NATO agenda. They have endeavoured to do this
not by words alone but by deeds also; and the Kosovo crisis provided
important opportunities in this respect. 
In an address in Paris in November 1999, then Defence Minister
Alain Richard referred to this approach. He spoke of:
The change in France … which has put to rest the myth that France was
seeking to promote Defence Europe in order to weaken NATO. The way
we took on our political and military responsibilities, within the Alliance,
during the crises in the Balkans, particularly our command of the
Extraction Force in November 1998, is obviously contributing to this
change in attitude.49
On initial deployment XFOR consisted of troops from France, the UK,
the FRG and Italy. The US was only minimally involved and
contributed no front-line forces.50 France had volunteered to be the
‘framework nation’ for XFOR. This meant that, in exchange for
contributing the single largest contingent of troops, the French would
command the force in the field. Overall command, however, was
vested in SACEUR. Thus, the French had undertaken the lead role in
an operational deployment within the NATO integrated command
structures. 
It was not the first time that this had happened since de Gaulle’s
era, as French forces had been operating under NATO command in
Bosnia since 1992. However, the pivotal French role in XFOR was
clearly intended to send an important political message, as Richard’s
subsequent remarks indicated. The signal was twofold. First, the
French role in XFOR reinforced the point made in Bosnia that France
was prepared to contribute fully to NATO-led operations, even
without becoming fully re-integrated into NATO’s military structures.
In doing so, the French could claim to be acting in good faith within
NATO.51 Second, XFOR was intended to demonstrate that Europeans
could manage a significant military mission themselves, with the US
sitting ‘on the horizon’, as Javier Solana put it.52
The French government’s political signals did have at least a
partially positive impact on its most important target audience – the
US. In a widely cited press article published in December 1998 –
which was in effect the Clinton administration’s public response to 
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the St Malo summit decisions – Madeleine Albright noted with
approval that:
The Kosovo crisis shows how practical European defence capabilities can
help fulfil NATO missions. Thanks to the initiative of the French and the
contributions of the Germans, British, Italians and other allies, NATO is
deploying an all-European ‘extraction force’ for the monitors of the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe who are being sent
to the troubled province. This force is under NATO command, and is
based on solid European capabilities. It shows how European forces can
work within NATO to great effect in the real world.53
Given the tenor of these comments it can fairly be argued that the
deployment of XFOR did play a role in persuading the Clinton admin-
istration to offer conditional support,54 rather than outright opposition
or hostility, to the St Malo agreements.
Matters did not end with the deployment of XFOR. Apart from
the US, France made the most significant contribution to Operation
Allied Force in 1999. Again, there was an exemplary dimension to this
and French leaders were eager to remind others – often in detail – of
the scale of their contribution. Richard spent some time detailing the
French contribution before an American audience in February 2000,
for instance:
French participation in Allied Force was, as you know, quite significant.
No other country, apart from the United States, was able to deploy so
wide a range of Air Force, Navy and Army military means, notably in areas
where few NATO members have any useful capacities, such as intelli-
gence-gathering tools or Search and Rescue capabilities. France deployed
68 combat aircraft (7% of the coalition total), including 51 strike aircraft
(8.8%). The total number of sorties of French aircraft put us second only
to the United States, and makes our air contribution by and large the
leading European one. In particular, French aircraft flew 16.6% of all close
air support sorties, 13.8% of all reconnaissance sorties, 11.2% of all elec-
tronic intelligence sorties. France was the only European country to
deploy a conventional aircraft carrier in the theatre.55
Following the Kosovo settlement, the French government
suggested that the command element of the ‘Eurocorps’56 take charge
of KFOR. This was agreed by the NAC in December 1999 and the
Eurocorps commander took over on a six-month tour of duty in April
of the following year. Criticisms were made of both the nature and
extent of the Eurocorps’ actual contribution in Kosovo. Some of these
seemed motivated more by crude anti-Europeanism than reasoned
analysis.57 On the other hand, it was fairly pointed out that the
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Eurocorps was only able to contribute some 350 officers to the total
KFOR headquarters staff complement of 1,200 during its tour of duty;
suggesting that its role was substantially symbolic. But the symbolism
mattered. A report published by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in
the autumn of 2000 argued that ‘the [deployment] decision marked an
important stepping stone, demonstrating European readiness to take
more responsibility in a crisis management operation. Indeed, it is the
first time that a European multinational headquarters is deployed for a
peacekeeping operation’.58
The French government concurred with this assessment and
seemed happy that important facts on the ground had been estab-
lished. In a speech to the WEU Parliamentary Assembly in May 2000,
Chirac stated that:
When, nearly a year ago, I first proposed that the general staff of the
European Corps should take over the command of KFOR in Kosovo from
NATO, the idea seemed presumptuous and even premature. Yet, this is
what has come to pass, thanks to the determination of the five members
of the European Corps and thanks to German-French co-operation. The
European Corps is becoming a Rapid Reaction Corps and its general staff,
headed by a Spanish officer, has provided exemplary command of KFOR
for several weeks now.59
In summary it can be stated that the influence and impact of the
Kosovo crisis on the evolution of the ESDP was somewhat more signif-
icant for the French government than for the British. It was certainly
not a decisive factor in initiating French interest. That interest was, as
we have seen, already long-established. The importance of the crisis lay,
rather, in the opportunity that it afforded the French government to
demonstrate that the development of an EU military component was
a natural and non-threatening (to NATO and the transatlantic link)
development. France attempted to demonstrate this by its own exem-
plary participation in the NATO-led operations occasioned by the
Kosovo crisis and also by creating precedents for missions and opera-
tions undertaken with European countries in the lead and reduced or
minimal reliance on the United States. 
Conclusions
The direct impact of the Kosovo crisis on the evolution of the ESDP
has been relatively limited. Attempts to develop it would almost
certainly have been made anyway, given the agendas of the two pivotal
THE EU’S MILITARY DIMENSION 137
Lat 05  22/4/03  9:44 pm  Page 137
European governments whose policies and approaches have been
discussed in this chapter. 
Kosovo did, however, provide an important part of the ‘atmos-
pherics’; i.e. the backdrop against which moves towards creating the
ESDP were set in train. The crisis undoubtedly did help to strengthen
the hand of the ESDP’s proponents. It drew attention to EU
members’ embarrassing lack of operational military capacity when
compared to the United States. It also provided the French govern-
ment with the opportunity to demonstrate that ‘more Europe’ did not
have to mean ‘less NATO’. This has helped to save the ESDP from
becoming the target of resolute US hostility and opposition under
either the Clinton or Bush administrations to date.
In September 2000, a report published by the WEU Institute for
Security Studies warned against the consequences of ‘the petering out
of the ‘Kosovo factor’’. It added that ‘as the memory of that episode
begins to recede, it is unlikely that public and political opinion will be
willing to go through the very real trauma of defence reform without
a relatively clear understanding of what it is for and what it entails’.60
Although it was not decisive in initiating moves towards the ESDP,
receding memories of the crisis may yet contribute to its losing
momentum or stalling as European leaders focus their interests and
energies elsewhere in the absence of a perceived pressing security threat
in their own backyard.
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Chapter 6
The evolution of the 
‘Atlantic Community’
Transatlantic relations have been a core issue in European – especially
West European – security since the end of the Second World War. The
first section of this chapter examines the nature of the transatlantic
relationship and its Cold War evolution. Attention then moves, in the
second section, to considering its development during the years since
1989. It will then be argued, in the third and final section, that the
crises in Bosnia and Kosovo have played a key role in helping to refine
and reshape the nature and basis of the relationship during the period
since the Cold War ended.
Origins of the transatlantic relationship
The ‘transatlantic relationship’ was essentially a product of the Second
World War. Prior to American involvement in that conflict – informally
from 1940 and officially from December 1941 – the United States
had, with one exception, chosen to remain aloof from European secu-
rity affairs. The exception had been US involvement in the latter stages
of the First World War. Even then, however, there was a distinct under-
current of ambiguity about the American stance. US participation was
as an ‘associated power’ rather than a full ally of France and Great
Britain. In addition, as is well known, President Woodrow Wilson
subsequently failed in his efforts to persuade the Senate to ratify US
participation in the post-war League of Nations.
The introspective stance was by no means uncontroversial inside
the US in the period between the two world wars. These years were
characterised by a ‘great debate’ between so-called ‘isolationists’ on the
one hand and ‘internationalists’ on the other. In addition this period,
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especially during the 1920s, saw the emergence of the US as the pivotal
player in the world financial system and also as a leading global
commercial power.1 The extent of American influence was graphically
demonstrated by the impact on European economies of the Wall Street
Crash of 1929.
Thus, there was an important, if not necessarily politically close,
relationship between the US and major European states even before
the outbreak of the Second World War. However the label ‘transat-
lantic relationship’ was seldom used to describe it. This term denotes
something more profound and positive than the usual economic and
political intercourse between states in the international system. Two
core elements characterised the emerging relationship from the 1940s.
They were: close co-operation in the military arena, and the perception
that a ‘community of values’ bound states in Western Europe together
with the US.
The military co-operation was an obvious product of participation
in the common struggle against Germany, Italy and Japan during the
first half of the 1940s. There was, from the beginning, a sense that this
co-operation was motivated by something more than simple military
expediency. This was particularly apparent in relations between the US
and the UK. Even before the formal entry of the US into the war,
Prime Minister Winston Churchill had been working to maximise
American support for the UK’s war effort, in large part on the basis of
an ideological appeal to President Franklin Roosevelt. This found its
most tangible expression in the Atlantic Charter, which the two leaders
signed in August 1941. To be sure, the main objective of the exercise
for the British government had been to shore up practical American
support for its war effort. Nevertheless, as the underlying basis of the
Atlantic Charter there were declared to be ‘certain common principles
… for a better future for the world’. Chief among those listed were
opposition to territorial aggrandisement and ‘the abandonment of the
use of force’.2
Anglo-American co-operation was, therefore, being premised
upon a concept of shared views about the nature of international 
relations and the ways in which countries should conduct themselves.
The Atlantic Charter marked out relations between the US and UK 
as being qualitatively distinct from those which they held with other
countries – even allied ones. In this context it is instructive to note 
that the Soviet Union, which was in the early desperate stages of its
defence against Nazi aggression in August 1941, was not a party to the
Charter and was mentioned only in passing in its preamble. Other ‘free
144 THE KOSOVO CRISIS
Lat 06  23/4/03  7:04 pm  Page 144
governments in exile’ in London, such as the French and Poles, were
not mentioned at all.
The Atlantic Charter represents the starting point of what was to
become the distinctive transatlantic relationship.3 In 1966 Harold van
B. Cleveland rightly asserted that:
The change [from traditional patterns of international relations] came in
World War II when the Western democracies found themselves allied
against a regime which sought not merely territorial aggrandizement or
other national advantage, but rather the imposition on Europe of a total-
itarian and imperialist new order. The idea of a Western community united
not simply by a common military threat but by a common devotion to
democratic freedoms was born of that struggle.4
Transatlantic relations during the Cold War
The onset of the Cold War had the effect of both extending and insti-
tutionalising the military-ideological relationship that had developed
between the US and the UK since 1941. As Cleveland has argued, the
ideological component ‘was perfected and strengthened when the Nazi
threat was replaced by that of Communist Russia, whose thrust was
even more explicitly directed at the foundations of Western political
and economic order’.5 An extension and institutionalisation of the
wartime relationship beyond its Anglo-American core was carried
through via the negotiation and signing of the Washington Treaty in
1949 and the subsequent construction of the institution (NATO)
which supported it. 
Nine West European countries and one other North American one
joined the Americans and British as founder members of NATO.6 Most
of these had been allied with the two core powers against the Axis in
the Second World War. However it is noteworthy that the boundaries
of NATO were deliberately set wider than this; bringing in Portugal,
which had been neutral in the war, and more particularly Italy. The
decision to admit a former Axis state was the subject of considerable
debate. That it was made reflects the extent to which the ideological
threat from Communism was keenly felt, especially in the United
States, during the late 1940s. The concern was not so much about a
direct Soviet attack on Italy, but rather the internal threat of a
Communist take-over given that the local Communist Party was
strong and enjoyed significant popular support.7
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The notion of shared fundamental values was written into the
Washington Treaty. The preamble is clear on this score, stating that the
signatories ‘are determined to safeguard the freedom, common
heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law’. Article 2 states that
signatories:
will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing
about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institu-
tions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-
being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic
policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all 
of them.8
The early years of NATO were dominated by concerns connected with
the need to organise an effective deterrence and defence effort against
the perceived threat of Soviet attack. Although present in the treaty,
‘common values’ thinking had only a limited operational impact.
NATO included countries where democracy was shaky (such as Italy or
France under the Fourth Republic) or even non-existent (such as
Portugal). This called into question the extent to which the alleged
‘common heritage’ of democracy really mattered, at least when set
against the pragmatic feeling that ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’.9
Discussions during the first half of the 1950s centred on the
proposed creation of the EDC and the concurrent issue of the poten-
tial rearmament of the FRG. At this time there was an expectation in
some influential quarters in the US, up to and including President
Eisenhower, that the successful creation of an EDC would facilitate an
American military withdrawal from Western Europe.10 It was never
clear what, if any, real strength a continuing American political
commitment to the Washington Treaty would have had if this had, in
fact, come about.
The emerging ‘Atlantic Community’ 
The idea that a perceptible ‘Atlantic Community’ was coming into
being, or else should be created, began to surface in the mid-1950s.
During the Cold War era it went through three formative phases in its
evolution. The first was apparent in 1955–56, the second during 1957
and the third from 1961–63. 
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In its first phase, the idea had two points of origin. First, the
collapse of the EDC project in 1954 strongly suggested that a substan-
tial US commitment to the defence of Western Europe would be
necessary into the indefinite future. Second, following the death of
Stalin in 1953, a slow but increasingly perceptible ‘thaw’ set into
East–West relations. Great store was set by many in a meeting of the
leaders of the US, UK, France and the Soviet Union ‘at the summit’ in
Geneva in July 1955. Although the Geneva summit achieved no real
breakthroughs, the ‘spirit of Geneva’ was, nevertheless, evoked for
months and years afterwards to denote hopes and expectations of
better times ahead in East–West relations.
By the mid-1950s some felt that a rethinking of NATO was
required in order to safeguard its future against any charges that
improving East–West relations made it less important or even unnec-
essary. Developing the idea that NATO was the institutional embodi-
ment of a broad Atlantic Community seemed to be the best means of
waylaying this negative possibility. 
One of the first arguments along these lines appeared in The
Economist in February 1955. Its editorial comments offered an early
definition of what actually constituted the community:
It is a group of countries that share certain ideas of what is important in
western civilisation, and are prepared to organise themselves to see that
these ideas survive. It is an organisation which, although based on the
concept that Luxembourg and Iceland have as much right to be heard in
its councils as the United States, has gone a long way towards recognising
the economic and military facts of life. It is a partnership in which each
country pulls its own weight and in which each carries the weight to
which it is entitled.11
The Economist’s editorial writers were clearly making the assumption
that the Atlantic Community equated to the membership of NATO
and that NATO was its organisational manifestation. NATO was not,
therefore, simply a military alliance. It was more fundamentally, a
sharing of enduring values amongst a group of western countries. This
would exist whether or not there was a Soviet threat. 
This did not mean that an operational Atlantic Community was
already in being. Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson argued
shortly after the Geneva summit that:
NATO cannot live on fear alone. It cannot become the source of a real
Atlantic community if it remains organized to deal only with the military
threat which first brought it into being. A renewed emphasis on the
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nonmilitary side of NATO’s development would also be the best answer
to the Soviet charge that it is an aggressive, exclusively military agency,
aimed against Moscow.12
Pearson’s views are important because he was the NATO leader who,
more than any other at the time, concerned himself with the issue of
developing the community. He believed that the existence of shared
values in itself was not enough to keep NATO going at a time of appar-
ently lessening military threat. What was needed was for member states
effectively to operationalise the community by engaging in regular and
extensive multilateral consultations across a range of issues.
A May 1956 NAC meeting affirmed the importance of developing
the institution’s non-military side. US Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles suggested that the best way to make progress, and to satisfy 
the reformists that something was being done, was to ask those 
same reformists to produce a report setting out their views and 
making recommendations for improvements. Pearson was given the
job of drafting, together with two colleagues – Gaetano Martino of
Italy and Halvard Lange of Norway. The media dubbed them the
‘three wise men’.
The Suez crisis in the autumn of 1956 posed a serious political
threat to NATO. The French and British had deliberately kept their
allies completely in the dark about their preparations for military inter-
vention in the Middle East. Once the interventions were launched 
the Eisenhower administration took the view that, because the French
and British had disregarded any sense of political obligation to consult,
neither did it feel bound. As a result the US in effect threatened
economic warfare in order to force France and the UK to cease mili-
tary operations and withdraw their forces from the Suez Canal zone.13 
The fallout from the Suez crisis arguably helped save the wise
mens’ report from being effectively filed and forgotten. Pearson and
his colleagues presented it to the NAC in December 1956. The main
thrust of the report was to entrench norms of consultation amongst
the member states so that, as a contemporary report in The Economist
put it, ‘henceforth, a country’s failure to consult becomes a sin of
commission, and not just of omission as in the past’. This account
correctly identified the paragraphs on enhanced political consultation
as being the report’s most significant feature, adding that ‘the NATO
treaty would not originally have been signed if these provisions had
been included’.14
Lester Pearson and his fellow wise men sought explicitly to estab-
lish a fully fledged consultative and behavioural regime amongst the
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NATO membership. The basic principles were set out in paragraph 42
of their report:
Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of informa-
tion, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO
Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or
trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of
problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before
national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective deci-
sions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it
will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge
of the views of the others.15
All this was fine as far as it went. Consultation within NATO arguably
did improve after 1956.16 Yet the wider and more general broadening-
out that Pearson had originally wanted did not happen. 
The impact of Suez did, however, help to ensure that interest in
the Atlantic Community concept was maintained. The second phase of
interest – during 1957 – followed on directly. 1957 saw the publica-
tion of the first significant academic contribution to the debate. This
was Political Community and the North Atlantic Area – the results of
a study by a group of scholars working at Princeton University. The
most important feature of this study was that it introduced the concept
of ‘security community’ into the debate. This term was used to
describe a situation where ‘there is real assurance that the members of
that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their
disputes in some other way’.17
Contrary to subsequent received wisdom, the Princeton scholars
did not conclude that a security community already existed amongst
NATO members as a whole. They argued that war had become incon-
ceivable between certain countries (such as Canada and the US and the
US and UK) but that there were still concerns about the FRG – at that
time a NATO member of just three years’ standing.18 Rather, the
authors suggested, the North Atlantic Area (which they defined as
embracing not just the NATO members but also Cold War neutrals in
Europe) was a less demanding ‘political community’ in 1957. This they
defined as a ‘social group with a process of political communication,
some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compli-
ance’, although ‘a political community is not necessarily able to
prevent war within the area it covers’.19
The Princeton study helped to make the concept of Atlantic
Community respectable in serious academic and policy-making circles.
Its publication dovetailed with an evident desire amongst NATO
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members, most especially the core Anglo-American partners, to ensure
that efforts to patch up the serious breach in NATO cohesion opened
by the Suez affair were consolidated and strengthened. To this end, a
NATO summit meeting was proposed – the first such gathering in the
institution’s history. It took place in Paris in December 1957.
In Paris the term ‘interdependence’ was introduced into political
discourse for the first time. NATO leaders declared that ‘our Alliance
… must organize its political and economic strength on the principle
of interdependence’. They stated further that ‘we have agreed to co-
operate closely to enable us to carry the necessary burden of defence
without sacrificing the individual liberties or the welfare of our peoples.
We shall reach this goal only by recognizing our interdependence and
by combining our efforts and skills in order to make better use of our
resources’.20 As used by the NATO leaders, therefore, the idea of inter-
dependence appeared to denote a more sustained effort at defence
burden sharing, with the elimination of wasteful duplicative and purely
national efforts.
Some, however, argued that wider political equality should be part
of the package as well. This was based on an instinctive feeling that
terms such as ‘community’ and ‘interdependence’ denote relations
based upon broad equality. In NATO, however, this was never the
case. There was one clearly pre-eminent power amongst the member-
ship and in military security terms Western Europe was a dependent
on, rather than being genuinely interdependent with, the United
States. This was reportedly the source of some discord at the Paris
summit, with complaints from the French, among others.21 In London
The Economist was moved to declare, in commenting on the Paris
summit, that ‘till economic integration cements the European nations,
including Britain, together, and enables them to talk to the Americans
on a more equal level of achievement, the NATO “community” will
remain an embryo’.22
Thus, for some the construction of the Atlantic Community
remained an unfulfilled aspiration. It certainly continued to be so in
the years immediately following the first NATO summit. This was
mainly because western leaders had more pressing concerns to attend
to; chiefly the protracted Berlin crisis which dominated the period
1958–61. Closer to home, the United States also had the fallout from
the 1959 Cuban revolution to contend with. There was in conse-
quence a lull in discussion about the development of the Atlantic
Community until the early 1960s.
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The topic returned to the agenda from 1961. This was mainly in
consequence of the coming to power in the US of the Kennedy admin-
istration. A number of suggestions were put forward by serving or
recently retired high officials for developing a stronger and more
comprehensive Atlantic Community, based upon but not restricted to
NATO.23 But it was not until President Kennedy expressed his personal
interest in the subject that decisive progress seemed possible. He did
so most clearly in his famous Independence Day address in July 1962.
This speech represented, in effect, the first official response of the
United States to the process of European integration, which had been
underway in the EEC since 1957–58. 
Kennedy sounded positive. He declared that ‘the United States
looks on this vast new enterprise [i.e. European integration] with hope
and admiration. We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival
but as a partner’. He proceeded to offer EEC leaders an implicit deal:
a greater say in transatlantic and NATO decision-making in return for
more effective military burden sharing within NATO. He stated that
‘we see in … Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of
full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and
defending a community of free nations’. Coming to the crux of his
speech, the President asserted:
I will say here and now, on this Day of Independence, that the United
States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence, that we will be
prepared to discuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming
a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between
the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union
founded here 175 years ago.24
In retrospect, this speech represented the high-water mark of official
interest in the development of a more profound Atlantic Community
during the Cold War years. It was never followed through; for a variety
of reasons. Kennedy himself was, of course, removed from the scene
less than eighteen months later. For its part the EEC, as noted in
Chapter 5, stayed clear of defence and military issues in any guise right
up until the end of the Cold War. Also, Kennedy’s 1962 vision
appeared predicated upon the development of ‘federal institutions’ for
the EEC. Serious progress in this direction was blocked by President
de Gaulle later in the 1960s. Some doubted whether the whole idea of
what came to be called the ‘dumbbell’ view of the Atlantic Alliance,
with a united Europe standing co-equal with the United States, could
work productively in any event.25
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For the remainder of the Cold War period, the notion of trying to
build a viable Atlantic Community lost salience amongst leaders in
NATO member states. To be sure, variations on the theme continued
to surface in official NATO statements from time to time, but these
appeared increasingly ritualistic.26 In 1966, Cleveland argued that such
a community as did exist was essentially ‘defensive and reactive’, a
‘[military] coalition and not a political community’.27 By 1989 the
concept seemed all but dead and buried. 
The Atlantic Community since the Cold War
Since the Cold War ended, there have been those who have denigrated
the idea that any underlying sense of community could continue to
exist sans the Soviet threat. John Holmes, a former US diplomat, has
echoed Cleveland’s views of the 1960s in claiming that ‘the [NATO]
alliance has remained an alliance, a convenience rather than an
emotional reality’.28 Stephen Walt has argued, starting from a similar
standpoint, that ‘the high-water mark of transatlantic security cooper-
ation is past’. He points to transatlantic disputes and disagreements 
in a number of areas during the 1990s. He also notes, in common 
with others, the apparently rising importance of Asia as a factor in US
security, economic and commercial policies.29 Christopher Layne,
meanwhile, has baldly asserted that ‘Atlantic Community’ is ‘a term
that is a code phrase for overall American leadership’ rather than
anything more profound or genuinely multilateral.30
In assessing these views, it is helpful to distinguish between the
idea of a security community as defined by the Princeton Study Group
in 1957 and what Michael Brenner has more recently called a ‘civic
community’. The main distinction between the two is that the latter is
based more fundamentally and explicitly on shared norms and values
whereas the former, as Brenner puts it, can reflect ‘merely the calcu-
lated preference of states’.31 The discussions here will now consider
each in turn.
The Atlantic security community
For a security community to exist, war should, ideally, be both struc-
turally and conceptually inconceivable. Countries within a security
community should, therefore, first be incapable of mounting military
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operations against one another; the so-called ‘structural incapacity to
attack’. Second, their leaders should share an unwritten but general
understanding that war would never be considered against other coun-
tries within the security community, however serious and protracted
disputes with them may become.
The first benchmark, that of structural incapacity for offensive
operations, could in theory be attained in two ways. One would be to
integrate the armed forces of the NATO member states so compre-
hensively that it would become physically impossible for any national
leader to detach ‘their’ forces for separate operations either against
neighbours and allies or anywhere else. This indeed was the kind of
root-and-branch military integration envisaged in the EDC plans in
the early 1950s. Had these been adopted they would likely have led to
the appointment of a European Defence Minister and to the establish-
ing of a common budget. 
A second, and perhaps more realistic, way in which a structural
incapacity to attack could be entrenched would involve NATO
member states adopting proposals which were in vogue during the
1980s for what was then called ‘Non Offensive Defence’ (NOD). As
its name suggested, NOD thinking boiled down to support for the
proposition that participating countries should eschew both weapons
systems and military concepts and tactics which gave them the option
to attack and conduct offensive military operations beyond their own
borders. Such ideas were highly controversial during the Cold War
period and were criticised by some who argued that adoption of such
a posture would dangerously constrain NATO’s options for respond-
ing to a Soviet attack without necessarily increasing its ability to deter
such an attack. Others argued that it was, in any event, not easy to
define and agree on either types of weaponry or military tactics which
were exclusively defensive and would be accepted as such by all rele-
vant governments.32
Neither of these two structural alternatives has ever been adopted
in the transatlantic area. Limited military integration has developed
within NATO since the 1950s but this has fallen short of the kind of
integration envisaged under the EDC and necessary to guarantee the
structural incapacity to attack. The vast bulk of members’ fighting
forces remain under national control in peacetime and there is no legal
obligation on any member state (except, historically, the pre-1990
FRG) to actually release NATO-assigned forces to multinational
control even in a crisis. In operational situations, national control is
ultimately maintained, via the red card system discussed in Chapter 2.
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A structural incapacity to attack does not exist today amongst all
members of the supposed Atlantic security community. In terms of the
size and capabilities of their armed forces, the US and, to a lesser
extent, France and the UK can certainly mount significant offensive
operations if they want to do so. In certain respects the FRG could too,
though here the picture is somewhat more complicated because of
historical and, until relatively recently, constitutional constraints. In
structural terms, therefore, the existence of an Atlantic security
community does not look quite as assured as is sometimes assumed. 
What can be said about the state of affairs in the conceptual arena?
Is it credible to believe that leaders would ever seriously consider 
going to war against a fellow NATO (or EU) member or, conversely,
feel threatened by the prospect of military attack by their allies? 
Here the case for stating that a developed security community exists
does seem stronger. After all, the bottom line is that no NATO or 
EU member has gone to war with another member since 1949 and
1957 respectively, nor, discounting for a moment the Greece-Turkish
fringe in NATO, ever seriously threatened to do so. How can this 
be explained? 
One of the most popular explanatory theories focuses on the so-
called ‘democratic peace’. Democratic peace theory draws heavily upon
West European and North American experiences – especially relations
amongst member states of the EU – for empirical support of its basic
proposition that mature democracies never go to war with each
other.33 One might expect greater support for this view with reference
to the EU than to NATO given that, as noted earlier, the latter has
never insisted de facto that all its member states be mature democra-
cies. Thus, tensions between Greece and Turkey can be ascribed to the
persisting failure to establish a mature democracy in the latter. 
Another popular explanation for the absence of war amongst
NATO/EU members since 1945 emphasises the role of increasing
interdependence amongst them. According to this view in its simplest
form the greater the network of ties and contacts between countries,
especially in the economic and commercial arenas, the lower the risk of
war. This is because these countries will have come to depend increas-
ingly on one another for supplies of vital materials and for export
markets and will not wish to see their access to these disrupted. 
Although the connection between interdependence and peace
might thus appear to be self-evident it should not be accepted at 
face value. As John Lewis Gaddis has reminded us, there is very little
historical support for the assertion that relations of apparent inter-
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dependence automatically promote international peace. Gaddis makes
his point by citing the specific examples of economic interdependence
that existed amongst the major powers in Europe on the eve of the
First World War, and he also notes that the US was Japan’s largest
trading partner in 1941.34
During the 1970s, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed 
the concept of complex interdependence. They argued that in a few
regions of the world (Western Europe and North America) relations 
of interdependence were marked by a web of connections, links and
relations which provided contact and communication not only
between governments but also between a range of other interest
groups within wider societies. The role of international institutions was
important in providing forums for communication and co-operation.
Keohane and Nye argued that, because the web joining states and 
societies together had become so dense, distinctions between military,
economic and political issues were becoming increasingly blurred. As 
a consequence, military power was no longer seen as the final arbiter
of disputes and disagreements in regions where complex interdepend-
ence exists.35
Jaap de Wilde has argued that the mere existence of interdepend-
ence, of whatever form, neither presumes nor leads to equality between
states and, as a result, the potential for conflict remains and may even
increase as two or more unequal states are drawn ever closer together.
What really matter, in de Wilde’s view, are perceptions. As he puts it,
‘the existence of economic and ideological interdependence by itself
[is] not enough; it [has] to be recognized’. Citing other writers, de
Wilde elaborates on this point:
Since 1945 the Western democracies seemed to have learned the lesson.
Marshall aid was offered and within a few years the enemy states were
accepted as equal partners in all kinds of international organizations.
Mutual interests outweighed national sentiments. Russett and Starr 
affirm that this had more to do with the perception of interdependence
(the psychological dimension, as they call it) than with the mere facts of
interdependence. Much of what is being seen as interdependence is not
new, but is just being recognized for the first time. The ‘material’ facts of
interdependence do not necessarily make for peace by themselves; the
‘immaterial’ facts must be present as well.36
The essential foundations of the Atlantic security community today are
the perceptions of interdependence which have developed amongst
those countries which make it up – the members of NATO and 
the EU. This has enabled discrepancies in size and relative power to 
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be overlooked. Most especially, it has facilitated a historic reconcilia-
tion between the FRG and its European neighbours. In 1957, it 
may be recalled, the Princeton Study Group refrained from describing
the North Atlantic Area as a security community largely on account 
of continuing concerns and suspicions about the Germans. Since 
that time, however, things have changed. Thus, for example, the
Benelux states appear to have had few problems integrating themselves
further within the European Union alongside the FRG, which by 
most objective measurements is the single most powerful state within
the EU. 
If not perfect, relations within Western Europe, North America
and between the two regions – collectively labelled here as the ‘transat-
lantic area’ – do represent the closest that any group of countries has
yet come to attaining a security community. 
For some this community is essentially ‘European’ rather than
‘Atlantic’. In 1997 John Holmes wrote that:
The idea of Europe as a community has flourished, and the cohabitation
of the Western European nations within the European Union (EU) has
reached the point that separation, much less divorce, seems impossible. In
contrast, could the fifty-year-old relationship between Europe and the
United States come to an end? Yes, though not immediately, and not
inevitably.37
Holmes thus implied that the US role in the security community 
was neither as strong nor as necessary as that of the West European
participants. However, such a view seriously undervalues the United
States’ pivotal role as what Josef Joffe has called ‘Europe’s pacifier’.
During the Cold War, it performed this role by extending a security
guarantee, backed in the final analysis by nuclear weapons, to its
NATO allies and also by taking on the role of NATO’s leader. As Joffe
puts it, ‘by extending its guarantee, the United States removed the
prime structural cause of conflict among states – the search for an
autonomous defense policy’. Further:
By sparing the West Europeans the necessity of autonomous choice in
matters of defense, the United States removed the systemic cause of
conflict that had underlain so many of Europe’s past wars (World War I is
perhaps the best example.) By protecting Western Europe against others,
the United States also protected the half-continent against itself. And by
paving the way from international anarchy to security community the
United States not only defused ancient rivalries but also built the indis-
pensable foundation for future cooperation.38
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The United States continued to play a ‘pacifier’ role among its allies
during the 1990s. This was most clearly seen in the context of relations
between Greece and Turkey. In 1996 the US took the lead in defusing
heightened tensions between the two, which some had thought might
actually lead to war, over disputed islets in the Aegean Sea. Richard
Holbrooke, the American mediator, reportedly accused EU members
of ‘literally sleeping through the night’ as the US worked to defuse the
crisis.39 In the following year Madeleine Albright reportedly engaged
in ‘more than a week of quiet shuttle diplomacy’ in order to persuade
Greek and Turkish leaders to agree a joint statement at a NATO
summit in Madrid.40
To imply that the United States is an optional extra in the security
community is, therefore, not justified. Whilst its role, arguably, is not
quite as fundamental as it was during the Cold War, it is still key – not
least because of its continuing role as the leader of NATO. This is one
of the two core institutional underpinnings of the contemporary
Atlantic security community (the other being the European Union).
NATO, by definition, could not exist without the United States.
The Atlantic civic community
The core feature of the Atlantic civic community, as defined above, 
is the role played by shared fundamental norms and values. Those 
most often described are individual freedom, political democracy and
the rule of law. Where can one best look for evidence for the existence
of such a community? There are two main schools of thought. The
broad-sweep school identifies the existence of common outlooks 
and shared viewpoints between Europeans and North Americans
based, as Christopher Layne has written, on ‘the friendship and web of
historical, political, and cultural ties’ uniting peoples in the two conti-
nents.41 For commentators such as Layne, the existence of particular
international institutions, such as NATO, is not necessary for the
underlying community of values to be maintained. Layne, indeed, has
argued that ‘Atlanticism’ could survive even if NATO were wound up. 
The second school of thought is NATO-focused. Adherents of this
view argue that NATO, if not the sole repository of the values of the
civic community, does at least represent their most important institu-
tional embodiment. Both Michael Brenner and Thomas Risse-Kappen
have developed arguments along these lines. Brenner has called NATO
an ‘incorporated partnership’, explaining the term thus:
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Incorporation has carried the allies beyond policy parallelism or ad hoc
collaboration to concert … Moreover, the articles of incorporation stipu-
late fixed obligations of the signatory states, establish routine procedures
for consultation and joint decision making, and create mechanisms for
review and oversight of actions taken. NATO structures are the organiza-
tional expression of those undertakings. They provide the staff, the inte-
grated commands, the facilities and resources for carrying out missions. A
political culture has evolved around them with a distinct set of norms and
expectations. They counter the disposition of member governments to
rethink the exceptional commitments that they have made.42
Risse-Kappen has argued in similar vein. In his view, NATO is of
prime importance because ‘as an institution [it] is explicitly built
around norms of democratic decision-making, that is, nonhierarchy,
frequent consultation implying co-determination, and consensus-
building. Its institutional rules and procedures are formulated in such
a way as to allow the allies to influence each other’.43
The major part of Cooperation Among Democracies, Risse-
Kappen’s key work in this area, is devoted to a series of case studies
demonstrating the extent to which the European NATO members
were able to influence US foreign policy decision-making through the
NATO structures at key junctures during the Cold War. Brenner has
also stressed the importance of this factor, writing that ‘the culture of
multilateralism [within NATO] eases the apprehensions of weaker
states about possible domination by the stronger. The consensus rule
amplifies the voice of the weaker; it opens opportunity for resisting the
will of the stronger – especially that of the United States as the over-
whelmingly most powerful and acknowledged leader of the Alliance’.44
The existence of an Atlantic civic community remains a
contentious issue. On one level it could be argued that, like beauty, it
exists in the eye of the beholder. On another level, however, what ulti-
mately matters are the perceptions of key leaders and policy makers
within the relevant countries. If, in reaching their decisions, their
approaches are conditioned by the view that a community of shared
norms and values does actually exist, then they will operationalise such
a belief. They will do this by consulting routinely and, even more
significantly, the more powerful will allow the views and agendas of
other members of the community to influence their own national
policy-making processes before final decisions are reached. 
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South East Europe:
challenges to the Atlantic Community
The successive crises in Bosnia and Kosovo have, arguably, made the
most significant impact on the post-Cold War Atlantic Community as
a whole. In this section, their impact, and the ways in which they were
dealt with, will be explored in order to determine the extent to which
this confirms or undermines the existence of a still viable and signifi-
cant Atlantic Community now that the Cold War has ended. Because
there is little dispute over the existence of a substantial security
community, attention will be focused on the more controversial issue
of the alleged community of shared norms and values. 
Bosnia
During the Cold War period it seemed scarcely conceivable that NATO
would become involved in peacekeeping-type military operations.
From 1992, however, this situation changed rapidly and fundamen-
tally. Beginning in the spring of that year, when the first tentative
contacts were established between the UN Secretary-General and his
NATO counterpart (at the initiative of the former), institutional and
operational relations between the UN and NATO started to develop.
The major catalyst for this was the conflict in Bosnia and the efforts of
the international community to bring it under control and, if possible,
broker a peace settlement.45
Once the first NATO assets and resources had been committed to
Bosnia over the course of the second half of 1992, the institution
quickly acquired a distinct stake in the success of international opera-
tions there and a disincentive to admit failure and withdraw. This was
largely a product of concerns about NATO’s credibility being on the
line, as discussed in Chapter 2. Thus, during the years 1993 and 1994,
far from seriously contemplating withdrawal from Bosnia, NATO
became progressively more involved. This was particularly evident in
the decision, from spring 1993, to offer airpower to support UN
humanitarian relief operations and, later, to underpin attempts to
declare and maintain certain Bosnian towns and cities as ‘safe areas’. 
There was, however, a mounting tide of criticism, especially in 
the United States, of NATO’s apparent inability to actually stop the
fighting. In a widely cited article published in the summer of 1993,
one American analyst went so far as to assert that ‘the Western alliance
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is dead … it seems likely that history will record the failure of NATO
to respond to the Bosnian war with military force as evidence of the
demise of an alliance that lasted for half a century’.46 This was by no
means an isolated view. 
At the same time, there was little evidence of a desire on the part
of either the Clinton administration or in the US Congress to commit
American troops to military action in the midst of a brutal civil war. As
an alternative, a number of senators, led by Bob Dole, began to argue
for a withdrawal of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the
lifting of the UN arms embargo against the Muslim-dominated
Bosnian government.47 This would have allowed it to import
(American) military equipment in order to be able to fight on more
equitable terms against the Bosnian Serbs, which the Dole supporters
saw as being the main aggressors. Also proposed was the use of NATO
airstrikes against the Serbs.
Despite the President having been rhetorically committed to a
similar ‘lift-and-strike’ approach since his successful 1992 election
campaign, the Clinton administration had not pushed for this to be
adopted during its first twenty-two months in office. This was despite
the Senate having passed a bill to terminate US compliance with the
UN arms embargo in May 1994.48 The main reason for the adminis-
tration’s hesitation was the strong opposition of France and the UK,
the two NATO members with the largest troop commitments to
UNPROFOR. In mid-November 1994, in the wake of crushing
Republican victories in mid-term congressional elections, the adminis-
tration changed its position. It agreed to prohibit US ships – which had
been deployed under NATO command in the Adriatic since 1992 to
enforce compliance with the embargo – from doing so in the case of
cargoes destined for the Bosnian government. The administration tried
to play down the significance of the move and stressed that NATO
allies had been ‘consulted’,49 but the decision nevertheless aroused
widespread displeasure amongst the European allies. 
By coincidence, most of them were meeting under the auspices of
the WEU in the same week that the American decision was announced.
The WEU members declared that they:
take note with regret of the US measures to modify its participation with
respect to the enforcement of the arms embargo in the Combined
WEU/NATO Operation SHARP GUARD in the Adriatic. In this
context, they particularly stress the importance that the US in NATO
structures will continue to observe fully the mandatory provisions of all
relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.50
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Despite the fact that the language was as diplomatic as could reason-
ably be expected, this was nevertheless an unprecedented collective
public rebuke for the US by its West European allies. To some
commentators the American decision and European reaction raised the
prospect of a Suez-type breakdown in transatlantic relations.51
In fact, as in the 1950s there was a sense of urgency in moving to
repair relations and forestall the possibility of NATO being perma-
nently debilitated. Within ten days of the US decision, NATO
launched its most significant airstrikes thus far, against Bosnian Serb
military positions threatening the town of Bihac. The rationale behind
these had at least as much to do with publicly demonstrating NATO’s
unity and ability to act as with any strategic or humanitarian concerns.
The then Secretary-General, Willy Claes, admitted as much when he
said that ‘this operation … indicates clearly … that NATO is not dead
at all. This was a multinational operation – Americans, British, French
and Dutch pilots … those who pretend that America is not willing to
go on to cooperate are making a serious mistake, I think’.52
In the year following the November 1994 controversy, the Clinton
administration executed an effective volte-face in its Bosnia policy and
decided to become much more actively involved in trying to bring
about a settlement. The administration’s main motivation was the
desire to reassert US leadership in European security affairs – with a
revitalised NATO as the chosen vehicle through which to do this. In
August 1995 NATO, with the US in the vanguard, launched
Operation Deliberate Force. This, coupled with reverses on the ground,
helped convince the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept a ceasefire and
engage in the political negotiations that eventually produced the
Dayton accords in November.
The most remarkable turnaround in US policy was still to come.
Up until 1995, the sine qua non of American policy had been a refusal
to deploy ground forces in Bosnia. Once the Dayton accords were
reached, however, the Clinton administration went on the political
offensive to persuade Congress to agree to send 20,000 US troops to
be part of the NATO-led IFOR. This appeal was underpinned by
frequent reference to NATO’s credibility being on the line, as noted in
Chapter 2.
The year 1995 was also important in witnessing the emergence of
a new ‘Clinton Doctrine’. This was almost certainly inspired in large
part by the desire of the administration to put the previous year’s low
point in relations with Europe behind it and reassert the essential
importance of the transatlantic link. Back in 1957, it may be recalled,
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the US had come up with the idea of interdependence as a way of
expressing an ideological conviction that transatlantic relations were
fundamentally strong. In 1995 the chosen idea, offered as part of the
Clinton administration’s ‘Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement’,
was that of the United States as a ‘European power’.
In June, the Pentagon issued a document on United States
Security Strategy for Europe and NATO. This declared that ‘America
has been a European power, it remains a European power, and it will
continue to be a European power’. It expanded on this statement thus:
Europe represents the world’s greatest concentration of nations and
peoples which share our commitment to democracy and market
economies. America’s cultural heritage and institutions largely spring 
from European roots. Our most important multilateral alliance – the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – is centered there. The
continent is also one of the world’s greatest centres of economic power
and represents a massive export market for US products. Thus, our
continued political, cultural, and economic well-being is inextricably tied
to Europe.53
For American leaders the European power concept was, this statement
suggested, based upon a combination of shared values and strategic
and economic interests. It was, argued prominent Americans, the
values aspect that really made the relationship distinctive, however. If
shared values were not present, the US would, in Ronald Steel’s words,
‘not [be] a European nation, any more than it is an Asian nation’.
Rather, it would be ‘an Atlantic power, and a Pacific one, with inter-
ests in both continents’.54
Joseph Nye, who served as a senior official in the first Clinton
administration, subsequently wrote that:
In a larger sense, the United States shares the values of democracy and
human rights more thoroughly with the majority of European countries
than with most other states. Values matter in American foreign policy, and
the commonality of values between the United States and Europe is an
important force keeping the two sides together. The United States is the
progeny of a certain island European power, the legacy of which is evident
in US political structures, legal mechanisms and civil protections, and
language.55
The idea of the United States as a European power represented, 
in effect, a dressing up of the old Atlantic Community concept in
different garb. Set against the background of the Bosnian crisis,
however, this was something of a post facto development. A sense of
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shared values had not been a prominent factor in determining western
policy towards Bosnia in the first place. Specifically, the notion of a
value-driven humanitarian intervention did not surface in a serious way
until the Kosovo crisis began to move centre-stage.
Kosovo
In the spring and early summer of 1999, NATO leaders’ public state-
ments stressed repeatedly that Operation Allied Force was being fought
for values, and not territory or narrow national interests in the tradi-
tional sense. Czech President Vaclav Havel, in an address to the
Canadian Parliament, said that:
This is probably the first war ever fought that is not being fought in the
name of interests, but in the name of certain principles and values. If it is
possible to say about a war that it is ethical, or that it is fought for ethical
reasons, it is true of this war. Kosovo has no oil fields whose output might
perhaps attract somebody’s interest; no member country of the Alliance
has any territorial claims there; and, Milosevic is not threatening either the
territorial integrity, or any other integrity, of any NATO member.
Nevertheless, the Alliance is fighting. It is fighting in the name of human
interest for the fate of other human beings … This war gives human rights
precedence over the rights of states.56
In similar vein, Alexander Vershbow was quoted as saying that
‘NATO is now in the business of defending common values and inter-
ests as well as the territory of its members. Our shared values –
freedom, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights – are
themselves every bit as much worth defending as is our territory’.57
The quotations above illustrate a key point about the shared values
that exist within the transatlantic area in the post-Cold War environ-
ment. They are viewed by NATO members as being available for
export to non-NATO members within the wider Europe. Additionally,
any perceived assault upon them is increasingly now viewed as being a
strike against the contemporary Atlantic Community and its members.
To argue that NATO’s action over Kosovo was not in any 
way interest-driven is overly simplistic. It would be more accurate to
claim that NATO was fighting for perceived interests, but that its
members interpreted their interests in a different way to the Cold War
years. NATO had been formed with the clear objectives, enshrined in
Article 5 of its treaty, of deterring and if necessary defending against 
a territorial assault on any of its members. Even then, however, a
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‘values’ element was built into the Washington Treaty. Since the Cold
War ended, and particularly as a result of NATO’s response to the
Kosovo crisis, this latter element has moved increasingly to the fore.
The ‘idea of Europe’
During the Kosovo crisis, reference was sometimes made to ‘a certain
idea of Europe’ being under assault. Javier Solana referred to it in a
speech in Berlin in June 1999, just before the end of Operation Allied
Force. His remarks offer useful insights into this strand of NATO think-
ing:
What makes NATO so united in this crisis is the fact that in Kosovo our
long term interests and our values converge. For behind the plight of the
Kosovars there is even more at stake: the future of the project of Europe.
The conflict between Belgrade and the rest of the international commu-
nity is a conflict between two visions of Europe. One vision – Milosevic’s
vision – is a Europe of ethnically pure states, a Europe of nationalism,
authoritarianism and xenophobia. The other vision, upheld by NATO and
the European Union and many other countries, is of a Europe of integra-
tion, democracy and ethnic pluralism. This is the vision that has turned
Europe and North America into the closest, most democratic and pros-
perous community ever built … If this positive vision of Europe is to
prevail, if Europe is to enter the 21st century as a community of states
practicing democracy, pluralism and human rights, we simply cannot
tolerate this carnage at its centre.58
In understanding how and why member states were motivated by
these concerns, it is important to bear in mind the extent to which
their concept of NATO’s area of responsibility has changed since the
end of the Cold War. Before, the term ‘NATO area’ was specifically
defined in the Washington Treaty.59 It was considered important to be
specific because an attack against this area would have triggered an
Article 5 collective response. 
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO members have adopted a
new formulation to describe their wider and broader sphere of interest
– the ‘Euro-Atlantic Area’ (EAA) and they have been willing to
conduct ‘non-Article 5 operations’ within this area. EAA is a label 
that came into circulation following the creation of NATO’s EAPC 
in 1997. Membership of the EAPC embraces all NATO members, 
all the former Warsaw Pact states and their successors, the Soviet
successor states and most of the countries of South East Europe, with
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the important exceptions of the FRY and Bosnia. It defines the param-
eters of the Euro-Atlantic Area.
When the EAPC was formally established, its founding document
spoke of the commitment of all participants to ‘strengthen and extend
peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, on the basis of the shared
values and principles which underlie their co-operation’.60 These were
identified as ‘protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and
human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through
democracy’.61
NATO’s response to the Kosovo crisis suggested to some that a de
facto European collective security arrangement might be coming into
being under the auspices of the EAPC. Traditional definitions of
collective security stress the internal policing role of involved countries;
i.e. their obligation to take action against any of their number whose
behaviour violates accepted standards or threatens to disturb order and
security. Yet, Kosovo cannot truly be described as a collective security
action. The FRY was not a member of the EAPC and hence not a part
of the Euro-Atlantic Area. Operation Allied Force was, therefore, an act
of collective defence against outside aggression – the first such in
NATO’s history. It was not, however, an Article 5 operation. What was
being defended, in this instance, was not territory but, rather, the
common values of the Euro-Atlantic community. 
In this context the diplomatic and psychological importance of the
EAPC meeting which took place on the margins of the NATO
Washington summit in April 1999 should not be underestimated.
Although EAPC members failed explicitly to endorse NATO’s air
attacks on the FRY they nevertheless ‘expressed support for the
demands of the international community’ and ‘emphasized their
abhorrence of the policies of violence, repression and ethnic cleansing
being carried out by the FRY authorities in Kosovo’.62 NATO officials
subsequently acknowledged the value – for reasons of legitimisation –
of this endorsement from the only multilateral body that brings
together NATO and its European partner states.63
Conclusions 
The Atlantic Community is, arguably, at least as strong today as before
1989. To recall, Karl Deutsch et al. did not think that a transatlantic
security community existed, beyond a few bilateral relationships, when
first discussing the concept in the late 1950s. Apart from the special
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case of Greece–Turkey relations, few would question its existence
today. In terms of the civic community – or ‘community of values’ –
between the US and its European allies, this has become if anything
more overt, if not stronger, since the Cold War’s end. 
During the 1990s, NATO expanded in the obvious, narrow, sense
of taking in more members. More profoundly, the members’ under-
standing of what constituted their area of responsibility was broadened
significantly with the adoption of the concept of the Euro-Atlantic
Area. This is not simply a geographical entity. Nor is it institutionally
defined. Only a minority of EAA states are members of NATO, and
some have made clear that they do not wish to join. Rather, the Euro-
Atlantic Area is best described as being a community of shared norms
and values.
The NATO response to the crisis in Kosovo demonstrated that
threats to shared values were sufficient to bring about a robust transat-
lantic response, even though there had been no direct threat to any
member of the Atlantic Community, or the EAA, in a traditional, terri-
torial sense.
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Conclusion
The discussions here will briefly revisit the main issues and debates that
have been examined in the substantive chapters of this volume in order
to assess the ways in which the Kosovo crisis, relative to other factors,
has had an impact in shaping them since the late 1990s. Following this,
overall conclusions will be drawn as to the extent to which the crisis can
be said to have significantly affected the post-Cold War European secu-
rity landscape.
A ‘Kosovo precedent’: new wars, new interventions?
When NATO undertook armed action without an explicit mandate
from the UNSC, it entered a kind of international no-man’s land
between upholding the sanctity of state sovereignty and that of 
human life. While NATO members asserted that the humanitarian and
strategic imperatives of saving Kosovar Albanian lives and preventing
destabilisation in South East Europe drove the action, states such as
Russia and China saw the Kosovo conflict as an unacceptable violation
of the FRY’s state sovereignty. The result was controversy and debates
that simmer on today. These debates raised important issues about 
how the armed conflict should best be viewed. Was Kosovo a war, a
limited war or something else? NATO’s military action best met the
description of being an intervention, but this descriptor itself was full
of variations, including the one that has been subject to the widest
debate; i.e. humanitarian intervention.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the idea of humanitarian intervention
can be broadly defined as being forced outside intervention in the
affairs of a sovereign state to uphold human rights or save the lives of
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people threatened by the violent oppression of a regime.1 This presents
the international community with a paradox. Bruce Cronin high-
lighted the difficulties of humanitarian intervention when he wrote:
On one hand, international law and diplomatic practice are clearly biased
in favor of state autonomy in matters that are considered to be domestic
… On the other hand, multilateral treaties and international institutions
have long provided for collective action in situations where governments
violate generally accepted norms of behaviour.2
This paradox brings into sharp focus the potential for conflict between
the long-standing doctrine of non-intervention that buttresses state
sovereignty and the increasingly universal norms of the international
system on human rights that challenge the sacrosanct view of the
sovereignty of the state. The crux of this paradox is the problem of
establishing criteria for intervention, and humanitarian intervention 
in particular.
Determining the ethical basis of intervention and establishing 
its legitimacy is a core challenge. Kosovo brought into focus this 
twin problem. As the discussions in Chapter 1 indicate, the ethics of
humanitarian intervention are far from being a simple and clear-cut
matter. Although some governments, such as in the UK, have made
valuable contributions to articulating a set of criteria, there remains no
consensus on this matter in the international community as a whole.3
With the events of 11 September 2001 prompting an international
intervention in Afghanistan, albeit for reasons other than humanitarian
imperatives, the problem of establishing agreed criteria for any kind of
international intervention is unlikely to go away. 
On the related issue of legitimacy, Kosovo seemingly saw the
UNSC being increasingly sidelined. Closer analysis suggests, however,
that far from marking the end of the UN role in conferring legitimacy
on international intervention, Kosovo reinforced the need for this
global security organisation, as demonstrated by the key role that
NATO members have conceded to the UN in overseeing the post-
conflict reconstruction of Kosovo. What was confirmed by the Kosovo
crisis is that the UN Charter and the security role that derives from it
makes the UN an international body that is optimised for dealing with
inter-state conflict better than the intra-state kind. 
The long-term impact of the Kosovo crisis on debates about inter-
vention in Europe specifically is not likely to be very large.
Intervention in Europe, given the strong institutional basis of the 
security order in this part of the world, is likely to be a case-by-case
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phenomenon and one undertaken only in extreme circumstances,
when all diplomatic options have been exhausted. Kosovo, however,
has more general importance when viewed as part of a wider pattern of
post-Cold War interventions that seem likely to increase rather than
decrease in the wake of the events of 11 September.
The future of NATO: Kosovo and after
The first part of Chapter 2 focused on controversies surrounding the
workings of NATO’s multilateral political decision-making and mili-
tary command and control structures during Operation Allied Force.
The allegedly negative lessons which the US, in particular, had drawn
from the Kosovo experience in this respect made headlines once again
in the autumn of 2001. This happened as a consequence of the mili-
tary operations in Afghanistan. 
Much of the analysis and commentary surrounding the conduct of
these operations focused on the extent to which the Americans ran
them on a unilateral basis, with no direct reference to NATO or any
other multilateral structures or processes. The Kosovo experience was
often cited as a key reason for this approach. As one British commen-
tator put it, ‘the frustrations of American commanders with the
cumbersome (and, at times, leaky) nature of Nato’s collective decision-
making during the Kosovo conflict [have] made them wary of too
much military involvement now by other countries’.4 Another argued
that, after Kosovo, ‘it is unlikely that they [the Americans] will ever
again wish to use NATO to manage a serious shooting war’.5
Extrapolating from this, some drew the conclusion that, in the post-
11 September security environment, NATO was becoming obsolete.
Such arguments seem overdone. To begin with, the ‘cumbersome
nature’ of allied decision-making during Operation Allied Force should
not be overestimated. As discussed in Chapter 2, at a very early 
stage in the operation, NATO members in effect decided that most of
their number would cede day-to-day supervisory authority to a sub-
group of the most powerful – the Quints. Within this caucus, the key
decisions about target approval were often made by an even smaller
grouping of three – the US, UK and France. 
What really counted during Operation Allied Force were not the
formal structures of NATO, which reportedly were soon substantially
cast aside when confronted by an actual military crisis. The important
thing was the existence of an informal network of links, ties and shared
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habits of co-operation amongst member states. These had been built
up over a fifty-year period in the case of many of the states concerned.
They represented the main contribution of ‘NATO’ to the prosecution
of the Kosovo campaign and, incidentally, in the 2001–02 Afghan war
also. In this latter case, the value of shared habits of co-operation and
working together was acknowledged even by the US Department of
Defense,6 popularly assumed to be the chief proponent of a unilateral
approach. In reality, the US was far from being the only NATO
member engaged in the war on terror in Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, there were discernible differences in the conduct of
the Kosovo and Afghan operations. During the former the US had, for
all the frustrations, operated throughout substantially within an inter-
national chain of command. Afghan operations were run through a US
national command chain, with bilateral arrangements being made with
other contributing countries. 
What accounts for the differences in the US approach to the
Kosovo and Afghan campaigns? The key difference is that Kosovo was
counted as being within the NATO area of responsibility. Afghanistan,
on the other hand, was not. As discussed in Chapter 6, the NATO 
area today is different to that which existed during the Cold War.
Then, it was clearly defined to include only the territory of the member
states in Europe and North America and the waters surrounding 
them. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has officially adopted the
notion that it has an interest in security and stability in the wider Euro-
Atlantic Area.7
Despite American interest in a potential ‘global NATO’, the
contemporary EAA does not extend to countries and regions beyond
Europe. Even within its own area, its reach is not as broad and expan-
sive as some at first assume. Officially, Kazakhstan, the Kyrghyz
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are all included
within the EAA, on the basis of their participation in PfP. However, as
NATO officials have privately admitted, these Central Asian countries
have been little more than nominal participants.8 They have developed
no real substantive relationship with NATO – although this may
change as a consequence of renewed US interest in Central Asia
following 11 September and the campaign in Afghanistan.
South East Europe has become the central region of the new
NATO area; a development both reflected and reinforced by NATO’s
response to the Kosovo crisis. As noted in Chapters 2 and 6 here,
NATO members believe that a large amount of the institution’s post-
Cold War credibility is invested in the region, particularly in making
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sure that the peace agreements currently in place in Bosnia, Kosovo
and Macedonia continue to hold. As Gilles Andréani et al. have put it:
If the Kosovo crisis found [NATO members] united, it was not because
events in the region affected both sides of the Atlantic in the same way, or
because of any intrinsic strategic value of Balkan territory, but because the
governments elevated the crisis into a test for the credibility of an Alliance
which they could not allow to collapse. There are not many instances
when this is likely to be the case.9
There was no serious expectation amongst its member states that
NATO would be formally involved in the post-11 September opera-
tions in Afghanistan. Its non-involvement should not, therefore, be
taken as an indication that it is an institution in decline. 
If, on the other hand, NATO members were beginning to disen-
gage from South East Europe then this would be a significant indica-
tor that the institution had had its day, given the credibility that it has
invested in the region. However, there is currently no real evidence to
suggest that such a process of disengagement is underway, even on the
part of the United States, as discussed in Chapter 2. By the middle of
2002, the international military presence in Bosnia and Kosovo looked
set to continue into the foreseeable future. 
A ‘Europeanised’ future?
In Chapter 5, it was argued that the Kosovo crisis played a smaller and
more indirect role in helping initiate the development of the European
Union’s ESDP than many have assumed. It is, therefore, perhaps not
surprising that, since 1999, Kosovo has played a less significant role in
shaping its evolution than have other factors.
The events of 11 September seemed to some to have set back the
evolution of the ESDP. Marta Dassù and Nicholas Whyte have, for
example, written that, since then, ‘the idea of a ‘common’ European
defence policy has almost instantly receded and given way to a renewed
bilateralism in transatlantic relationships’.10 There was increased fric-
tion within the EU in the period immediately following 11 September,
when the major powers (France, the FRG and the UK) began meeting
as a threesome to discuss the ‘European’ response to international
terrorism. This caucusing took place to the growing chagrin of the
other members. An intended three-power dinner discussion convened
by Tony Blair in November 2001 degenerated into near-farce. There
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was an outcry amongst the smaller EU members, which led Blair to
backtrack and invite a number of their leaders along too.11
Overall, the impression conveyed was one of disunity, drift and
consequent impotence on the part of the European Union collectively.
Individual member states – chiefly France and the UK – did make
significant military contributions in Afghanistan. These were on the
basis of national agreements with the US, however, and there was no
role as such for the EU’s emerging military dimension. Indeed, in
another embarrassing public disagreement, the Belgian government, as
the then EU presidency state, had been rebuffed in December 2001
for suggesting that the impending deployment of an international
peacekeeping force to Kabul might become the first ESDP operation.12
In common with other military activities in Afghanistan, the Kabul
force was subsequently made up of an ad hoc ‘coalition of the willing’
under the command of a British General.
Despite these reversals, it would be premature, at best, to assume
that the ESDP initiative has completely run out of steam. As the
discussions in Chapter 5 made clear, leading EU members – the British
and French – have had powerful reasons for supporting it and ensur-
ing that it does not die. 
The most likely arena for an actual EU military operation is South
East Europe. By 2002 the region was coming increasingly to be seen
as the key litmus test for the EU’s aspirations to be able to act more
coherently and effectively on the international stage. EU officials noted
that what they called the ‘Western Balkans’ were absorbing between 50
and 60 per cent of the time and effort of Javier Solana, now the EU’s
foreign policy supremo.13
The EU has the biggest stake and role in Macedonia, rather than
in Bosnia or Kosovo. In both of these places, the senior international
representative is an appointee of the UN. In Macedonia, meanwhile,
an EU Special Representative fills the position. This official’s task is to
offer ‘advice’ to the Macedonian authorities across a range of areas.14
In the spring of 2002, the European Commission published a report
setting out a comprehensive range of ‘suggestions’ to ensure contin-
ued stability in Macedonia. It included proposals for reform of the
economy and the political and legal systems.15 Underpinning this was
an informal pledge of eventual EU membership providing that the
country avoided instability and conflict and maintained its ‘European
orientation’.16
The military forces in Macedonia since August 2001 had, it is true,
been organised and commanded within a NATO framework. On the
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other hand, the personnel were almost exclusively European. In the
first such force – ‘Task Force Harvest’ in August and September 2001
– it was reported that there was ‘only one American … a press officer’,
although US support assets such as airlift and intelligence gathering
were being utilised extensively.17 By the summer of 2002 there was
growing discussion about whether EU members might soon be able
and willing to take over the command and control of the military
forces in Macedonia from NATO. They had signalled willingness in
principle to do so at their Barcelona summit meeting in March.18
An expanding Atlantic Community?
The NATO response to the Kosovo crisis confirmed that South East
Europe, a geographically adjacent region, is now regarded as being a
place in which the basic values of the Atlantic Community are expected
to be observed and upheld. The relatively prompt NATO response –
just over a year elapsed between the first official expression of concern
and the launch of Operation Allied Force – contrasted with the division
and hesitation which characterised the first three years of the response
to the civil war in Bosnia. In the case of Macedonia, the reaction by
both NATO and the EU to the threat of civil war was even quicker,
and more effectively pre-emptive, during 2001.
It would be premature to argue that the boundaries of either the
security or civic communities have yet been extended into much of
South East Europe. The states and peoples in the region still tend to
be regarded as objects for remedial treatment or action, rather than as
full participants in the communities. Nevertheless, there does now exist
the prospect that some of them will, ultimately, be fully integrated.
This will be done through membership of one or both of the two core
community institutions, i.e. NATO and the EU. 
At present, South East Europe enjoys a unique status with both
NATO and the EU. It is not yet a full part of the western-based
communities, and parts of the region may not become so for some
considerable time, if ever. It is, on the other hand, considered to be a
region of special interest and importance. Both NATO and the EU
now regard South East Europe as being within their areas of responsi-
bility. Both also have a greater institutional stake in the future peace,
stability and prosperity of this region than of any other in the world.
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Russia’s role and place in European security affairs
Post-Kosovo relations between Russia and NATO remain dogged by
two things – the ambivalence of NATO policy towards Russia and 
the decline of Russia as both a regional and global power. The former
may in fact be a product of the latter. With Russia’s ultimate post-Cold
War position in European and global security affairs uncertain and
changing, NATO has found it difficult to pursue a consistent policy
other than vaguely assuming that it is a given that Russia cannot be
ignored. Yet, on a number of vital issues, Russian views have not
seemed to carry much weight in NATO’s decision-making. For
example, Russia’s objections to enlargement did not ultimately divert
NATO from taking in new members between 1997 and 1999, and
pledging to do so again from 2002. 
As for Russia’s economic and military decline, this was clearly
evident in the last decade of the twentieth century and the prospects
for future Russian recovery remain ultimately uncertain. The scale 
of Russian decline during the 1990s can be illustrated by the fact 
that Russia’s Gross Domestic Product in 1998 was only 55 per cent 
of the level registered by the Soviet Union in 1989,19 although in
recent years the Russian economy has shown some signs of revival. 
The decline in Russia’s international influence is undoubtedly linked 
to its internal problems. The economic decline of Russia underpins 
the erosion of its military power in terms of both conventional and
nuclear forces. 
With this decline come inevitable questions regarding Russia’s
place in the international order. Can Russia be considered a regional
power – let alone a superpower – given its palpable inability to prevent
NATO from launching Operation Allied Force and exert military 
pressure of its own during the Kosovo crisis? Although Russia’s nuclear
arsenal, together with its permanent seats on the UNSC and in the G8,
still afford it an importance in international affairs, this is a status that
is likely to fade unless the domestic problems which have eviscerated
Russian power since the late 1980s are overcome. 
What the Kosovo crisis appears to have done for Russian leaders is
similar to the impact of the Suez crisis of 1956 on the UK’s political
establishment. The significance of Kosovo is that it drove home to the
Russian political and military establishment the limitations on Russian
power and influence and persuaded key leaders to pursue policies
matching Russia’s means rather than memories of its previous status as
a great or superpower. 
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The rise in the perceived threat of international terrorism has
provided a common set of interests upon which to build a new Russia–
NATO relationship. For NATO, Russia still matters in security terms,
but in ways that are different and related to the changes in the 
international security environment since 11 September. The rapid
emergence of the NRC during 2001–02 has provided a new oppor-
tunity for Russia and NATO to work together on security matters,
both in Europe and further afield. In remains to be seen, however, how
far this potential will be realised. 
South East European futures: unachievable goals?
The normative bases of the Dayton agreements, UNSC Resolution
1244 and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe all promote
democracy in conjunction with a civic model of nationalism that is
distant, if not alien to, ethnic national identities in South East Europe.
On this crucial issue of nationalism, the gulf in understanding between
the recipients and givers of norms lies at the crux of the problem of
norm transmission and inculcation in the region. With nationalist
tension and conflict still existing in parts of Europe, this gulf remains
an important issue for European security. 
Moreover, with the majority of conflicts around the world being
intra-state, with an ethnic or nationalist dimension present in a large
number of them, the issue of what concept of nationalism should
underpin norms and values is scarcely an irrelevant one. ‘Failed states’
are a major source of instability and potential base for international
terrorists.20 Thus, how the international community imparts norms 
in the context of post-conflict peace-building makes an understanding
of the problems of nationalism in the post-11 September security 
environment an important normative element in the war on terror. 
As the discussions in Chapter 3 made clear, post-crisis efforts at
peace-building in South East Europe have been premised on the belief
that the states and societies in the region should base their political,
social and legal systems on ‘internationally accepted’ norms. These 
are largely modelled on the experiences of the democratic states of
North America and Western Europe. To this end, the international
community, led by NATO and EU member states, has set up intrusive
supervisory apparatus, in Kosovo in particular. According to the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, UNSC
Resolution 1244 provides for ‘an unprecedented constitutional role for
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the UN … to take the place of a government which has abused its 
own citizens in the way the Milosevic government did in respect of the
majority population of Kosovo’.21 In similar vein, the Independent
International Commission on Kosovo has argued that ‘Resolution
1244 created a unique institutional hybrid, a UN protectorate with
unlimited power’ and of potentially unlimited duration.22 In Bosnia
the situation is somewhat different, but the international community
nevertheless is able to exercise considerable influence in shaping 
the normative development of the state. More widely in South East
Europe, NATO and the EU, by political influence and economic 
leverage, have considerable power in shaping the region’s development
in all aspects. 
In Chapter 3, however, it was argued that attempts to impose
‘western’ norms and values on other states and societies without adapt-
ing them to local conditions can potentially have counterproductive
consequences. This does not mean that the norms themselves are
either flawed or irrelevant. Rather, the international approach might
not take sufficiently into account the consequences of a strong sense of
ethnic identity amongst peoples in South East Europe. This raises the
issue of whether the policy prescriptions chosen are ones that will lead
to lasting stability and a winding down of the major commitments of
the international community in the region. A better tailoring of inter-
national norms to conditions in South East Europe may hold out the
prospect of greater and lasting progress towards stability.
Conclusions: lessons of Kosovo?
The immediate aftermath of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 saw consider-
able debate and discussion about what its ‘lessons’ might be. This was
followed again fairly predictably, by a number of ‘revisionist’ views
suggesting that, perhaps, the impact of the crisis was less significant
and profound than many had first believed. 
Debates over the vexing issues associated with international inter-
vention were not new. A string of post-Cold War interventions of
various kinds, from the Persian Gulf to Somalia, had already generated
a series of conundrums and dilemmas that defied the articulation of
clear lessons. Kosovo was no exception. 
For NATO, the military operations over Kosovo provided confir-
mation of the Alliance’s post-Cold War redefinition of its main area of
interest and responsibility. In this respect Kosovo was a key step in a
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process that had begun with the initial NATO involvement in Bosnia
from the summer of 1992. 
With the European Union’s ESDP, the Kosovo crisis did no more
than accelerate trends that were already apparent. Its foreign and 
security policy wing was not brought into being by the crisis.
Nevertheless, Kosovo was important in accelerating a trend towards
making South East Europe its principal focal point. The region has
since become the main testing ground for the EU’s aspirations to be a
significant international security actor. 
If there are any lessons to be gained from the pattern of Russia-
NATO relations during and after the crisis, they warn of the dangers 
of attempting to draw long-term conclusions about such an unpre-
dictable relationship. It might be argued that the response to the crisis
in Kosovo provides lessons about the importance of international
efforts at norm transmission, in the face of indigenous nationalism,
being enacted with great care and delicacy. Even so, this challenge is
not limited to Kosovo or, indeed, to South East Europe. 
Judah has offered the opinion that ‘there were no particular
lessons’ to be drawn from the Kosovo crisis.23 Daalder and O’Hanlon,
meanwhile, have argued that ‘the overall verdict on Kosovo is less likely
to offer new lessons than to affirm old truths’.24 Overall, it does seem
that the Kosovo crisis and the international response reinforced and
reflected trends and developments that were already emerging or
apparent, rather than giving rise to anything dramatically new. The
crisis, therefore, offers us few simple lessons to be learned. On the
other hand, the way in which it was tackled tells us much about the
nature and evolution of post-Cold War European security. 
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Appendix
Key documents
Charter of the United Nations 
San Francisco June 1945 (excerpts)
Chapter 1
Purposes and Principles 
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated
in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles. 
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its Members … 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations … 
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII. 
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Chapter 7
Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accor-
dance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security … 
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use
of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it
may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such meas-
ures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means
of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations … 
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not 
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security. 
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Chapter 8
Regional Arrangements
Article 52
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for
regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations. 
Article 53
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.
But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements
or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council … 
UNSC Resolution 1199 (1998)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting on 23
September 1998
The Security Council, 
Recalling its resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 
Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to
that resolution, and in particular his report of 4 September 1998 … 
Noting with appreciation the statement of the Foreign Ministers of
France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America (the Contact Group) of 12 June 1998 at the conclusion of the
Contact Group’s meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Canada and
Japan … and the further statement of the Contact Group made in
Bonn on 8 July 1998 … 
Noting also with appreciation the joint statement by the Presidents 
of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 
16 June 1998 … 
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Noting further the communication by the Prosecutor of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to the Contact
Group on 7 July 1998, expressing the view that the situation in
Kosovo represents an armed conflict within the terms of the mandate
of the Tribunal, 
Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in
particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian secu-
rity forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous
civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the Secretary-
General, the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes, 
Deeply concerned by the flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia
and Herzegovina and other European countries as a result of the use
of force in Kosovo, as well as by the increasing numbers of displaced
persons within Kosovo, and other parts of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, up to 50,000 of whom the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees has estimated are without shelter and
other basic necessities, 
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return
to their homes in safety, and underlining the responsibility of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for creating the conditions which allow
them to do so, 
Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in
pursuit of political goals by any group or individual, and all external
support for such activities in Kosovo, including the supply of arms 
and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo and expressing concern at
the reports of continuing violations of the prohibitions imposed by
resolution 1160 (1998), 
Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situa-
tion throughout Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian
catastrophe as described in the report of the Secretary-General, and
emphasizing the need to prevent this from happening, 
Deeply concerned also by reports of increasing violations of human
rights and of international humanitarian law, and emphasizing the need
to ensure that the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo are respected, 
Reaffirming the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the
Council expressed support for a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo
problem which would include an enhanced status for Kosovo, a 
substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-
administration, 
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Reaffirming also the commitment of all Member States to the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the
region, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Demands that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease
hostilities and maintain a ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which would enhance the prospects for a meaningful
dialogue between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Kosovo Albanian leadership and reduce the risks of a humani-
tarian catastrophe; 
2. Demands also that the authorities of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian leadership take immediate steps 
to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the impending
humanitarian catastrophe; 
3. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately into a 
meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with international
involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis
and to a negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo, and
welcomes the current efforts aimed at facilitating such a dialogue; 
4. Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in 
addition to the measures called for under resolution 1160 (1998),
implement immediately the following concrete measures towards
achieving a political solution to the situation in Kosovo as contained in
the Contact Group statement of 12 June 1998: 
(a) cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian
population and order the withdrawal of security units used for
civilian repression; 
(b) enable effective and continuous international monitoring in
Kosovo by the European Community Monitoring Mission and
diplomatic missions accredited to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, including access and complete freedom of movement
of such monitors to, from and within Kosovo unimpeded by
government authorities, and expeditious issuance of appropriate
travel documents to international personnel contributing to the
monitoring; 
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(c) facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the safe return
of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and allow free
and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies
to Kosovo; 
(d) make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue
referred to in paragraph 3 with the Kosovo Albanian community
called for in resolution 1160 (1998), with the aim of agreeing
confidence-building measures and finding a political solution to
the problems of Kosovo; 
5. Notes, in this connection, the commitments of the President of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in his joint statement with the
President of the Russian Federation of 16 June 1998: 
(a) to resolve existing problems by political means on the basis of
equality for all citizens and ethnic communities in Kosovo; 
(b) not to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful
population; 
(c) to provide full freedom of movement for and ensure that there
will be no restrictions on representatives of foreign States and
international institutions accredited to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia monitoring the situation in Kosovo; 
(d) to ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organi-
zations, the ICRC and the UNHCR, and delivery of humanitarian
supplies; 
(e) to facilitate the unimpeded return of refugees and displaced
persons under programmes agreed with the UNHCR and the
ICRC, providing State aid for the reconstruction of destroyed
homes, 
and calls for the full implementation of these commitments; 
6. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist
action, and emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovo Albanian
community should pursue their goals by peaceful means only; 
7. Recalls the obligations of all States to implement fully the prohibi-
tions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998); 
8. Endorses the steps taken to establish effective international monitor-
ing of the situation in Kosovo, and in this connection welcomes the
establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission; 
9. Urges States and international organizations represented in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to make available personnel to fulfil the
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responsibility of carrying out effective and continuous international
monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of this resolution and those
of resolution 1160 (1998) are achieved; 
10. Reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it has the primary
responsibility for the security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the safety and security of
all international and non-governmental humanitarian personnel in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and calls upon the authorities of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and all others concerned in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia to take all appropriate steps to ensure that
monitoring personnel performing functions under this resolution are
not subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind; 
11. Requests States to pursue all means consistent with their domestic
legislation and relevant international law to prevent funds collected on
their territory being used to contravene resolution 1160 (1998); 
12. Calls upon Member States and others concerned to provide
adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region and to
respond promptly and generously to the United Nations Consolidated
Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the
Kosovo Crisis; 
13. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
the leaders of the Kosovo Albanian community and all others
concerned to cooperate fully with the Prosecutor of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the investigation of possible
violations within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; 
14. Underlines also the need for the authorities of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia to bring to justice those members of the security forces
who have been involved in the mistreatment of civilians and the delib-
erate destruction of property; 
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular reports to the
Council as necessary on his assessment of compliance with this resolu-
tion by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and all
elements in the Kosovo Albanian community, including through his
regular reports on compliance with resolution 1160 (1998); 
16. Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution
and resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action
and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in
the region; 
17. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
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Statement
Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council
Brussels April 1999
1. The crisis in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the
values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, for which
NATO has stood since its foundation. We are united in our determi-
nation to overcome this challenge. 
2. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has repeatedly violated
United Nations Security Council resolutions. The unrestrained assault
by Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces, under the direc-
tion of President Milosevic, on Kosovar civilians has created a massive
humanitarian catastrophe which also threatens to destabilise the
surrounding region. Hundreds of thousands of people have been
expelled ruthlessly from Kosovo by the FRY authorities. We condemn
these appalling violations of human rights and the indiscriminate use 
of force by the Yugoslav government. These extreme and criminally
irresponsible policies, which cannot be defended on any grounds, have
made necessary and justify the military action by NATO. 
3. NATO’s military action against the FRY supports the political 
aims of the international community: a peaceful, multi-ethnic and
democratic Kosovo in which all its people can live in security and enjoy
universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis. In this context,
we welcome the statement of the UN Secretary-General of 9th April
and the EU Council Conclusions of 8th April. 
4. NATO’s air strikes will be pursued until President Milosevic accedes
to the demands of the international community. President Milosevic
knows what he has to do. He must: 
• ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate
ending of violence and repression; 
• ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and
paramilitary forces; 
• agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military
presence; 
• agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and
displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humani-
tarian aid organisations; 
• provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the
basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a 
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political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with
international law and the Charter of the United Nations. 
5. Responsibility for the present crisis lies with President Milosevic. He
has the power to bring a halt to NATO’s military action by accepting
and implementing irrevocably the legitimate demands of the interna-
tional community. 
6. We underline that NATO is not waging war against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. We have no quarrel with the people of the FRY
who for too long have been isolated in Europe because of the policies
of their government. 
7. We are grateful for the strong and material support we have received
from our Partners in the region and more widely in the international
community in responding to the crisis. 
8. The Alliance shares a common interest with Russia in reaching a
political solution to the crisis in Kosovo and wants to work construc-
tively with Russia, in the spirit of the Founding Act, to this end. 
9. As a result of President Milosevic’s sustained policy of ethnic cleans-
ing, hundreds of thousands of Kosovar people are seeking refuge in
neighbouring countries, particularly in Albania and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Others remain in Kosovo, destitute
and beyond the reach of international relief. These people in Kosovo
are struggling to survive under conditions of exhaustion, hunger and
desperation. We will hold President Milosevic and the Belgrade leader-
ship responsible for the well-being of all civilians in Kosovo. 
10. NATO and its members have responded promptly to this emer-
gency. We have activated with our Partners the Euro-Atlantic Disaster
Response Coordination Centre. NATO forces in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia have constructed emergency accommodation
for refugees and have cared for them. NATO troops are also being
deployed to Albania to support the humanitarian efforts there and to
assist the Albanian authorities in providing a secure environment for
them. We will sustain and intensify our refugee and humanitarian relief
operations in cooperation with the UNHCR, the lead agency in this
field. NATO-led refugee and humanitarian aid airlift operations for
both Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are
already under way and they will increase. The steps being taken by
NATO and the efforts of other international organisations and agen-
cies, including the European Union, are complementary and mutually
reinforcing. 
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11. We pay tribute to NATO’s servicemen and women whose
commitment and skill are ensuring the success of NATO’s military and
humanitarian operations. 
12. Atrocities against the people of Kosovo by FRY military, police 
and paramilitary forces violate international law. Those who are
responsible for the systematic campaign of violence and destruction
against innocent Kosovar civilians and for the forced deportation of
hundreds of thousands of refugees will be held accountable for their
actions. Those indicted must be brought before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague in
accordance with international law and the relevant resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council. Allies reaffirm there can be no
lasting peace without justice. 
13. NATO has repeatedly stated that it would be unacceptable if the
FRY were to threaten the territorial integrity, political independence
and security of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. We have consulted closely and at a high level with both
countries on their specific concerns. We will respond to any challenges
by the FRY to the security of Albania and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia stemming from the presence of NATO forces
and their activities on their territory. 
14. We are concerned over the situation in the Republic of
Montenegro. We reaffirm our support for the democratically elected
government of President Milo Djukanovic which has accepted tens of
thousands of displaced persons from Kosovo. President Milosevic
should be in no doubt that any move against President Djukanovic and
his government will have grave consequences. 
15. The Kosovo crisis underscores the need for a comprehensive
approach to the stabilisation of the crisis region in south-eastern
Europe and to the integration of the countries of the region into the
Euro-Atlantic community. We welcome the EU initiative for a Stability
Pact for South-Eastern Europe under the auspices of the OSCE, as
well as other regional efforts including the South Eastern Europe Co-
operation initiative. We are strengthening the security dialogue
between NATO and countries of the region with a view to building a
dynamic partnership with them and have tasked the Council in
Permanent Session to develop measures to this end. We look forward
to a time when the people of Serbia can re-establish normal relations
with all the peoples of the Balkans. We want all the countries of south-
eastern Europe to enjoy peace and security. 
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The Alliance’s Strategic Concept
Washington DC April 1999 (excerpts)
Introduction 
1. At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO
Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance’s new Strategic
Concept. 
2. NATO has successfully ensured the freedom of its members and
prevented war in Europe during the 40 years of the Cold War. By
combining defence with dialogue, it played an indispensable role in
bringing East-West confrontation to a peaceful end. The dramatic
changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of
the Cold War were reflected in the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept.
There have, however, been further profound political and security
developments since then. 
3. The dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but
also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks. A new
Europe of greater integration is emerging, and a Euro-Atlantic security
structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part. The Alliance
has been at the heart of efforts to establish new patterns of coopera-
tion and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region and
has committed itself to essential new activities in the interest of a wider
stability. It has shown the depth of that commitment in its efforts to
put an end to the immense human suffering created by conflict in the
Balkans. The years since the end of the Cold War have also witnessed
important developments in arms control, a process to which the
Alliance is fully committed. The Alliance’s role in these positive devel-
opments has been underpinned by the comprehensive adaptation of its
approach to security and of its procedures and structures. The last ten
years have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to
Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict,
economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. 
4. The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating 
and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting
current and future security challenges. It has, therefore, a demanding
agenda. It must safeguard common security interests in an environ-
ment of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collec-
tive defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance
192 THE KOSOVO CRISIS
Lat 08   23/4/03  7:04 pm  Page 192
that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It
must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession
of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the
military means required by the entire range of its missions. 
5. This new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance as it pursues this
agenda. It expresses NATO’s enduring purpose and nature and its
fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new
security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance’s broad
approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation
of its military forces. 
Part I – The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance 
6. NATO’s essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington
Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by
political and military means. Based on common values of democracy,
human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its
inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will
continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by
crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The
Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but
contributes to peace and stability in this region. 
7. The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of
North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the
practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in
support of their common interests. 
8. The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is
that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sover-
eign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its
members. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily
cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure that no
single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in
dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member
states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities
in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective
effort to realise their essential national security objectives. 
9. The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the
Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their
national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-
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Atlantic area. The Alliance does not seek these benefits for its members
alone, but is committed to the creation of conditions conducive to
increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who
share its broad political objectives. 
10. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations commit-
ted to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the
Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks: 
Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable
Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of demo-
cratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of
disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce
any other through the threat or use of force. 
Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington
Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations 
on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible devel-
opments posing risks for members’ security, and for appropriate co-
ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern. 
Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of
aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles
5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. 
And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic
area: 
• Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by
consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington
Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to
engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response
operations. 
• Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, coopera-
tion, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic
area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence
and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance. 
11. In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance
will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and
seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the
United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly inter-
national relations and support democratic institutions. The Alliance
does not consider itself to be any country’s adversary. 
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Part II – Strategic Perspectives 
The Evolving Strategic Environment
12. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change.
Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncer-
tainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises. Within
this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strength-
ening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its
growing political role; its increased political and military partnership,
cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia,
Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing open-
ness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other
international organisations; its commitment, exemplified in the
Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including
through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape
its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the
Euro-Atlantic area. 
13. In parallel, NATO has successfully adapted to enhance its ability to
contribute to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Internal reform has
included a new command structure, including the Combined Joint
Task Force (CJTF) concept, the creation of arrangements to permit
the rapid deployment of forces for the full range of the Alliance’s
missions, and the building of the European Security and Defence
Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. 
14. The United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the
Western European Union (WEU) have made distinctive contributions
to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Mutually reinforcing organisa-
tions have become a central feature of the security environment. 
15. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibil-
ity for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as 
such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the
Euro-Atlantic area. 
16. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the most inclusive secu-
rity organisation in Europe, which also includes Canada and the
United States, and plays an essential role in promoting peace and
stability, enhancing cooperative security, and advancing democracy and
human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly active in the fields
of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and
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post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have developed
close practical cooperation, especially with regard to the international
effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. 
17. The European Union has taken important decisions and given a
further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence
dimension. This process will have implications for the entire Alliance,
and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrange-
ments developed by NATO and the WEU. The development of a
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includes the progressive
framing of a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the
Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security
and defence policy established within the framework of the
Washington Treaty. Important steps taken in this context include the
incorporation of the WEU’s Petersberg tasks into the Treaty on
European Union and the development of closer institutional relations
with the WEU. 
18. As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reaffirmed in Berlin
in 1996, the Alliance fully supports the development of the European
Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance by making available
its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. To this end, the
Alliance and the WEU have developed a close relationship and put into
place key elements of the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. In order to
enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European
Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increas-
ing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and
capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defence
enhances the security environment of the Alliance. 
19. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of arma-
ments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and
non-proliferation agreements support NATO’s political and military
efforts to achieve its strategic objectives. The Allies have played a major
part in the significant achievements in this field. These include the
enhanced stability produced by the CFE Treaty, the deep reductions in
nuclear weapons provided for in the START treaties; the signature of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the indefinite and unconditional
extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the accession to it
of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as non-nuclear weapons states,
and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The
Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines and similar agree-
ments make an important contribution to alleviating human suffering.
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There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in
conventional weapons and with respect to nuclear, chemical, and
biological (NBC) weapons …
Part III – The Approach to Security in the 21st Century 
25. The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which
recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environ-
mental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This
broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its
fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to
develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic
organisations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to
build a European security architecture in which the Alliance’s contri-
bution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the
contribution of these other international organisations are comple-
mentary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among
Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the
essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for
agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commit-
ments of its members under the Washington Treaty. 
26. The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic
security and stability by: the preservation of the transatlantic link; the
maintenance of effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence
and defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions; the development
of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance; an
overall capability to manage crises successfully; its continued openness
to new members; and the continued pursuit of partnership, coopera-
tion, and dialogue with other nations as part of its co-operative
approach to Euro-Atlantic security, including in the field of arms
control and disarmament. 
The Transatlantic Link
27. NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between
Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they
share. The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisi-
ble. Thus the Alliance’s commitment to the indispensable transatlantic
link and the collective defence of its members is fundamental to its
credibility and to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. 
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The Maintenance of Alliance Military Capabilities 
28. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear
preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central
to the Alliance’s security objectives. Such a capability, together with
political solidarity, remains at the core of the Alliance’s ability to
prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that
military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived
as an option with any prospect of success. 
29. Military capabilities effective under the full range of foreseeable
circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance’s ability to contribute to
conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis
response operations. These missions can be highly demanding and can
place a premium on the same political and military qualities, such as
cohesion, multinational training, and extensive prior planning, that
would be essential in an Article 5 situation. Accordingly, while they
may pose special requirements, they will be handled through a
common set of Alliance structures and procedures. 
The European Security and Defence Identity
30. The Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defence of
its members and through which common security objectives will be
pursued wherever possible, remains committed to a balanced and
dynamic transatlantic partnership. The European Allies have taken
decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the secu-
rity and defence field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the
Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security of all Allies. On the basis of
decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the
European Security and Defence Identity will continue to be developed
within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between
NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union.
It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effec-
tive contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an
expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transat-
lantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by them-
selves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a
case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities
available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily
under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU
or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all
European Allies if they were so to choose. 
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Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management
31. In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and
enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental 
security tasks, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organisa-
tions, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its
effective management, consistent with international law, including
through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response
operations. The Alliance’s preparedness to carry out such operations
supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability
and often involves the participation of NATO’s Partners. NATO recalls
its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case 
basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other
operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the
responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance
resources and expertise. In this context NATO recalls its subsequent
decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans.
Taking into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion,
participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to
decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions. 
32. NATO will make full use of partnership, cooperation and dialogue
and its links to other organisations to contribute to preventing crises
and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage. A coherent
approach to crisis management, as in any use of force by the Alliance,
will require the Alliance’s political authorities to choose and co-
ordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and 
military measures and to exercise close political control at all stages … 
36. Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the
framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia have committed them-
selves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest,
reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace 
in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and 
co-operative security. NATO and Russia have agreed to give concrete
substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and
undivided Europe. A strong, stable and enduring partnership between
NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-
Atlantic area … 
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Enlargement
39. The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 of 
the Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further invitations in
coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities
and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that 
the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and
strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and 
cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability. To this
end, NATO has established a programme of activities to assist aspiring
countries in their preparations for possible future membership in the
context of its wider relationship with them. No European democratic
country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will
be excluded from consideration … 
Part V – Conclusion 
65. As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be
ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The
Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and
sets out its fundamental security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO
to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting 
security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to
democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic
Concept will govern the Alliance’s security and defence policy, its 
operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its
collective defence arrangements, and will be kept under review in the
light of the evolving security environment. In an uncertain world the
need for effective defence remains, but in reaffirming this commitment
the Alliance will also continue making full use of every opportunity to
help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the
vision of a Europe whole and free. 
The Treaty on European Union 
Maastricht December 1991 (excerpt)
The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security
policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of
which shall be:
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• To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, inde-
pendence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the
principles of the United Nations Charter;
• To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
• To preserve peace and strengthen international security;
• To promote international cooperation;
• To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions
relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing
of a common defence policy … which might lead to a common
defence, should the European Council so decide … The Western
European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the
Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability …
Western European Union Petersberg Declaration
Bonn June 1992 (excerpt)
Apart from contributing to the common defence … military units of
WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be
employed for:
• Humanitarian and rescue tasks;
• Peacekeeping tasks;
• Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-
making.
A Planning Cell will be established … The Planning Cell will be
responsible for preparing contingency plans for the employment of
forces under WEU auspices [and] preparing recommendations for the
necessary command, control and communication arrangements …
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council
Berlin June 1996 (excerpt)
The Alliance will support the development of the E[uropean] S[ecurity
and] D[efence] I[dentity] within NATO by conducting, at the request
of and in coordination with the WEU, military planning and exercises
for illustrative WEU missions identified by the WEU.
As an essential element of the development of this identity, we will
prepare, with the involvement of NATO and the WEU, for WEU-led
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operations (including planning and exercising of command elements
and forces). Such preparations within the Alliance should take into
account the participation, including in European command arrange-
ments, of all European Allies if they were so to choose …
Joint Declaration issued at the British–French Summit
St Malo December 1998 (excerpt)
The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on
the international stage … To this end, the Union must have the capac-
ity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the
means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to
respond to international crises.
In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve
military action where the [NATO] Alliance as a whole is not engaged,
the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for
analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for rele-
vant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking
account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its rela-
tions with the EU … 
An Alliance for the 21st Century: 
[NATO] Washington Summit Communiqué
Washington DC April 1999 (excerpt)
We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capac-
ity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve
military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. As this
process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the develop-
ment of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency,
building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU.
We therefore stand ready to define and adopt the necessary arrange-
ments for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets
and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as
a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance …
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Presidency Conclusions
Cologne European Council
June 1999 (excerpt)
In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and
the progressive framing of a common defence policy, we are convinced
that the [European] Council should have the ability to take decisions
on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks
defined in the Treaty on European Union, the ‘Petersberg tasks’ …
We are now determined to launch a new step in the construction
of the European Union. To this end we task the General Affairs
Council to prepare the conditions and the measures necessary to
achieve these objectives, including the definition of the modalities for
the inclusion of those functions of the WEU which will be necessary
for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg
tasks …
Presidency Conclusions
Helsinki European Council
December 1999 (excerpt)
The European Council underlines its determination to develop an
autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is
not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in
response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary
duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army …
Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European
Council … the European Council has agreed in particular the follow-
ing: cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States
must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least
1 year military forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons capable of the
full range of Petersberg tasks. New political and military bodies and
structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union
to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to
such operations …
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NATO–Russia Relations: A New Quality
Russia-NATO Summit
Rome May 2002
At the start of the 21st century we live in a new, closely interrelated
world, in which unprecedented new threats and challenges demand
increasingly united responses. Consequently, we, the member states of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation are
today opening a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing our
ability to work together in areas of common interest and to stand
together against common threats and risks to our security. As partici-
pants of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and
Security, we reaffirm the goals, principles and commitments set forth
therein, in particular our determination to build together a lasting and
inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democ-
racy and cooperative security and the principle that the security of all
states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible. We are convinced
that a qualitatively new relationship between NATO and the Russian
Federation will constitute an essential contribution in achieving this
goal. In this context, we will observe in good faith our obligations
under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and
principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter
for European Security.
Building on the Founding Act and taking into account the initia-
tive taken by our Foreign Ministers, as reflected in their statement of 7
December 2001, to bring together NATO member states and Russia
to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at twenty, we
hereby establish the NATO-Russia Council. In the framework of the
NATO-Russia Council, NATO member states and Russia will work as
equal partners in areas of common interest. The NATO-Russia
Council will provide a mechanism for consultation, consensus-build-
ing, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states
of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-
Atlantic region.
The NATO-Russia Council will serve as the principal structure and
venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia. It
will operate on the principle of consensus. It will work on the basis of
a continuous political dialogue on security issues among its members
with a view to early identification of emerging problems, determina-
tion of optimal common approaches and the conduct of joint actions,
as appropriate. The members of the NATO-Russia Council, acting in
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their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respec-
tive collective commitments and obligations, will take joint decisions
and will bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their
implementation. Each member may raise in the NATO-Russia Council
issues related to the implementation of joint decisions.
The NATO-Russia Council will be chaired by the Secretary
General of NATO. It will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at
the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and at the level of Heads
of State and Government as appropriate. Meetings of the Council at
Ambassadorial level will be held at least once a month, with the possi-
bility of more frequent meetings as needed, including extraordinary
meetings, which will take place at the request of any Member or the
NATO Secretary General.
To support and prepare the meetings of the Council a Preparatory
Committee is established, at the level of the NATO Political
Committee, with Russian representation at the appropriate level. The
Preparatory Committee will meet twice monthly, or more often if
necessary. The NATO-Russia Council may also establish committees or
working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad
hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate. Such committees and working
groups will draw upon the resources of existing NATO committees.
Under the auspices of the Council, military representatives and
Chiefs of Staff will also meet. Meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place
no less than twice a year, meetings at military representatives level at
least once a month, with the possibility of more frequent meetings as
needed. Meetings of military experts may be convened as appropriate.
The NATO-Russia Council, replacing the NATO-Russia
Permanent Joint Council, will focus on all areas of mutual interest
identified in Section III of the Founding Act, including the provision
to add other areas by mutual agreement. The work programmes for
2002 agreed in December 2001 for the PJC and its subordinate bodies
will continue to be implemented under the auspices and rules of the
NATO-Russia Council. NATO member states and Russia will continue
to intensify their cooperation in areas including the struggle against
terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and
confidence-building measures, theatre missile defence, search and
rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, and civil emergencies.
This cooperation may complement cooperation in other fora. As initial
steps in this regard, we have today agreed to pursue the following
cooperative efforts: 
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• Struggle Against Terrorism: strengthen cooperation through a
multi-faceted approach, including joint assessments of the terror-
ist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area, focused on specific threats, for
example, to Russian and NATO forces, to civilian aircraft, or to
critical infrastructure; an initial step will be a joint assessment of
the terrorist threat to NATO, Russia and Partner peacekeeping
forces in the Balkans. 
• Crisis Management: strengthen cooperation, including through:
regular exchanges of views and information on peacekeeping oper-
ations, including continuing cooperation and consultations on the
situation in the Balkans; promoting interoperability between
national peacekeeping contingents, including through joint or
coordinated training initiatives; and further development of a
generic concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. 
• Non-Proliferation: broaden and strengthen cooperation against
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the
means of their delivery, and contribute to strengthening existing
non-proliferation arrangements through: a structured exchange of
views, leading to a joint assessment of global trends in proliferation
of nuclear, biological and chemical agents; and exchange of 
experience with the goal of exploring opportunities for intensified
practical cooperation on protection from nuclear, biological and
chemical agents. 
• Arms Control and Confidence-Building Measures: recalling the
contributions of arms control and confidence- and security-
building measures (CSBMs) to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area
and reaffirming adherence to the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) as a cornerstone of European security,
work cooperatively toward ratification by all the States Parties and
entry into force of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE
Treaty, which would permit accession by non-CFE states; continue
consultations on the CFE and Open Skies Treaties; and continue
the NATO-Russia nuclear experts consultations. 
• Theatre Missile Defence: enhance consultations on theatre missile
defence (TMD), in particular on TMD concepts, terminology,
systems and system capabilities, to analyse and evaluate possible
levels of interoperability among respective TMD systems, and
explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation, includ-
ing joint training and exercises. 
• Search and Rescue at Sea: monitor the implementation of the
NATO-Russia Framework Document on Submarine Crew Rescue,
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and continue to promote cooperation, transparency and confi-
dence between NATO and Russia in the area of search and rescue
at sea. 
• Military-to-Military Cooperation and Defence Reform: pursue
enhanced military-to-military cooperation and interoperability
through enhanced joint training and exercises and the conduct 
of joint demonstrations and tests; explore the possibility of estab-
lishing an integrated NATO-Russia military training centre for
missions to address the challenges of the 21st century; enhance
cooperation on defence reform and its economic aspects, includ-
ing conversion. 
• Civil Emergencies: pursue enhanced mechanisms for future
NATO-Russia cooperation in responding to civil emergencies.
Initial steps will include the exchange of information on recent
disasters and the exchange of WMD consequence management
information. 
• New Threats and Challenges: In addition to the areas enumerated
above, explore possibilities for confronting new challenges and
threats to the Euro-Atlantic area in the framework of the activities
of the NATO Committee on Challenges to Modern Society
(CCMS); initiate cooperation in the field of civil and military
airspace controls; and pursue enhanced scientific cooperation. 
The members of the NATO-Russia Council will work with a view to
identifying further areas of cooperation.
UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) (excerpts) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting on 10 June
1999
The Security Council,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council
for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998)
of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239
(1999) of 14 May 1999,
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Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the require-
ments of these resolutions,
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well
as all terrorist acts by any party,
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April
1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in
Kosovo,
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return
to their homes in safety,
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo
crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolu-
tion) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper
presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to 
this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to
that paper,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and
annex 2,
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy
and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security,
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel
and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under
the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based
on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the
principles and other required elements in annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of
the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1
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above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put
an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo,
and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo 
of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security
presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav
and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to
Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations
auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate
equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implemen-
tation of the international civil presence, and further requests the
Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate
closely with the international security presence to ensure that both
presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive
manner;
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations
to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in
point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities
under paragraph 9 below;
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective inter-
national civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the
parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence
to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing
the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police
and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other
armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and
displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil
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presence can operate, a transitional administration can be estab-
lished, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;
(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil
presence can take responsibility for this task;
(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can,
as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the
work of the international civil presence;
(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself,
the international civil presence, and other international organiza-
tions;
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant
international organizations, to establish an international civil presence
in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo
under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide tran-
sitional administration while establishing and overseeing the develop-
ment of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil pres-
ence will include:
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full
account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords …
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as
long as required;
(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government
pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its adminis-
trative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consol-
idation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other
peace-building activities;
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s
future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords …
(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from
Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under
a political settlement;
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other
economic reconstruction;
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(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian
organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local
police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of interna-
tional police personnel to serve in Kosovo;
(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and
displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief opera-
tions, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded
access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate
with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery
of international aid;
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to
contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe
return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context
the importance of convening an international donors’ conference,
particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the
earliest possible date;
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the interna-
tional security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia;
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups
end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the require-
ments for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international
security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General;
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution
1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of
the international civil and security presences;
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other inter-
national organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the
economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the
Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order
to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability
and regional cooperation;
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the imple-
mentation of all aspects of this resolution;
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19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are estab-
lished for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless
the Security Council decides otherwise;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular
intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports
from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences,
the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this
resolution;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
Cologne June 1999 (excerpts)
II Principles and Norms
5. We solemnly reaffirm our commitment to all the principles and
norms enshrined in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the
Charter of Paris, the 1990 Copenhagen Document and other OSCE
documents, and, as applicable, to the full implementation of relevant
UN Security Council Resolutions, the relevant conventions of the
Council of Europe and the General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a view to promoting good neigh-
bourly relations. 
6. In our endeavours, we will build upon bilateral and multilateral
agreements on good neighbourly relations concluded by States in the
region participating in the Pact, and will seek the conclusion of such
agreements where they do not exist. They will form an essential
element of the Stability Pact. 
7. We reaffirm that we are accountable to our citizens and responsible
to one another for respect for OSCE norms and principles and for the
implementation of our commitments. We also reaffirm that commit-
ments with respect to the human dimension undertaken through our
membership in the OSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern
to all States participating in the Stability Pact, and do not belong 
exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned. Respect for
these commitments constitutes one of the foundations of international
order, to which we intend to make a substantial contribution. 
8. We take note that countries in the region participating in the
Stability Pact commit themselves to continued democratic and
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economic reforms, as elaborated in paragraph 10, as well as bilateral
and regional cooperation amongst themselves to advance their 
integration, on an individual basis, into Euro-Atlantic structures. The 
EU Member States and other participating countries and international
organisations and institutions commit themselves to making every
effort to assist them to make speedy and measurable progress along
this road. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every partici-
pating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements,
including treaties of alliance as they evolve. Each participating State
will respect the rights of all others in this regard. They will not
strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. 
III Objectives
9. The Stability Pact aims at strengthening countries in South Eastern
Europe in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human
rights and economic prosperity, in order to achieve stability in the
whole region. Those countries in the region who seek integration into
Euro-Atlantic structures, alongside a number of other participants in
the Pact, strongly believe that the implementation of this process will
facilitate their objective. 
10. To that end we pledge to cooperate towards: 
• preventing and putting an end to tensions and crises as a prereq-
uisite for lasting stability. This includes concluding and imple-
menting among ourselves multilateral and bilateral agreements
and taking domestic measures to overcome the existing potential
for conflict; 
• bringing about mature democratic political processes, based on
free and fair elections, grounded in the rule of law and full respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights
of persons belonging to national minorities, the right to free and
independent media, legislative branches accountable to their
constituents, independent judiciaries, combating corruption,
deepening and strengthening of civil society; 
• creating peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region
through strict observance of the principles of the Helsinki Final
Act, confidence building and reconciliation, encouraging work 
in the OSCE and other fora on regional confidence building 
measures and mechanisms for security cooperation; 
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• preserving the multinational and multiethnic diversity of countries
in the region, and protecting minorities; 
• creating vibrant market economies based on sound macro policies,
markets open to greatly expanded foreign trade and private sector
investment, effective and transparent customs and commercial/
regulatory regimes, developing strong capital markets and diversi-
fied ownership, including privatisation, leading to a widening
circle of prosperity for all our citizens; 
• fostering economic cooperation in the region and between the
region and the rest of Europe and the world, including free trade
areas; 
• promoting unimpeded contacts among citizens; 
• combatting organised crime, corruption and terrorism and all
criminal and illegal activities; 
• preventing forced population displacement caused by war, perse-
cution and civil strife as well as migration generated by poverty; 
• ensuring the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced
persons to their homes, while assisting the countries in the region
by sharing the burden imposed upon them; 
• creating the conditions, for countries of South Eastern Europe, for
full integration into political, economic and security structures of
their choice … 
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